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During the course of the Second World War the small,
traditionally conservative pre-war Regular Army absorbed
some three million new recruits, the vast majority of
them conscripts. The objective of the thesis is to assess
the impact of this process on the Army as a social
institution. In order to achieve this, six areas of the
Army's social organization have been examined: other rank
selection, officer selection, promotion, officer-man
relations, welfare and education.
The results of research show that the Army did change in
relation to its new intake. It became an institution
seemingly more careful of human values, more responsive
to the needs and aspirations of the ordinary soldier, and
more democratic in spirit. Yet traditionalist elements in
the Army remained unconvinced of new methods and
techniques, and tempered their application in a number of
the areas investigated. Change there was, but not perhaps
as deep-seated as some might have hoped.
ii
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
This thesis, and the research recorded in it,




I would like to take this opportunity to thank the staffs
of Edinburgh University Library, the National Library of
Scotland, the Public Record Office, the Imperial War
Museum, the Ministry of Defence Whitehall Library, the
Prince Consort's Army Library, the Liddell Hart Centre
for Military Archives and the Tom Harrisson Mass-
Observation Archive, for their unfailing courtesy and
helpfulness. I also wish to thank the many old soldiers
who related their experiences to me, and in particular to
Mr. Jack Davies, Mr. Bernard Ungerson and Dr. Boris
Semeonoff for commenting on draft chapters. My gratitude
is further due to my supervisors, Dr. Paul Addison and
Mr. Terry Cole, for their advice, support and friendship,
and to the Economic and Social Research Council for








2. OTHER RANK SELECTION 5
3. OFFICER SELECTION 42
4. PROMOTION 93







with love and thanks
1. INTRODUCTION
Over recent years academic study of the British Army has
come to focus not just on the campaigns and battles it
has fought, but increasingly on how it organizes itself
as a social institution. Indeed, the work of historians
such as Hew Strachan, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, Alan Skelley,
Edward Spiers, Ian Beckett and Keith Simpson have given
us new insights into the Army's function in this respect,
from the early Victorian age through to the First World
War.1 There has though been little detailed study of the
British Army during the Second World War in these terms,
and this thesis attempts to fill that gap.
On the eve of the Second World War the small, peacetime
Regular Army of some 220,000 men was still in many ways
an intensely conservative social institution. Certainly,
under Leslie Hore-Belisha, who became Secretary of State
for War in May 1937, some changes had taken place. Faced
with a recruiting crisis in the 1930s which was conceived
as being in large part due to the continuing archaic
nature of military life, efforts were made to improve the
1
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terms and conditions of service and to make the Army a
more attractive career prospect for its officers and
men.2 Yet the Army was to remain an essentially inward-
looking organization which shared few of the
values of the civilian society it served. As one young
journalist, William Shebbeare, was to observe on joining
the Service in 1939: "The present-day army lacks every
one of those characteristics of a democratic army."3
During the Second World War, and for the second time in
the century, this institution was forced to absorb a
generation of civilians into its ranks. With the threat
of war looming, in May 1939 the Military Training Act was
introduced which required all men of twenty years to
undergo six months training in the Forces. On the
outbreak of war in September this was superseded by the
National Service (Armed Forces) Act which imposed a
liability to military service on all males between
eighteen and forty-one for the duration of the emergency.
Whilst voluntary recruitment continued to play an
important subsidiary role, between 1939 and 1945 the
Army absorbed nearly three million men, three-quarters of
2R. J. Minney The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (London:
Collins, 1950), pp. 39-40; Brian Bond, "Leslie Hore-Belisha at
the War Office," in Politicians and Defence. Studies in the
Fomilatim of British Defence Policy 1845-1970, eds. Ian F. W.
Beckett and John Gooch (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1981), pp. 117-118, 121, 129.
3Captain X [William G. C. Shebbeare], A Soldier Lodes Ahead
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 1944).
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whom were conscripts.4 Drawn from all occupational groups
and social backgrounds, generally better educated than
their forefathers of the First World War, more critical
of those in authority and less convinced of war's
contribution to society, the military authorities were
confronted with the task of moulding these civilians in
uniform into an effective fighting force. It was, in the
words of one wartime soldier, "a fascinating human
problem."5
The objective of this thesis is to seek to assess the
impact of this process of integration on the Army as a
social institution. In order to do this, six major areas
of the Army's social organization will be examined: other
rank selection, officer selection, promotion, officer-man
relations, welfare and education. In so doing the degree
to which the Army changed in relation to its new intake
will be assessed, what the nature and extent of any
change that took place actually was; and how different
the Army of 1945 was from that of 1939. Moreover, in a
wider context, some conclusions can be drawn about the
relationship between the Army and society and the impact
of war on society which continue to be areas of much
4
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debate.
It must also be noted that this thesis refers very
largely to the Army at home, since that was where the
bulk of it was stationed for most of the war. Indeed, it
was not until after D.Day that the majority of the Army
was overseas, and even by the end of the war over a
million men out of a total of nearly three million were
still serving at home.6 The experience of the average
wartime soldier was not one of "daring deeds at the sharp
end, " but rather of a sedentary existence in a camp or
depot somewhere in Britain, cleaning his boots and
wondering why he was there.
6W0 163/48, War Office Progress Report, A.E.25., June 1940; WO
163/51, War Office Progress Report, A.C./G( 42)34., September
1942; WO 163/53, War Office Progress Report, A.C./G(44)38.,
September, 1944; WO 163/54, War Office Progress Report,
A.C./G(45)6., March 1945.
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2. OTHER RANK SELECTION
One of the major problems the Army faced as a result of
its great expansion related to the selection of recruits
for the wide range and variety of occupations implicit in
any modern military machine. During the period of
conscription in the First World War some preliminary
sifting of recruits had taken place. In 1916 the new
Directorate of Organization at the War Office issued
instructions to those who allocated soldiers to jobs to
use each man's experience and abilities to good
advantage.1 However, the Army had always been, and would
remain in the post-war era, a volunteer force and as such
recruits were posted more or less in accordance with
their wishes. There was no really rational system of
personnel selection.
Moreover, despite poor manpower planning and misplacement
during 1914-18,2 the recommendations of the post-war
Southborough Committee which called for action to be
taken to prevent temperamentally unsuitable men from
joining the Service,3 and the advances made by the
1
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American and German Armies in scientific selection
methods, the British Army made little progress in this
field. Medical entry standards were relaxed and the
maximum age of enlistment raised by Hore-Belisha in 1937
in an effort to improve the poor levels of recruitment.5
Yet apart from a few limited experiments within
individual Corps, little attention was paid to selection.
Peacetime soldiers on long-term engagements, it was
considered, had plenty of training time to become fully
adept in their chosen Arms.6 Indeed, when in April 1939,
as a result of the announcement by the Ministry of
Pensions of restricted provision for the wartime victims
of neurosis, a psychiatrist, Dr. J. R. Rees, and
psychologist, Alec Rodger, submitted a fairly complete
scientific selection scheme to the War Office drawing on
results of research in industrial psychology, it was
rejected.7 The War Office may have had more pressing
matters on its mind,8 the stresses of war may not have
4Cyril Burt, "Psychology in Wartime," The Spectator 169 (August
1942), pp. 166-167; Philip E. Vernon and John B. Parry,
Personnel Selection in the British Forces (London: University of
London Press, 1949), p. 17-23.
5R. J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (London:
Collins, 1960), pp. 43, 46.
5W0 277/19, Ungerson, p. 2.
7
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been adequately forseen,9 but it was also clear that
vocational psychology was not held in high esteem by the
Army authorities, nor within government circles.10 On the
contrary, the selection scheme adopted at the beginning
of the war was, to a very large extent, ad hoc.
The administrative machinery having been put in place
from the Spring of 1939 during the period of the Military
Training Act, men liable to be called up for service
under the wartime National Service Act were required to
register at one of the local offices of the Ministry of
Labour and National Service. There each man was required
to furnish certain personal information as an aid to
placement, and could express a preference for one of the
Services although no guarantees could be given.
After the initial sorting of registration, men who were
not reserved for industry or granted deferment were
summoned to a medical examination at a Recruiting Centre.
Each man was graded according to fitness for service and
then interviewed by the Recruiting Officer of the Service
he hoped, or was destined, to join. If a man was
interviewed for the Army he had the chance to put forward
his views on the Corps or Arm he wished to serve with,
and on his own relevant qualifications and abilities.
9Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Adam Papers
[hereafter Adam], Adam VIII, typescript narrative by Gen. Sir
Ronald Adam cn "Various Administrative Aspects of the Army
during the Second World War," 1963, chap. 2, pp. 1, 12.
10
Vernon and Parry, pp. 23-24.
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Once the interview was completed the officer recorded his
remarks and recommendations for posting, taking into
account a man's preferences, age, physical and mental
capabilities, civilian occupation and experience. Men
with certain kinds of skills were earmarked for one of
the many service trades.
The Recruiting Officer's recommendations were then
forwarded to the Regional Offices of the Ministry of
Labour and National Service, who endeavoured to post men
to Corps or regiments in accordance with War Office
manpower requirements, and as far as possible associated
with a recruit's home locality. In the first instance,
men were posted to appropriate Corps or Regimental
Training Units to undergo between eight and twenty-two
weeks of Corps training depending on the Corps, before
being posted to a unit or battalion.11
The procedure by which a volunteer was initiated into the
Army followed similar lines. A volunteer registered his
name at either a local office of the Ministry of Labour
and National Service or at a Recruiting Centre and was
interviewed by the Recruiting Officer in the same way as
those liable under the National Service Act. He was
posted, as far as possible, in accordance with his
11
Ministry of labour and National Service. Report for: the Years
1939-6, Qnd. 7225 (September 1947), pt. 1, pp. 12, 21, 26; H.
M. D. Parker, Manpower. A Study of War-time Policy and




Under this existing system, then, a man's future role in
the Army was, by and large, defined by an interviewing
officer after a short meeting with the recruit. In this
sense it was based on the system that had selected and
allocated regular volunteers in peacetime.
It was crucial, particularly in view of the pressing
time factor that came to dominate every military task,
that the Army efficiently used its limited manpower
resources. In this respect it faced two particular
problems. In the first instance, it had to place in
suitable employment a large number of dull and backward
men. Not only were large numbers of able men reserved in
industry or claimed by the Civil Defence Services, but
the Navy and R.A.F. proved to be more popular
preferences, and with their more stringent entry
requirements were able to take what seemed to them the
best material. The Army, having the largest manpower
requirements and able only to reject the medically
unfit, thus absorbed a relatively higher proportion of
less able recruits.
At the same time it had to make the very best use of its
more able recruits. Modern warfare had vastly increased
the Army's demand for soldiers of high intelligence and
12
Parliamentary Debates (Ccmmcns), 5th series, vol. 352 (1936-39),
col. 346.
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education to fill its more technical jobs. About one
quarter of all troops were employed as tradesmen, whilst
perhaps as many more did work which called for particular
skills. Competing demands ensured that the Army was
nearly always short of skilled manpower. This meant that
the Army had always to be on the look out for men with
the capacity to be trained from scratch.
However, during the early years of the war the existing
selection and allocation system came to be seen as
increasingly inadequate in these respects. There were a
number of inherent weaknesses. Primarily, there was no
detailed record of the range of employments within the
Army, nor of the aptitudes and temperamental
characteristics necessary to carry them out
satisfactorily, a problem complicated by the fact that
few military occupations had a direct civilian
equivalent.
In addition, there was no comprehensive assessment of how
a man could be most efficiently employed and placed
within the framework of Army employments, or indeed
whether he could be suitably employed at all. There was
no thorough mental examination of recruits on intake, and
the Recruiting Officer's interview could only partially
reveal a man's general capacity to learn, his specific
abilities and his personality traits. In practice the
interview tended to be even more unsatisfactory.
Recruiting Officers were not trained in the art of
10
interviewing, nor were there any guidelines to ensure
information could be interpreted and applied uniformly.
Furthermore, under the existing system recruits were
recommended for and allocated to a Corps or regiment.
There was, however, a very wide range of jobs to be done
in each Corps. The Royal Engineers, for example, needed
not only skilled mechanical tradesmen but drivers,
storekeepers, clerks and domestic staff. To recommend a
man to a Corps was thus to make no recommendation as to
the type of work he should undertake.13
The problem was compounded by the fact that if a man was
misplaced the machinery of transfer was complicated. The
loyalty of both men and commanding officers was often, in
the first instance, a loyalty to their particular Corps
or regiments, and with their strong local associations
and sectional interests this inevitably set up
obstacles.14
Admittedly, some efforts were made to classify recruits
at the training stage. In late 1939 Anti-Aircraft Command
accepted an offer from Professor Frederick Bartlett, a
13
WO 277/19, Ungerscn, pp. 4-8; War Office Directorate for
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Management Congress, (Stockholm, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 451-452.
14
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A.C.M.(A. E.)17., 21 August 1940.
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psychologist from Cambridge University, to design tests
to allot soldiers to the most appropriate duties in gun
teams. In the Summer of 1940, at the suggestion of the
Medical Research Council, Eric Farmer, another
psychologist from Cambridge University, was charged by
the Director of Military Training with the task of
devising tests for all intakes to training and field
units within Home Commands. These were designed to
accelerate training and identify potential specialists,
and those who scored poorly were referred to Army
psychiatrists.1
Although useful experiments, these initiatives could not
remedy the inherent weaknesses in the system. With no
military branch appointed to act as executive, the
effective employment of the tests relied upon the
cooperation of commanding officers which was not always
forthcoming. Moreover, the selection technique had
limited possibilities as a manpower weapon unless all
recruits could be posted from the beginning of their Army
careers on the basis of the results.16
Concern amongst the military authorities grew. From the
Spring of 1940 Lieutenant-Colonel G. R. Hargreaves, the
Command Psychiatrist, Northern Command, carried out a
number of experiments amongst training units in his area.
15WO 277/19, Ungerson, p. 9; Ahrenfeldt, pp. 36-37.
16W0 277/19, Ungerson, pp. 9-10.
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The results revealed not only the value of tests in
placing men in jobs best suited to them, but also a
catalogue of existing misplacement which, it was
estimated, would be evident in every training centre and
field unit in the Army. In January 1941 Hargreaves
submitted a memorandum to the command authorities,
entitled "Notes on the Efficient Use of Manpower," and in
March another, "The Selection and Allocation of Army
Personnel." In these papers he outlined the results of
his investigations and recommended that testing should be
carried out before recruits were allocated to Corps, and
that both the testing and disposal of recruits be placed
under the control of a special War Office department.17
This work enjoyed the full support of the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command,
Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam, a regular officer who
had risen to high rank during the inter-war years and had
commanded the Third Army Corps at Dunkirk, but a man
unusually open to new ideas and methods. In October 1940
he had written to the War Office that it was important
that the Army, as the greatest single employer of
labour, should appreciate the value of testing in the
same way that industrial undertakings and the Ministry of
Labour had done in recent years, and in the early months
of 1941 he made several representations to the War Office
17Ahrenfeldt, pp. 37-38.
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on the basis of Hargreaves' documents.18
As a result of these promptings a committee of
psychologists was appointed by the War Office in the
Spring to inquire into the matter. Under the chairmanship
of the Director-General Army Medical Services, it
included Professor J. Drever, Dr. C. S. Myers and Dr. S.
J. F. Philpott, and was later joined by Professor C. Burt
and Professor Bartlett.19
At the end of May 1941 General Adam left Northern Command
to become Adjutant-General at the War Office, thus
assuming responsibility for selection matters. In June he
submitted a paper to the Executive Committee of the Army
Council (E.C.A.C.) which outlined just how inefficiently
the Army was using its manpower resources. On the basis
of the tests conducted in Northern Command, it was
estimated that 4% of all intakes were useless for
training as soldiers, 20% of every infantry intake and
50% of every Tank Regiment intake had not the
intelligence for full efficiency in the Corps to which
they had been posted, and 20% of every infantry intake
and 50% of every Pioneer Corps intake were capable of
efficient service in a more skilled Arm than the one to
which they had been assigned.20
18
Ibid.
19WO 277/19, Uhgerscn, p. 12.
20WO 163/84, "Selection Tests for the Army," Memorandum by A.G.,
E.C.A.C./P(41)4., 7 June 1941.
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The situation was further complicated by the fact that
the war as it developed made it necessary for the Army to
change its major effort, at relatively short notice, from
one type of warfare to another, or from defensive to
offensive action, which meant modifying the ratios of
different Corps within the Service. Under the existing
arrangements there was no means of comprehensively
varying the distribution of recruits entering the Army in
accordance with specific demands, nor was there the means
of efficiently converting units to new roles, since it
was largely a matter of conjecture as to whether a
soldier could successfully adapt to a new job. With the
Army at this stage converting in order to expand its
armoured formations, it was thus additionally important
that selection be improved.21
Moreover, not only did this misplacement have obvious
implications for operational efficiency, but also for
morale. Often men tended to become maladjusted either
through feelings of inferiority or frustration. As two
Army psychiatrists recorded:
It had been expected that there would be
psychiatric casualties arising from the stress of
active service but what had not been foreseen was
the extent of the psychiatric breakdown rate
during training amongst those who had no
experience of action. It became apparent that one
of the most important causes of difficulty in
adjustment to the Army was the unsuitable
21D.S.P. , p. 451.
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employment within the Army itself. A large number
of soldiers were occupied in work which was
either above or below their capacity and, in
either case, dissatisfaction, poor morale and
even breakdown were apt to follow.
The concern amongst the military authorities was set
against a background of growing discontent within
civilian circles. During the Summer of 1941 the Select
Committee on National Expenditure was inquiring into the
allocation of manpower to the Army, and the Ministry of
Labour and National Service appointed Sir William
Beveridge to investigate the use of skilled manpower in
the Services, with particular emphasis on engineering
skills. Criticism of the arbitrary methods employed by
the Army was reflected in a stream of parliamentary
questions23 and comment in the press. "I frequently read
that this is a technician's war," wrote one frustrated
soldier, "but it appears that the qualities required of a
soldier are no different from those required in the days
of Waterloo."24
Clearly, some reform of the selection and allocation
system was necessary. In his paper to the E.C.A.C. in
2 2
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Psychotherapy (New York, 1945), p. 444.
2 3
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 359 (1939-40),
col. 27; Ibid., vol. 359 (1939-40), cols. 811-812; Ibid., vol.
368 (1940-41), cols. 1202-1203; Ibid., vol. 369 (1940-41), cols.
509-510; Ibid., vol. 371 (1940-41), cols. 675-676.
2 4
Sapper, "Wasted Talent," The Spectator 165 (September 1940), p.
294.
16
June 1941 Adam argued:
The British Army is wasting its man-power in
this war almost as badly as it did in the last
war. A man is posted to a Corps almost entirely
on the demand of the moment and without any
effort at personal selection by proper tests....
If we are to beat the Germans we must
overhaul the whole system at once. The only way
to obtain an efficient and contented Army is to
place the right man^5as far as humanely possible,
in the right place.
To remedy the problem, he recommended that the Army adopt
psychological testing procedures. Ideally, he stressed,
men should be enlisted into the Army and after undergoing
testing at special depots be posted to Corps. This,
though, was not considered immediately feasible. It would
necessitate an amendment of the Army Act since no man
could be deemed as enlisted until he had joined a Corps,
and also the provision of extra training establishments
between Recruiting Centres and Corps Training Centres. It
was, however, proposed to try out general tests at
Recruiting Centres, with further coordinated tests during
Corps training. The whole operation was to be conducted
by a War Office Directorate of Selection of Personnel,
with an inspecting psychologist attached, and the Board
of psychologists already constituted to act as technical
j . 2 6advisers.




headway in solving this problem, but the application of
psychological techniques was strongly urged by Adam and
he cited their adoption by other major Armies. The
American Army, he noted, had carried out a great
experiment of this kind during the First War and had
started again in this. The German Army was employing
1,000 trained psychologists on testing and the Russians,
it was understood, were also involved in this work.27
Moreover, there was a feeling that this new system might
prove beneficial to civil life. "The results of this
experiment should be far reaching," noted Adam, "not
only for this war, but for the future of the civilian
2 8
population of this country."
On 9 June the E.C.A.C. considered these arguments, and
in the knowledge that the Army had to be publicly seen to
be making efforts to resolve the difficulties, agreed to
the principle of applying psychological selection testing
to the Army and to adopt the machinery and schemes put
forward.29 The full Army Council endorsed this on 17
June.30 As Colonel Bernard Ungerson, former Chief
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The decision to invoke psychological assistance
was based partly upon historical factors, and
partly on the Army's wish to make it quite clear
that it was making a really thorough effort to
set its house in order.
The new Directorate for the Selection of Personnel
(D.S.P.) was immediately set up in the War Office and
removed selection from the advisory to the executive
sphere. It was headed by a soldier, Brigadier Kenneth
McLean, succeeded by Brigadier Alick Buchanan Smith, and
consisted of a team of soldiers and psychologists. This
organization, it was felt, was essential if the new
methods were to be found acceptable to the Army. The
Directorate was advised by the Board of psychologists,
assisted by psychiatrists from Army Medical Services, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Davies was appointed Inspector of
Personnel Selection. At its peak the staff included
nineteen psychologists and thirty-one officers who had
had some psychological training, the psychologists being
drawn largely from the Universities, the National
Institute of Industrial Psychology and the Industrial
Health Research Board.32 These specialists brought with
them the fruits of over thirty years research in the
field and ensured a certain crusading element within the
movement for reformed selection. As Jack Davies recalls:
31
WO 277/19, Ungerscn, p. 12.
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Everyone who took part in DSP's effort was
trained centrally by the same group of people. It
was not difficult in this climate to generate the
feeling that this was something of a cause,
attractive because at the same time it sought to
make the Army more efficient and more careful of
human values.
To the psychologists and psychiatrists
involved in DSP the whole exercise was not only a
great opportunity, but also a gesture of
recognition to professional groups often treated
with a good deal of scepticism. Psychologically-
based procedures were being incorporated into the
administrative system at a time of national
crisis. Most of those who participated in the
effort responded vigorously.
The D.S.P. immediately began work preparing job analyses,
devising suitable tests and training those who would
administer the testing procedure. In August 1941 Dr. J.
C. Raven's Progressive Matrices, or Matrix Test, of
general intelligence was introduced at the Recruiting
Centres, and a minimum intelligence level laid down for
certain Corps. However, only forty minutes were devoted
to testing and the test conditions did not favour full
cooperation since many new recruits were suspicious or
bewildered. Others tried to secure rejection by
falsifying results.34 In July Army psychiatrists were
given powers to recommend men for less skilled employment
within the Pioneer Corps,35 but this only served a
limited corrective function rather than preventing
misplacements before they occurred.
33
Jack Davies, letter to the author, August 1989.
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In the meantime, in August the Select Committee on
National Expenditure published its report on the
allocation of manpower to the Army. It complained of the
waste of resources in training men unlikely ever to
become efficient soldiers in the Arm to which they had
been posted, and noted:
The mechanisation of the Army demands a high
standard of intelligence in personnel since
valuable weapons and equipment are wasted if put
into the hands of unintelligent and therefore
unskilful users. The greatest care has been
exercised to provide the Army with first class
equipment of every kind, but it appears that
sufficient corresponding attention has not been
paid to the best methods of attaining an ecjual
standard in the human component of the Army.
To add to this, in October 1941 the War Office received
the final report of the Beveridge Committee on the use of
skilled men in the Services. It accused the Army of
wasting the very qualified skilled manpower it so
urgently required. The Committee concluded that whilst
the Ministry of Labour and National Service was calling
upon industry to surrender skilled men to the Services,
the Army had shown a "continuing failure to use men with
engineering skills according to their skills, which has
surprised us by its extent." It estimated that after two
years of war less than half of the engineers joining the
Army had been mustered in any engineering trade. The
3 6
menty Second Report for the Select Committee on National
Expenditure, (P.P., Reports: Committees, vol. 3, 1940-41), p. 3.
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Committee could cite, amongst others, an electrical and
mechanical engineer working as a Military Police cook,
and a fitter with a marine engineering firm working as a
"sanitary" man at a Royal Army Ordinance Corps depot.37
As a result of these findings, the government took the
drastic action of stopping all intakes of tradesmen to
the Army in the majority of mechanical and electrical
3 8
engineering trades; a ban not lifted until August 1942.
Both the Beveridge and the Select Committee Reports
called for recruits to be sent to central depots on
joining the Army and tested before posting to a Corps.39
As a result of these two reports, and with a view to
approaching the E.C.A.C., Adam asked the Director of
Organization at the War Office to look into the
practicability of urgently establishing common reception
centres to test recruits. This he did in a paper written
in conjunction with the Director of Military Training in
October 1941. Although they agreed that these centres
would have certain advantages, they argued that
considerable selection was already being applied and the
time was not yet appropriate for the scheme. Not only was
it pointed out that the training centre organization had
37
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just been streamlined, but a major reorganization of the
Field Army was in progress which involved using training
units for re-training. Extra staff and accommodation
would be required for up to 20,000 recruits, and existing
training units have to be converted to a "post-basic"
function. Training periods would have to be extended by
four to six weeks on average, and increased movements of
personnel would be unavoidable and undesirable,
particularly during the winter months. There would also
be considerable administrative upheaval. The control of
postings would have to be centralized in the War Office
and a separate "General Service" Records and Pay Office
established.
Moreover, it was felt that if recruits were enlisted into
the Army and centrally posted to a Corps by the War
Office after testing, this would have an adverse effect
on the regimental system. Not only would the regimental
and geographical connections based upon feelings of local
sentiment and tradition be harmed, but disadvantage would
accrue from not introducing a recruit from his first day
in the Army to the methods and atmosphere of individual
regiments.4 0
Adam castigated the paper as inaccurate and biased
40
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against the proposal. The advantages of the scheme and
certain reassurances about its implications had not been
sufficiently stressed. He accepted a compromise would
have to be found for the time being, but emphasized:
Both the Select Committee of the House of
Commons and the Beveridge Committee have called
attention to the problem. I took up my
appointment as A.G. determined to remedy the
situation and everything I have seen has
confirmed me in my view.
The decision of the War Office to publish a rejoinder to
the Beveridge Report, defending the Army's record and
outlining improvements being made, added to the urgency.
The fact that the War Office's subsequent investigations
suggested that the misuse of skill had been overstated
did not diminish its impact.42 Adam ordered the paper to
be rewritten.43
On 26 November Adam submitted a revised paper to the
E.C.A.C. and stressed:
The present system of posting men direct to
Corps on first joining the Army has resulted in a
failure to utilise properly the man-power
allotted to the Army, and a misplacement of
potential tradesmen. It is a source of discontent
and invaliding, owing to men being in unsuitable
41
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jobs.
The themes of the Select Committee and Beveridge Reports
were reiterated, and it was recommended that in order to
achieve the ideal new recruits should be enlisted for
"General Service," so sidestepping any legal
complications, and sent in the first instance to common
reception centres. There they would undergo basic
training and selection tests to determine the Corps or
Arm for which they were most suitable. They would then be
posted to carry out specific Corps training. Outlining
the practical difficulties involved, it was noted that
the scheme could not be implemented at once. It was
recommended, though, that forthwith the D.S.P. should
apply selection tests to recruits as soon as possible
after arrival at Corps or Regimental Training Units, and
this was already being done in some cases. On the basis
of the tests misplaced men would be transferred to more
suitable Arms.45 On 28 November the E.C.A.C. agreed to
the desirability of establishing common reception
centres, and that the proposed modified scheme be put
into effect.4 6
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On arrival at the Corps or Regimental Training Units
recruits underwent five tests; the Matrix Test and four
further tests to measure verbal fluency, arithmetic,
spatial perception and mechanical aptitude. Although they
threw up many potential tradesmen and confirmed many as
unsuitable for the jobs to which they had been allocated,
there were a number of difficulties. Even if only a
limited number of training units were tested some
thousands of men had to be dealt with during their first
month of training. The only way to cover the ground was
to give a rapid course of instruction to officers
nominated from the Corps themselves, which inevitably
meant that expertise was limited. Furthermore, within
these constraints, the scheme tended to operate most
successfully when highlighting the best and the worst of
the recruits. It was not so effective in sorting the
remainder.47 In January 1942 psychiatrists were given
general powers to transfer and dispose of those who could
be employed but displayed mental backwardness or
instability,48 but this again only served a wider
corrective function rather than preventing misplacements
before they occurred.
Events compelled an early decision on the ideal scheme.
Experience showed that despite the testing at Recruiting
Centres misplacement was still occurring. It was also
4 7
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clear that although the Ministry of Labour and National
Service attempted to post men to Arms according to
intelligence and aptitudes, they were unable to do so in
balanced proportions.49 Further evidence was also
available on the implications for morale of poor
selection. Quarterly Army morale reports, which were
initiated by Adam early in 1942 on the basis of
commanders' reports, censorship reports of soldiers'
letters and other available sources,50 attributed absence
without leave in part to lack of interest in Army
employment. It was found that a desire to be placed in an
occupation in which the best use could be made of special
skills or aptitudes was listed as a major preoccupation
of soldiers,51 and that those employed in their civilian
trades rarely went absent.52 As Adam later recalled:
I am convinced that conditions of work are more
important than wages, and interest is all
important. This was brought home to one
constantly in the Army and was of course the main
object of all Personnel Selection.
Over the winter months the difficulties holding back the
4 9WO 277/19, Uhgerscn, p. 27.
50
Adam VIII, chap. 5, pp. 2-4.
51
WO 163/51, Morale Report, February-May 1942, A.C./G(42)20., 12
June 1942.
52
WO 163/88, Morale Report, January 1942, issued with
E.C.A.C./P(42)37., 1 April 1942.
53Gen. Sir Ronald Forbes Adam [hereafter Adam (2)], "Lessons from
the Army's Experience in Selection," Psychology at HorTc 1 (May
1948), p. 2.
27
establishment of common reception centres were tackled.
In a paper to Adam at the end of March 1942, however, the
Director of Organization still urged a degree of caution:
While such a system would be a novelty in the
British Army, and its practicability would need
demonstrating to the Army at large, it does not
involve any new or unproven principles. Firms
such as Vickers and the Westinghouse Company,
already use tests of special aptitudes as well of
intelligence, combined with a personal interview,
in selecting their personnel. The broad
principles on which the scheme is based can be
taken as established in civil life, but a short
experimental period is needed to adjust both the
technical details and the administrative
machinery to meet the particular needs of the
Army, and to convince the Army of its
practicability and benefit to the Service.
In May Adam placed before the E.C.A.C. a detailed scheme
for the selection of Army Class intakes at common
reception centres. An experiment would start in one
training unit of each Arm to try out the procedure, but
he recommended that the full programme should come into
operation in July. The scheme was designed to minimize
any practical difficulties. The reorganization of the
Field Force having been completed, by a process of
rationalization and reallocation it was found that
existing training units, staff and administrative
resources would suffice with only minor additions and
temporary dislocation. Movement would be restricted to a
minimum by either marrying these centres to local Corps
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Training Units, or by creating some establishments with
both a reception and a Corps training function. The
Matrix test would continue to be conducted at the time of
the medical examination to enable the quality of recruits
to be distributed between centres acting as feeders for
certain Corps. Total training time would be extended
initially, but it was hoped that by allocating men
properly training times could be reduced in the long
5 5
term.
Reassurances were also given that the regimental system
would be preserved. Recruits would be posted according to
the requirements of the Corps, but as far as possible in
the same way as before, with due regard to the
regional origins of personnel and the need to foster
regimental spirit.56 Indeed, in a letter to infantry
colonels, Adam stressed that if a recruit was posted
correctly from the outset, avoiding unnecessary and
disheartening transfers later, regimental spirit and
tradition would be enhanced.57 On 8 May the E.C.A.C.
approved the adoption of the General Service Selection
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Scheme.58 After trials, it came into effect on 2 July.
In the first instance, a new recruit was enlisted into
the General Service Corps and posted to a Primary
Training Centre or Wing of a Regimental Training Unit.
There he underwent six weeks of basic training and
completed the battery of tests that had been in operation
at Corps Training Centres since November 1941, an agility
test being added for all recruits. Scores for each test
were expressed as Selection Grades or S.G.s. These were
summed to yield an overall intelligence score or Summed
S.G. The tests were administered by teams of Sergeant
Testers who had undergone one month's training by the
D.S.P. They were selected from among serving soldiers
with academic or professional qualifications and included
many school teachers whose experience made them
especially suitable for the work.
After completing a questionnaire which noted educational
and employment record and spare-time activities, a
recruit was interviewed by a specially trained Personnel
Selection Officer (P.S.O.) who clarified details and
consulted a man's interests and preferences. The P.S.O.
then made a decision about a recruit's employment. He
could either recommend a man for a trade, or make three
"Training Recommendations" for broad types of work in
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order of suitability. These ranged from "Driving" to
"Signalling" to "Mobile and Combatant" to "Clerical". In
making this decision he had to take into account a
recruit's wishes, experience, temperamental
characteristics and medical category, as well as
observing the test minima for each "Training
Recommendation" as prescribed by the completed job
analyses. No recommendation was made, at this stage, for
a particular Corps or regiment unless a man was a
volunteer, or had a strong claim which made it desirable
from the point of view of morale. During the interview
potential officers were also noted, and those with very
low test scores, or who for some other reason were
regarded as unstable, were referred to psychiatrists for
clinical interview. Having screened a recruit, the
psychiatrist recommended either special employment or
discharge.
The P.S.O.s were drawn from volunteer regimental
officers. Ideally, from a technical viewpoint,
psychologists would have filled this role. However, there
were far too few available, and it was considered that
the scheme would be more readily acceptable to the Army
if interviews were conducted by serving soldiers. Trained
by the D.S.P. for a month, preference was given to men
whose background would help in the work. Again the
teaching profession was well represented, but there were
a number from industrial employment departments and
social service organizations.
31
Once the "Training Recommendations" were completed by the
P.S.O.s, they were forwarded to the War Office. The
demand from the Corps was expressed in terms of these
recommendations and divided into intelligence strata to
ensure that each Corps received a distribution of men by
general intelligence. Men were then posted on the basis
of their individual recommendations. Summed S.G. and, as
far as possible, territorial connections. This was done
with the help of a special card cataloguing system known
as the Hollerith Sorting Machine. A recruit was then sent
on to Corps training accompanied by his "Training
Recommendation" and a suggestion as to a specific job on
the basis of that recommendation.59
Between July 1942 and June 1945 some 700,000 recruits
passed through the General Service Corps. 9% were chosen
for training as tradesmen and 6% marked down as
potential officers.50 14% were referred to
psychiatrists.61 In all, it was estimated that ten hours
were spent per individual in selection. Adam noted later:
My first lesson is the importance of making every
man feel, on joining a large organisation that he
is being treated as an individual and not as a
59W0 277/19, Ungerson, pp. 39-44; D.S.P., pp. 455-457.






In 1943 it was also possible for the Army to institute
special Army Selection Centres which reclassified
misplaced men already serving, those who had been
medically downgraded or those whose units had been
disbanded. Between 1943 and 1944 over 30,000 men went
through these centres.63
Certainly, there was a considerable amount of statistical
evidence to show that the selection scheme assisted in a
more efficient use of the Army's manpower. Several
follow-up studies revealed that from the beginning of
their Army careers men were being more suitably employed
than before. As examples, the training failure rate for
drivers fell from between 16-20% to less than 3%, and of
tradesmen from between 17-27% to under 7%.6 * Further
tests revealed signallers were being selected with a
failure rate of 7%, storeman 3% and clerks less than
2%.6 5
There was also evidence of a resulting improvement in
morale. One Army Commander commented:
Although their tests at first sight seem
gibberish, one point stands out, the men
62Adam (2), p. 2.
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themselves believe in them. Previously if a man
fancied himself as a clerk, nothing would
persuade him that he really ought to be a
mechanic, but if the D.S.P. tells him so he
seems willing to admit that he must have been
wrong.
This of course has an enormous psychological
effect on making men contented and keen at their
,66 3work.
Tom Harrisson, founder of the Mass-Observation social
survey organization and a serving soldier in the
Reconnaissance Corps, recorded that the new procedure
"introduced an intelligent, intelligible system, making
men feel valued for their private abilities and personal
peculiarities."67 Brigadier J. R. Rees, who had become
Chief Consulting Psychiatrist to the Army, noted that
"the matching of men to suitable work is as valuable a
means of psychiatric prophylaxis as anything that could
well be advised."68
Furthermore, many field officers fully endorsed the
scheme and saw it as a step forward in improving the
selection process. Amongst them, General Slim, Commander
of the Fourteenth Army, wrote that in his view the system
had proved exceedingly accurate as a means of assessing
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mental and physical characteristics.69
There were, though, factors which, according to some
commentators, limited the technical effectiveness of the
scheme. They were mainly due to the fact that the
adoption of a science-based approach to the solution of
an essentially human problem rested rather uneasily
within the Army system. Philip Vernon and John Parry,
both of whom were involved as psychologists in selection
work for the Services, argued that whilst the huge size
of the task to be done in the Army necessitated a large
non-technical staff, the Army's reaction to the use of
psychology in selection was not always cooperative:
Without belittling in any way the very fine work
done by all types and grades of staff, it must be
admitted that the organization did not always
function smoothly. Psychologists suffered
considerable frustration. They were commonly of
lower rank than their non-technical colleagues.
Policies which they advocated as scientifically
sound were often rejected, and the methods they
devised were often misapplied and misinterpreted
by insufficiently trained personnel. Their
training had perhaps predisposed them to seek
what was best for the interests of the
individuals with whom they had to deal, and they
were less experienced in envisaging the broader
needs of the Army as a whole. Again the fact that
they were immured in headquarters (apart from
occasional visits for inspections or for carrying
out experimental investigations) tended to widen
the gulf between the technical and practical
aspects of selection.
The lot of the Sergeant Testers, they continued, was




Many were highly intelligent teachers and
university graduates, but, except for a few
brought to headquarters as research assistants
and statisticians, they were restricted to
routine application and scoring of tests under
the command of PSO's whose educational and
psychological qualifications were sometimes
inferior to their own, and were liable to be put
on to cutting of grass or other duties at the
whim of any C.O. A quarter to a third of them
eventually achieved commissions by the same route
as other Army recruits, but not on the grounds of
technical competence at their work.
They concluded with an overview:
Presumably the lesson to be drawn is that
psychologists cannot expect a complex institution
like the Army to accept novel procedures merely
on scientific grounds, that gradual education and
infiltration rather than the imposition of
technically valid methods are needed.
Indeed, there was evidence that some elements within the
Army remained sceptical about the scheme. In September
1942 the Cabinet appointed an Expert Committee to
investigate and appraise the work of psychologists and
psychiatrists in the Services, which collated the
criticism. No doubt partly informed by the fact that
selection was conducted in isolation from the bulk of
the Army and thus assumed an air of mystery, the view was
still held that dull men made the best soldiers and that
psychological tests placed unintelligent men who would
make good fighters in non-fighting jobs. The involvement
of the psychiatrist was seen as a convenient escape route
70
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for those who were determined to evade military
service.71 Churchill himself shared this distrust of
psychologists and psychiatrists in the Services. In
December 1942 he minuted the Lord President of the
Council:
I am sure it would be sensible to restrict as
much as possible the work of these gentlemen, who
are capable of doing an enormous amount of harm
with what may very easily degenerate into
charlatanry.
Moreover, as the war developed the perceived adverse
effects on the regimental system could be substantiated.
There was a tendency for recruits to join Corps or
regiments demoralized by their lack of identity,
allegiance and incentive to work hard at Primary
Training Centres.73 In addition, and inevitably within
the restrictions of supply and demand, the extent to
which recruits were posted in accordance with their
territorial connections was not always satisfactory,
particularly to the Scots, Welsh and Irish. One survey of
infantry intakes in February 1945 revealed that only 53%
of men were posted to the regiment to which they were
7Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB 98/25, Papers of the
Expert Committee on the Work of Psychologists and Psychiatrists
in the Services, P.P. (42)2., 17 September 1942.
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most closely connected.74
In 1947 the published report of the Expert Committee
noted that the advantages of personnel selection were
many. Intellectual resources were put to the best use,
men were no longer liable to be over or under employed,
and thousands of men with predispositions to psychiatric
disorder were screened out. "We have ample evidence," it
concluded, "that the psychological methods of selection
for training as employed by the Services are justified by
training results."75
In 1948 Army Quarterly commented:
During the Second World War few subjects
caused more argument and engendered so much heat
as the introduction of psychiatrists and
psychologists into Army organization and
procedure. The Army is an innately conservative
body. The Infantry of the Line is perhaps the
most die hard of all the arms and viewed the
Personnel Selection Officers, their tests and
their ' bags of tricks' with deep suspicion and
mistrust. For years comment amongst regimental
officers was caustic.76
Towards the end of the war the authorities began to
consider the application of testing to the post-war Army.
In a paper to the Army Post-War Planning Sub-Committee on
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Selection Testing, the Director of Manpower Planning
argued that the selection procedure should be continued,
particularly if conscription remained, and that the
General Service Corps provided an efficient and
economical method of carrying this out. Testing at
Recruiting Centres would only allow part of the procedure
to be implemented, whilst testing during Corps training
would, as he expressed it, "be putting the cart before
the horse."77
Whilst the War Office acknowledged the value of selection
7 8
testing, it was perhaps not surprising, in view of some
of the doubts that lingered, that in seeking to cut back
the post-war training organization, and without the
pressures of wartime, it dispensed with the General
Service Corps in 1948. Under the new scheme recruits were
posted directly to Corps and regiments, with a
preliminary selection test conducted at Recruiting
Centres and the remainder of the procedure completed
during Corps training. Transfers between Arms were to be
the exception rather than the rule.79 The primacy of the
regimental system was thus restored, but the full
benefits of psychological testing both to the Army and
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the individual could not be exploited.
During the course of the war the military authorities
made significant changes to the way in which recruits
were allocated to military occupations. Whilst in the
pre-war Army little attempt was made at rational
placement, an array of scientific selection techniques
were introduced specifically designed to match the right
man to the right job. Besides revolutionizing the
utilization of manpower in the Army, these brought with
them the institutionalized recognition that recruits had
different individual capabilities, temperaments and job
needs, and that quality was as important as quantity. As
the Expert Committee recorded:
In modern warfare it is no longer a question of
'measuring Guardsmen by the yard.'
However, whilst it was perhaps a reflection of the
suspicion that these techniques aroused in some quarters
in the Army that the Brigade of Guards did not actually
take part in the General Service Selection Scheme, it is
also relevant to note that not only did the Report into
the Army's Working Day in 1948 draw attention to the
continuing misemployment of troops it found during its
8 1
investigations, but that Trevor Royle's survey of the
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post-war Army reveals that one of the greatest gripes of
national servicemen was the Army's misuse of civilian
skills and abilities.82
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Another problem that confronted the military authorities,
and one linked to other rank selection, was the task of
finding officers to lead the expanding Service. During
the First World War the creation of the New Armies and
the high officer casualty rate ensured that the Army was
forced to cast its social net wider and deeper than ever
before in the search for potential officers.1 However,
the officer corps had always been drawn, and continued to
be drawn between the wars, from a narrow segment of
society. Certainly, the aristocratic dominance had been
lost as recruitment reflected the changing fortunes of
social classes and occupational groups, but by 1939 the
Army still relied on an exclusive upper and middle class
group to fill its commissioned ranks, characterized
almost entirely by those with a public school education.2
During the inter-war years the normal route to a
commission was through either of the fee-paying cadet
colleges at Sandhurst or Woolwich. A limited number of
free places were reserved for rankers, but in the main
cadets joined the colleges directly from school for the
eighteen-month course. Selection was based on a
1
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candidate's performance in the Civil Service
Commissioners' written examination, a headmaster's report
and a short interview.3 Preferences for individual
regiments were submitted to the colonels of the regiments
concerned who vetted applicants and assessed their
suitability.4
Between the wars over 80% of entrants to Sandhurst and
Woolwich were from public schools, and over a third from
ten major schools.5 This reflected a social exclusiveness
based partly on the preparation that many of these
schools gave for a career in the Army through the
teaching of "army classes" and preparatory training in
the Officer Training Corps (O.T.C.), but also on the
professional assumption that the gentlemanly virtues of
public service instilled by these institutions were a
prerequisite for successful military leadership.6
It had a further foundation in terms of harsh economics.
It was calculated that in 1937 the cost of putting a
cadet through officer training, including fees and
3
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maintenance, was £455.7 In addition, the expenses
incurred in taking commissioned rank were prohibitive
except to those with a private income. In an average line
regiment, it was estimated, a second lieutenant needed
private means of between £60 and £100 a year. In 1938
officers were granted pay increases but this only brought
Q
in an extra £18 per annum.
By the mid-1930s a career in the Army was proving less
appealing to the established sources and there was a
shortfall of new officers.9 In response the War Office
began to consider modifying its selection methods and
making the officer corps more accessible to other groups.
In September 1937 Hore-Belisha suggested that all
recruits should enter through the ranks, and after a
year's service those selected as potential officers
should undergo a shortened and free course at either
Sandhurst or Woolwich.10 In December 1937 the Willingdon
Committee, which had been set up to investigate the
dearth of candidates for commissions, recommended that
the Army make more use of the ranks and the secondary
schools as sources of officers. It proposed more direct
7
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commissions and a hundred percent means tested
scholarship scheme for the cadet colleges. "The more
widely the net is spread, " it noted, "the greater the
chance of securing men of ability to officer the Army."11
In August 1938 the Strathcona Committee, which had been
appointed to look into the specific question of direct
commissions from the ranks, recommended that forty such
awards be granted each year.12
Although these proposals signified changing attitudes
within the War Office to the question of officer
recruitment, and Hore-Belisha was able to announce the
introduction, in due course, of a scholarship system and
more direct commissioning from the ranks,13 they were
never ultimately followed through. The new trend in
policy was opposed by the Military Members of the Army
Council. General Sir Walter Kirke, the Director-General
of the Territorial Army, represented their views when he
warned that it was:
... important not to take any drastic measures to
attract a new class of officer whose entry in any
considerable numbers would probably have the
effect of curtailing the existing supply from the
11
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Moreover, the introduction of conscription in the Spring
of 1939 with the Military Training Act, and the approach
of war, effectively halted peacetime personnel reforms of
the Regular Army.15 Indeed, the exclusivity of the
officer corps remained intact. Of the 587 entrants to
Sandhurst and 195 to Woolwich in 1939, 85% and 91%
respectively were from public schools.16
On the outbreak of war the War Office decreed that no
permanent commissions would be awarded. All would be
emergency commissions for the duration of the conflict
and normally granted into the rank of second lieutenant.
Candidates would be trained at Officer Cadet Training
Units (O.C.T.U.s). To meet immediate requirements for
emergency officers it was notified that a number of
direct commissions would be granted and that applications
would be considered from holders of Certificate "B"
gained in the university divisions of the O.T.C., those
who had gained the Officer Qualification Certificate in
the Territorial Army, and certain categories of ex-
officers. To provide initial quotas for the O.C.T.U.s,
applications would be considered from holders of
Certificate "A" from the schools' O.T.C.s, and from
14Memorandum by D.G.T.A., 19 January 1938; quoted in Spillman, p.
207.
15Spillman, p. 207.
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candidates recommended by university authorities.17
However, it was laid down that when sufficient numbers
had been obtained, all future officer requirements, apart
from a number of specialists, would be met by selection
from amongst men who had served a period in the ranks.18
Surprisingly, no formal records were kept relating to
this decision. It was only two years later, when the
Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff desired to study
the policy basis, that an attempt was made to reconstruct
its origins. The view was held that this decision was a
natural corollary of developments before 1939. Before the
war, it was noted, there had been much talk of promotion
of officers from within and the matter had attracted the
attention of many politicians. The recommendations of the
Willingdon Committee and the Strathcona Committee had
demonstrated this process.19 Moreover, as General
Brownrigg, the former Military Secretary, recalled, with
the introduction of the Military Training Act, when every
man called up had to serve in the ranks of the militia,
it was only to be expected that apart from regular
officers no one could get a commission without going
17
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through the ranks.20
On 11 October 1939 Hore-Belisha announced the
introduction of the new policy emphasizing its
egalitarianism:
In this Army the star is within every private
soldier's reach. No one, however humble or
exalted his birth, need be afraid that his
military virtues will remain unrecognised. More
important, no one, who wishes to serve in the
Army need consider his status minimised by
starting on the bottom rung of the ladder.
By 21 October the immediate requirements for officers and
O.C.T.U. cadets had been satisfied, and service in the
ranks became the normal channel towards a commission.22
William Shebbeare, the journalist who was serving in the
Royal Armoured Corps, observed, though, that in this
interim period the officer corps had begun to be
constructed along familiar lines. A number of distinct
elements emerged; pre-war regulars and territorials;
university men with Certificate "B" from their O.T.C.s
who were commissioned as soon as the war began; and
public schoolboys of all ages who, he noted, almost
wholly fed the O.C.T.U. s in the first six weeks of the
20WO 216/86, letter frcm Lt.-Gen. Sir Douglas Brcwnrigg to D. of
0., 22 October 1942.
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 352 (1938-39),
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'2W0 216/86, "Termination of Arrangements for the Special
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Office, n.d. [but 1939].
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war, and who by virtue of having gained Certificate "A"
from their school O.T.C.s at the age of sixteen became
officer-cadets as soon as they joined up.23
Under the officer selection system adopted after October
a potential officer was selected for training, on the
recommendation of his commanding officer,24 by a senior
regular officer, such as a divisional or district
commander, after a short interview.25 Selection was to be
based on personality, powers of leadership and
intelligence.26 From April 1940 sponsorship of cadets by
colonels of regiments ended, and to ensure a more even
distribution of good officers throughout the Army new
officers were posted to regiments according to their
preferences, any territorial claims they had and their
grading at O.C.T.U.s.27
If an Army is what its leaders make it then it was
crucial that competent men be selected for training as
officers in sufficient numbers. Not only was this
particularly important in view of the scope of the
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officer's job in modern mechanized warfare with its
variety of tactics and weapons and complex administrative
procedures, but the number of officers required by the
Army during the war was quite unprecedented. Between 1939
and 1945 the ratio of officers to other ranks rose from 1
to 21 to 1 to 13.28
During the first months of the war the Army seemed
satisfied with its selection methods, the initial wave of
volunteers and conscripts yielding what was seen as a
rich supply of good officer material.29 According to
Shebbeare, during this period the O.C.T.U.s were still
dominated by a limited section of the nation, namely
public schoolboys who had merely to serve three months in
the ranks before being reasonably sure of gaining a
commission, and pre-war regular N.C.O.s. At least though,
he continued, the worst type of public schoolboy could be
relied upon to blot his copybook whilst serving in the
ranks and thus never be recommended, whilst a number of
highly skilled and professional N.C.O.s were given the
chance to become worthy officers.30
Yet hereafter, as the Army rapidly expanded, strategic
commitments increased and the demand for officers grew,
28WO 277/16, "Morale," War Office Monograph compiled by Lt.-Col.
J. H. A. Sparrow, 1949, p. 21.
29WO 277/19, "Personnel Selection," War Office Monograph compiled
by Col. B. Uhgerscn, 1953, p. 55.
30Captain X, p. 15.
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so the War Office became concerned that the selection
system was not producing enough potential officers of the
requisite quality. Certainly, the fact that the Navy and
the R.A.F. absorbed a high proportion of the most able
recruits compounded the problem, but a number of
important factors were highlighted.
Primarily, it was clear that not enough good quality
candidates were being submitted for selection. One
element in this was the reluctance of many able men in
the ranks to come forward because of the financial
liabilities associated with taking commissions. The
financial sacrifices many had to make during officer
training, the relatively low rates of pay of junior
officers and the expenditure associated with officer
status all acted as disincentives. As Henry Longhurst,
the journalist and future Conservative M.P. who was
serving in the Royal Artillery at the time, observed:
"Potential officers are being kept in the ranks by the
fear that they could not live, without a private income,
as their regimental standards require."31
On becoming Adjutant-General in 1941 and thus assuming
responsibility for the provision of officers, General
Adam sought to remedy some of these problems. Under
existing arrangements, and on the principle that soldiers
31
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should receive pay only for the jobs they were doing, on
entry to an O.C.T.U. cadets had to forego any acting rank
they held and the extra pay that went with that. In a
paper to the Executive Committee of the Army Council
(E.C.A.C.) in October Adam proposed that paid acting rank
should be retained. Not only did he note evidence that
the Army was losing promising officer material because of
financial difficulties, but he argued:
As things are, there is a distinct danger of
unpleasant political repercussions. If the War
Office is attacked on the score that some of the
best men cannot get commissions because they
cannot afford the financial sacrifices entailed
in their training as officers, it will have no
reply but to admit it.32
There was some hesitancy on the part of the E.C.A.C., the
view being held that as no acting ranks could be
appointed as substitutes for personnel attending courses,
so units would have to carry vacancies on their
establishments for protracted periods.33 However, the Air
Ministry's successful negotiations with the Treasury over
concessions for officers attending the Air Staff College
persuaded the War Office to ask for similar arrangements
with regard to staff officers and O.C.T.U. cadets.34 In
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February 1942 Treasury approval was granted.
Adam also sought to increase the junior officer's income
by speeding up promotion. Under the rules governing
promotion in wartime it was laid down that a second
lieutenant would normally be promoted to lieutenant after
eighteen months, provided service was satisfactory. In a
paper to the E.C.A.C. in June 1942 he proposed to reduce
this to six months. Not only was it argued that this
period of probation was too long in wartime and that the
duties of the two ranks were the same, but the evidence
of candidates being deterred from coming forward by
financial considerations compelled such a reform. Indeed,
it was noted that a second lieutenant, in the typical
case of a married man with two children, was financially
worse off than a company sergeant-major, in the case of a
single man worse off even than a sergeant. Adam noted:
There is an urgent demand for a very large number
of officers of the best type available; neither
the numbers nor the quality are likely to be
forthcoming unless financial conditions are
improved materially and soon. Promotion to
lieutenant gives an immediate increment of 14/- a
.36 a
week.
Although the E.C.A.C. were wary of the capital that could
be made out of this in respect of other rank pay, they
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agreed that some reduction should be made but were
divided on the extent of reduction, some members
preferring a longer period.37 The Secretary of State, Sir
James Grigg, came down though in favour of the six month
period.38 Treasury permission was granted and the new
arrangements came into effect in the late Autumn.39
Adam also engineered some economies in terms of the extra
costs an officer was expected to meet on being
commissioned. In a paper to the E.C.A.C. in September
1942 he noted:
It is still clear, from a mass of evidence,
that the low rate of pay of a second-lieutenant,
and the inevitable increased expenses that an
officer's status involves, are holding back many
suitable candidates, especially those with
families or those who have to support their
relatives.4
On being commissioned, officers were expected to purchase
their own uniforms. Although an allowance of £35 was
available this was considered inadequate in view of
rising clothing costs and the imposition of the purchase
tax. In November it was announced that the grant was to
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be increased to £45.41
Officers were also expected to meet the mess
subscriptions levied by individual officer's messes.
These went towards the purchase of extra food to
supplement the rations and the provision of other
domestic luxuries. The charges could be high, varying
from regiment to regiment depending on the standards to
which each had become accustomed to live. One soldier
related that he would be expected to contribute £1 a
week, about a third of a subaltern's pay, if
commissioned.42 In June 1943 a maximum standard charge of
1/6 a day was introduced.43
Besides the financial disincentives involved in the
taking of a commission, it was also true that there was a
reluctance on the part of many commanding officers to
recommend able men in the ranks for selection. From the
earliest months of the war the importance of this matter
was emphasized.44 In May 1940 commanding officers were
instructed that the failure to seek out, or ensure that
junior commanders seek out, potential officers in the
41
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ranks was a "grave dereliction of duty." However, it
seemed that in many cases instructions went unheeded.
Some commanding officers were unaware of the capabilities
of men under their command, whilst others preferred to
keep able men in the ranks for the sake of unit
efficiency. A number of C.O.s, the majority of whom were
regulars, chose to ignore men with obvious qualifications
for commissioned rank on social grounds. As one soldier
recorded:
The worst aspect of the whole business is the
fact that you are at the mercy of your C.O.
absolutely, whether you are ever given an
opportunity of appearing before the Selection
Board. Without his permission there is no appeal
and no redress. And the prejudices of C.O.s are
real, and unfortunately, only too prevalent.4
This was a view that from the earliest months of the war
had been represented to the War Office in Parliament.47
In December 1941 Adam reiterated the importance of
commanding officers searching out suitable men and
instructed each C.O. to appoint a Unit Board to which the
names of likely candidates would be reported and recorded
45Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Bridgeman Papers,
Bridgeman 3/7, Army Training Memorandum No. 32, War Office, May
1940, p. 11.
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for inspection by senior officers.48 Yet this seemed of
little avail. During 1942 an investigation of units that
were being disbanded revealed 178 potential officers in
ten infantry battalions and 128 in one armoured
brigade.49 A quota system was tried out but the standard
of candidates put forward was deemed deplorably low. Mass
intelligence testing was also experimented with but was
regarded as producing potential officers who lacked the
necessary personal qualities.50 In September 1942 Adam
recorded:
The greatest hindrance is still the reluctance of
the commanding officer to put up more than a few
candidates, and his lack of knowledge of the
material available.
The following month a new initiative was presented by the
Adjutant-General's department. In a paper to the E.C.A.C.
it was argued that the present method of producing
candidates was not providing the essential quantity or
quality of officer material. A recent investigation had
shown that out of 700 units surveyed 475 had put forward
no candidates and 100 just one candidate each over the
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review period. Moreover, the majority of candidates that
were put forward were from the worst trained units. It
was essential, so the paper continued, to ascertain
definitely whether or not sufficient potential officers
of the requisite quality existed in the ranks to meet
requirements. To this end, a system of regimental
nomination of candidates was proposed.52
This sociometric - approach had been suggested by
psychiatrists and psychologists in the Army as a means
of making use of the knowledge that each group possessed
of its own human resources.53 In a secret ballot each man
in a company would write down on a slip of paper those
within his own platoon, and others in other platoons,
whom he thought fit to be leaders. The names of men who
received an appreciable number of nominations would then
be channelled up to the commanding officer for a decision
to be taken on recommendation.
The results of tests conducted in Scottish Command, it
was noted, were promising. In one unit, in which no
candidates had been under consideration by the C.O. at
the time, some twenty N.C.O.s and men had received strong
to fair support and eleven had been accepted for officer
training. In addition, the vast majority of officers and
52WO 163/89, E.C.A.C./P(42)140.
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men in the units tested had expressed their approval of
the experiment. An extension of the scheme was requested,
but it was carefully pointed out that this initiative did
not in any way mean a diminution of the commanding
officer's powers of veto:
It is important that this scheme should not be
misrepresented as being a revolutionary
innovation under which the future officers of the
British Army are to be finally chosen by the
direct vote of the soldiers. This is not the
case. The experience and assistance of other
ranks is to be enlisted for the purpose of
finding and recommending candidates for the
consideration of the commanding officer. The
responsibility for the selection of officers
remains upon the existing basis.
The E.C.A.C. took a dim view. There was general agreement
that the scheme was liable to abuse; it would give the
soldier the idea that he had some right to share in the
selection of his officers, and would be seized upon by
unscrupulous persons and distorted to the detriment of
Army discipline.55
The matter was put to the full Army Council. In support
of the scheme it was submitted that its potential value
could be measured against the fact that in order to meet
requirements units had to produce officers at the rate of
0.4% of their strength per month. During the trial period
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it had not only raised the submission rate in the
selected units from the Scottish average of 0.1% to 8%,
but improved the acceptance rate for officer training
from 0.06% to 4%. The Army Council, though, remained
unconvinced. Although the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, General Brooke, and the Civil Member, Arthur
Henderson, dissented, there was general opposition. Not
only were the concerns of the E.C.A.C. shared, but it was
considered that even in the present Army "only a minority
of men had the quality to appraise the basic requirements
in an officer's character." Furthermore, it was asserted,
once introduced it would be difficult if not impossible
to drop, especially if superficially successful. The
recommendation was made that quotas should be pursued by
orthodox means.56 In Adam's words, "the experiment was
regarded with the gravest suspicion and as almost
Bolshevik."5 7
A solution to the problem presented itself the following
year. By this stage the Army had the views of the trained
Personnel Selection Officers (P.S.O.s) at the Primary
Training Centres (P.T.C.s) who, as part of their remit of
interviewing all new recruits before they were assigned
to Corps, were expected to assist C.O.s by noting likely
officer candidates for observation during Corps training.
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From April an investigation was carried out, which came
to be known as "Exercise Bypass,"58 comparing the
efficiency of P.S.O.s and C.O.s at nominating candidates.
Not only did it confirm that the latter's judgements were
uneven, but it was found that a large proportion of
suitable candidates were earmarked at the P.T.C.s only to
be turned down at the units. As a result of this,
although commanding officers remained free to nominate,
all those designated as having officer potential by the
P.S.O.s were automatically submitted for selection.59
Whilst initiatives were taken to improve the supply of
candidates, the formal selection process itself was
reformed. During the early years of the war there was
increasing concern that candidates submitted for
selection were being inadequately assessed. Unlike other
rank selection which was largely concerned with measuring
mental abilities, officer selection was more a matter of
appraising personality. Yet no matter how shrewd the
senior officer appointed to select potential officers, a
proper judgement could not be made on the basis of a
short interview. In contrast with the situation in the
First World War, in the initial stages of the conflict
there was less opportunity for selection on the basis of
performance in battle. Moreover, as senior officers were
untrained and appointed on an ad hoc basis, there was no
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way of knowing where the line was normally drawn between
acceptance and rejection. One officer summed up the
dilemma:
From discussions I have had with other
officers and from my own experience I think the
difficulty is to know just what standard, apart
from technical qualifications, to aim at. We are
all more or less agreed, I think, as to what type
of candidate we should accept in time of peace,
but in war one feels that the net may have to be
spread a little wider. Just how much wider is the
question which it is often a little difficult to
answer. It is in fact a question of supply and
demand, as to which the interviewing officer may
be quite ignorant.
In the Summer of 1940 the War Office tried to solve this
difficulty by replacing the senior officer's interview
with a fifteen to twenty-minute interview before a
Command Interview Board. Controlled by the local Command
Headquarters, the Boards were headed by a permanent
President, a full colonel drawn from the Reserve,
assisted by regular commanding officers seconded from
local units. The Presidents were chosen for their good
judgement, and since they were to serve for long periods
it was hoped that a greater expertise and uniformity
would be injected into the system.61
However, the establishment of the Boards did little to
improve matters. Not only was there scant attempt to
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bring the Presidents together to ensure common standards,
but the Boards did not ameliorate the inherent weaknesses
in the interview technique. In short, a candidate still
stood or fell by the first impression he created.62 "An
awesome business," wrote Henry Longhurst, "not improved
by the thought that one's entire future may be dependant
on>the state of another man's liver."63
Furthermore, it became evident that as the demand for
officers outstripped the traditional sources, so the
Boards were poorly placed to assess candidates who came
to represent a wider cross-section of the nation. As
Brigadier J. R. Rees, Consulting Psychiatrist to the
Army, noted:
Since the supply of young men from the
universities and public schools was drying up,
the interviewing officers sometimes found
themselves rather at sea since for purposes of
rapid assessment they understood too little the
background and outlook of many of the candidates
whose civil life experience had been so
completely different from anything of which they
had previous knowledge.64
Unsurprisingly, the Boards came to assume something of a
reputation amongst candidates for allowing social bias to
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colour their judgements. One gunner wrote of his
experiences:
I have recently had interviews with the Command
and the Technical Boards, and on each occasion I
was made to feel that my residence at a couple of
English universities doesn't quite make up for
the fact that my old headmaster didn't attend the
Headmasters' Conference.
In January 1941 it was estimated that some 25-30% of
those selected for officer training by the Boards were
being rejected by the O.C.T.U.s.66
As for the social composition of the officer corps at
this time, it was certainly widening. In March 1941 it
was noted that whilst 26% of newly commissioned officers
had a public school background, 74% had been educated at
6 7
either Grammar, Council, Board or Technical schools.
Yet these statistics concealed a system of preferences.
William Shebbeare observed that, unable to receive enough
of the dashing young public schoolboys to whom they were
accustomed, the Command Interview Boards chose for a long
time to select in their stead men who superficially
resembled them.68 This was a view corroborated by the
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Australian author Alan Wood who was serving in the Royal
Artillery. He wrote of what he considered to be the
wartime Army's imitation of the Regular Army. In
reference to the military representative's judgement of
potential officers, he noted:
Nowadays he cannot hope to find Eton and Oxford
among the recruits. So he acts on the principle
of accepting the second best. If he cannot get
Eton, he will get a good Grammar School. If he
cannot have Oxford, he will get a graduate of a
provincial University. If he cannot get the
genuine ex-public-school boy, he will get the
best imitation in the market.69
On becoming Adjutant-General, Adam recalled that he was
keenly aware of the deficiencies in officer selection and
the implications both for military efficiency and morale:
When I went to the War Office in 1941, I had
already realised from the failure rate at
O.C.T.U's in my command that the system was a
failure. I found that the average failure rate
was 25% and at one O.C.T.U. 50%. We could not
tolerate this waste of valuable training
establishments, and cadets were oppressed by the
knowledge that at least a quarter would fail. In
order to find out the reasons, I invited three
good presidents of boards to sit together to
examine candidates in my presence. They could
each ask the candidates as many questions as they
wished, and then submit on a piece of paper their
opinion of the candidate, which I saw on its way
to the recording officer. The diversity of views
of three experienced officers after an interview
confirmed my opinion that we must devise a new
procedure.
A further confirmation was the knowledge that
the candidates did not consider that the board
gave them a fair chance, and consequently there
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was a decline in volunteers for commissions.70
It was clear that the high failure rate had operational
implications. The shortfall of 25% in the output of the
O.C.T.U.s from the 600 which was their monthly target
meant that the War Office was unable to provide units in
the Middle East and India with their requirements, let
alone those at home.71
Moreover, not only were there numerous complaints from
O.C.T.U.s and receiving units overseas over the quality
of new officer material, but the cumulative effect of
poor selection was evident in the number of officers who
proved unable to shoulder the burdens of leadership. As
Brigadier Rees recounted:
...the psychiatric breakdown rate among officers
was high. A considerable number of officers had
been brought back from the reserve but were
really unfit. Some of them had even been in
receipt of disability pensions for neurosis since
the last war. Many had clearly been inefficient
on psychiatric grounds for quite a long time
before they were sent for psychiatric interview.
Equally, quite a number of men newly commissioned
from the ranks had a history of psychopathy which
should have excluded them. It was evident that a
neurotic breakdown had often occurred because the
man was unable to carry the extra responsibility
that came with his increase in rank, while his
shortcomings in ability and personality might
still have been compatible with efficient service
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in the ranks.72
Concern within the War Office was set against a backdrop
of growing civil unease over the whole question of
officer selection. By the middle of 1941 as many as
thirty parliamentary questions a week were being asked on
the subject,73 and the Select Committee on National
Expenditure was inquiring into officer selection as part
of its general investigation into allocation of manpower
to the Army.
On 9 June 1941 the E.C.A.C. had taken the decision to
create the Directorate for Selection of Personnel and
adopt psychological selection methods for other ranks. It
was thus only logical that their extension to officer
candidates should be considered.74 Indeed, at a meeting
in the War Office at the end of June to discuss the
institution of psychological testing for the Army as a
whole, Adam stated that he was not satisfied with the
existing officer selection methods.75 There had, though,
been little scientific study in Britain of the selection
of high grade executives and administrators, and unlike
other rank selection there was not a fund of civilian
72Rees, p. 64.
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experience on which to draw.76
However, it was known that the German Army had developed
a system for the selection of specialists and potential
officers. Brigadier Rees had received a complete record
of their procedure through the United States which was
still neutral.77 Under the German system an officer
candidate spent two or three days at a psychological
centre undergoing a number of intelligence and
personality tests. The staff consisted of a trained
psychologist, psychiatrist and a military representative.
At a conference at the end of the selection period, the
observers presented a report on each candidate to the
president of the unit, a regular officer, who had
7 8
ultimate responsibility for deciding their fate. With
the prestige of the Germans at its zenith at this stage
of the war, Adam asked for a system, possibly on the
German model, to be developed.79 In August the Select
Committee gave its blessing to this approach by
recommending that psychological tests be utilized as an
8 0
aid to officer selection.
7 6
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In the meantime, it was suggested that some improvement
in the existing system might be introduced. In the late
Summer the Command Interview Boards were removed from
command control and placed directly under the War Office.
Conferences were held to study the methods of the
Presidents, and attempts were made to interest them in
standardized interview techniques and the supplementary
use of intelligence tests.81
Preliminary experiments on a new officer selection system
did, however, proceed. Two psychiatrists, Captain Eric
Wittkower and Lieutenant-Colonel Fergusson Roger, who had
already been conducting unofficial investigations in
Professor F. A. E. Crew's laboratories at Edinburgh
University, arranged to undertake research at the
Scottish Company Commander's School. Their experiments on
the validity of psychological methods of assessing
officer qualities gave encouraging results when set
against the more traditional military assessment. In one
brief survey the psychiatrist's appraisal of the officers
under review correlated in 80% of cases with the views of
the commandant, who had observed the control group for
8 2
several weeks. In a further survey agreement was
reached in 90% of cases.83
81
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At a conference in Edinburgh in December 1941 the
psychological technigues used were demonstrated to Adam
and the Director for Selection of Personnel, Brigadier
McLean, and the decision was taken to establish an
experimental board within the city.84 Edinburgh
University consented to the use of its facilities and
grounds at King's Buildings, and the trial enjoyed the
full support of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Scottish Command, General Thorne, who as a former
military attache had first-hand experience of German
officer selection methods.85
No.1 War Office Selection Board was formed in January
1942 and included on its staff Major W. R. Bion, a
psychiatrist from Harley Street, Captain Eric Trist, who
held doctorates in psychology from universities in both
Britain and the United States, Major Jock Sutherland, a
psychiatrist and psychologist from Edinburgh University,
together with a number of experienced soldiers.86 Some of
the more bizarre German tests were considered unsuitable
for the British Army. One such technique involved the
secret filming of candidates' facial contortions as they
8 7
were subjected to progressive electric shocks. However,
from the beginning the Board adhered to the German plan
84
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in which psychologists, psychiatrists and military
experts shared the vetting of candidates. The staff
immediately set about honing the testing procedures and
8 8
by February the Board was assessing candidates.
Ten batches of potential officers having been appraised,
Adam returned to Edinburgh to watch the procedure.
Brigadier Vinden, a member of his staff, recounted:
All participated with the board staff and were
surprised at what they themselves discovered
independently about the personality of the
candidates which coincided with the board's
decisions. Thereupon, General Adam ordered me to
establish the system throughout Great Britain as
fast as possible.
From the Spring of 1942 all the Command Interview Boards
were replaced by new War Office Selection Boards
(W.O.S.B.s). With the expansion of the Army in India and
the heavier than anticipated officer demands from other
overseas theatres during the year, this took on a greater
urgency. By the end of September there were sixteen in
operation.9 0
The new Boards operated under the control of the
Directorate for Selection of Personnel, but a special
W.O.S.B. Research and Training Centre was evolved from





expert psychologists and psychiatrists, with Trist as
Senior Psychologist and Sutherland as Senior
Psychiatrist, to develop procedures, train personnel and
provide follow-up studies. According to Jack Davies,
Inspector of Personnel Selection at the time, a number of
considerations underpinned the evolution of the W.O.S.B.
technique:
Obviously one objective was to develop a
procedure which assessed suitability better than
the old Interview Boards. Equally important was
to inaugurate a system in which the Army at all
levels could have confidence. Still more
important was the aim of getting more people in
the ranks to aspire to commissions and to get rid
of any residual beliefs that commissions were
only for the 'posh' or for the Sandhurst
Stereotype. The WOSBs were informed by a
meritocratic philosophy.
There was, he recalls, also a feeling that it could be of
some positive benefit to civil life:
The WOSB procedure was highly innovative and I
should say that its possibilities caught the
imagination of wider groups, not merely among
those close to its development in the Army. There
was a stream of visitors from public and private
institutions to see the procedure and much
discussion about the modifications that might be
needed to adapt it to the needs of civilian
institutions.
The exact procedure varied from one W.O.S.B. to another
in order to discourage cramming, but all incorporated the
same basic features. Candidates reported to the Boards,
91




which were usually situated in large country houses, in
batches of thirty or forty for a three-day selection
process. The staff consisted of a President and Deputy
President who were senior regular officers, two Military
Testing Officers (M.T.O.s) who were usually line officers
of some experience, a psychiatrist and a psychologist or
a Sergeant Tester trained in psychological techniques.93
Those attending the Boards were required to conceal their
badges of rank and were known only as numbers.
After completing a detailed questionnaire, the candidates
underwent a number of individual intelligence and
personality tests. The latter consisted of a Word
Association Test and Murray's Thematic Apperception Test.
These were administered and interpreted by the
psychological staff.94
Candidates also participated in a number of group tests
conducted by the M.T.O.s. When the W.O.S.B.s were first
organized it was believed by some of the senior officers
concerned that all that was necessary to ensure adequate
selection was an intelligence test and a psychiatric
interview. In fact, it was conceived that the non¬
technical members of the Board merely provided cover for
the psychiatrist.95 The tests administered by the M.T.O.s





initially consisted of a group discussion, an outdoor
exercise which was little more than a "tactical exercise
without troops," and a physical test in which candidates
were expected to tackle an organizational problem after
half an hour's P.T.96
Yet it was quickly realized that practical group tests
had a useful role in assessing leadership through the
relationship between the leader and the led. The M.T.O.s
tests thus became progressively less purely military in
character and more organized on a definite plan according
to psychological principles. Designed to assess
candidates' initiative, powers of cooperation and other
social qualities, the most notable initiative was perhaps
the development of the "Leaderless Group Test" by Major
Bion, during which leaderless groups of candidates were
observed as they tried to solve simple practical
problems.9 7
At the outset of the scheme all candidates were
also interviewed by the psychiatrist. This provided a
broad overview of personality and detected any
unrecognized potential and strengths or underlying
psychopathic or neurotic tendencies. Moreover, the
psychiatrist acted as a technical adviser to the Board
and was given the responsibility of maintaining and





furthering a scientific attitude towards selection.
After candidates had undergone a further interview with
the President, a meeting of the Board members was
convened at which their judgements were compared and
discussed. The various character traits of each candidate
were recorded and agreed ratings given to each individual
trait.99 As trained Sergeant Testers, who generally
performed the psychological role at the Boards, did not
attend the conference, the psychiatrist came to represent
the qualified technical opinion.100 Since it was
considered essential that ultimate responsibility for
officer selection should lie with the military
organization, rather than its technical advisers, if the
new procedure was to prove acceptable to the Army, the
final decision on a candidate was taken by the
President.101 Those that satisfied the Boards were sent
on to O.C.T.U.s.
During the course of the war some 140,000 candidates
passed through the W.O.S.B.s, of whom approximately
98Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers [hereafter CAB], CAB 98/26,
"The Role and Status of the Psychiatrist in the War Office
Selection Boards," Revised Memorandum by Brig. J. R. Rees,
P.P.(43)37., 4 October 1943.
"d.S.P. , p. 460.
100Philip Vernon and John B. Parry, Personnel Selection in the
British Forces (London: University of London Press, 1949), pp.
54, 56.
101D.S.P., p. 460; Brig. G. N. Tuck, "The Army's Use of Psychology
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60,000 were recommended for officer training.102
Candidates who were rejected had the right to
reassessment by another Board.103 During 1943, after
consultation with Dr. Kurt Hahn, the headmaster of
Gordonstoun School and inspirer of the outward bound
concept, a Highland Fieldcraft Centre was established
with the aim of developing young soldiers of potential
rejected by the Boards for lack of maturity.104
Arrangements were also made for officers suffering from
certain psychiatric disabilities to be assessed at a
designated W.O.S.B. for redeployment.105 In January 1943
the Army began to grant permanent regular commissions to
selected officers, and with only minor modifications the
W.O.S.B. procedure was adopted.106
Macdonald Hastings, writing in Picture Post, argued that
the introduction of the new system of officer selection
was one of the most progressive initiatives that had been
taken since war began: "If successful it will put an end
to all talk of 'class favouritism,' and should lead to a
high increase in efficiency."107
102Vernon and Parry, p. 53.
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Certainly, there was a good deal of evidence to confirm
that the introduction of the W.O.S.B. procedure improved
the efficiency of officer selection. Between May and
September 1942, whilst the old and new Boards were
working simultaneously, the opportunity was taken to
compare the two systems by following up potential
officers at O.C.T.U.s. Of those selected by the old
methods, 21.1% were rated above average, 36.5% below
average and 12.5% markedly below average. In spite of
passing as great a proportion of the total candidates as
the old Boards, the corresponding figures of those
selected by the W.O.S.B.s were 34.5%, 25.2% and 7.9%.108
There was also evidence to suggest that a greater
confidence and sense of fairness was brought to the
officer selection process. Regular anonymous
questionnaires revealed that an overwhelming proportion
of both accepted and rejected candidates were satisfied
with the procedure.109 In September 1942 Adam reported:
These Boards are having an extremely good
effect throughout the Army. The candidates
realise that they have been exhaustively tested
over a reasonable period of time, by a staff of
officers who have been specially trained to seek
a common standard.
Even those who fail feel that they have been
given a fair deal and there have been remarkably
108CAB 98/28, "Follow-Up of W.O.S.B. Cadets at O.C.T.U. Progress
Report June 1943," R.T.C. Technical Memorandum No.4,
P.P.(S.C.)(43)36., 19 August 1943.
109Morris, p. 226.
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few protests at the decisions of these Boards.
There is consequently a growing feeling of
confidence in these Boards, which was lacking
under the old system, and in Commands in which
the Boards have been working for some time, the
number of candidates has appreciably
increased.1
Indeed, it was argued that the Boards played a leading
role in increasing the supply of material which rose by
65% between May and September 1942.111 Brigadier Rees
recorded:
In such serious affairs as the Selection of
Officers it is, of course, important that justice
should not only be done but that it should appear
to be done. The scientific basis of the New
procedure ensures both these objects.
Interestingly, it was noted that complaints about
rejections reaching the War Office tended to be mainly
confined to public school candidates.113
It was further calculated that the increased supply of
candidates, combined with more efficient selection,
resulted in two and a half times more above average
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114
review period than previously. Indeed, during a time
in which it was generally conceded that the quality of
Army intakes declined, between 1943 and 1945 the
rejection rate at O.C.T.U.s fell to 8%.115
The very heavy demand for officers in 1942 was thus
largely met,116 and although there was always a shortage
of regimental officers fit for active service in a front¬
line unit, the selection methods succeeded in providing
the Army with enough officers to contest the war to its
conclusion.117 The quality of officers also seemed to
prove acceptable. In a follow-up study of the performance
of W.O.S.B. selected officers in the Mediterranean
Campaign and of infantry units in the British Liberation
Army, 76% proved to be giving completely satisfactory
118
service in the opinion of their commanding officers.
There were though, according to some observers, factors
which undermined the technical effectiveness of the
scheme. Again it was clear that the adoption of modern
scientific methodology to solve an essentially human
problem rested rather uneasily within the Army system.
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wrote of what they considered to be the organizational
limitations placed on the scientific advisers:
Though the aim was to educate the Army gradually
into accepting scientific methods, the compromise
eventually achieved showed considerable technical
defects. Psychiatrists, psychologists and M.T.O.s
were technical advisers to the president; and
each president could run his board as he wished,
with as much or as little reference to the
technicians as he wished, subject only to the
controlling authority of the Director for
Selection of Personnel, himself a professional
soldier. Hence, the president, representing the
Army, was responsible for the final decisions;
hence also a major part was played by the M.T.O.s
who were regimental officers. This meant
considerable dependence on the subjective
judgement of a single man, and considerable
divergence between different boards.
The W.O.S.B. Research and Training Centre revealed a more
subtle limitation. After a detailed study of a designated
Board in 1945, it was found that because the President
had the final decision, the opinions of the advisers were
greatly affected, both consciously and unconsciously, by
the President's personality.120
Moreover, from the outset the War Office realized that a
good deal of hostility to the W.O.S.B. procedure would be
encountered from the Army. This perhaps explains why the
matter was never put before the Army Council. In fact,
Churchill himself minuted the Secretary of State that he
119Vernon and Parry, p. 55.
120University of Edinburgh, Department of Psychology, Private
Papers of Dr. B. Semecnoff, "First Report: A Descriptive
Introduction, " R.T.C. Report No. 160, Developmental Programme at
No. 14. W.O.S.B., 16 June 1946.
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considered that the commanding officer was the best judge
of potential officers, and that if he was not a good
judge he was scarcely fit for his position,121
Efforts were made to "sell" selection. In a letter to
Home Commands in October 1942, every commanding officer
was instructed to act as a visiting member of a Board at
least once,122 and Brigadier Vinden recalled that he
invited anyone whom he heard through the grape-vine as
being critical, to witness the new methods at first
, .12 3
hand.
Yet powerful elements remained unconvinced. The Expert
Committee, set up by the Cabinet in September 1942 to
inquire into the work of psychologists and psychiatrists
in the Services, acted as the focal point for criticism.
Of particular significance in this respect was the role
of the psychiatrist. Not only was it stressed by General
Paget, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, amongst other
senior officers, that the psychiatrist's interview
created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust and upset
the candidates by encroaching on personal affairs, but
that psychiatrists were dominating the selection
121
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procedure by virtue of their technical knowledge and
ability to present evidence. Some of the psychiatrists,
it was pointed out, could not appreciate what was
required of an officer because they had little or no
experience of Army life and traditions, and candidates
were being rejected who were otherwise considered
suitable. Indeed, it was argued that the psychiatrists
could be dropped from the procedure without any loss of
efficiency to the Boards.124 Brigadier Rees countered to
the Committee:
The slightest reflection shows that this
criticism is directed not so much against the
psychiatrist as against the scientific methods
which he employs. The critics object to the fact
that a man, who, on everyday standards of
judgment appears suitable to be an officer,
should be recommended for rejection by the
psychiatrist. They fail to pay attention to the
fact that it is just because the W.O.S.Bs. employ
scientific methods which penetrate surface
appearances that good results are obtained.
Furthermore, he noted, to eliminate the work of the
psychiatrists and the scientific technique they employed
would be absurd: "To do so would be to return without any
adequate reason to the conditions operating under the old
124
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procedure. 1,1 2 6
Although the Expert Committee refuted the complaints
placed before it,127 the Secretary of State succumbed to
the critics. In April 1943 psychiatrists at the
W.O.S.B.s were instructed that the number of interview
cases should comprise no more than half of the
candidates. For some time the shortage of trained
psychiatrists had meant that not every candidate had been
examined, but this formal limitation, it was argued,
compounded the problem. According to Rees, the
instruction had two effects:
It altered the status of the psychiatrist from
his position as medical examiner of all
candidates and allotted to him instead his
traditional role of alienist.
By encouraging the misconception that the
psychiatrist only saw 'abnormals' the anxiety of
candidates with regard to psychiatric examination
was increased.128
Moreover, it was contended, this policy resulted in a
considerable proportion of candidates being assessed
without an effective third opinion.129
This was accompanied by a further instruction in early
1943 that no questions on sex or religion should be asked
1 2 6 _. . ,
Ibid.
127
CAB 98/26, P.P. (43)39; CAB 98/29, "The Work of Psychiatrists on
War Office Selection Boards," Report by the Expert Committee,
P.P.M.(44)1., 9 February 1944.
128CAB 98/26, P.P. (43)37.
129Ahrenfeldt, p. 64.
83
by the psychiatrist during the interview. Robert
Ahrenfeldt, former Deputy Assistant Director of Army
Psychiatry, noted:
It should, however, have been clear to all but
the most prejudiced, that it was of the greatest
importance for psychiatrists, as medical men
required to assess emotional maturity and
stability of personality, to enquire in
appropriate cases into so significant an aspect
of the human mind, behaviour and social
adaptation as sexual adjustment. Similarly, it
should have been obvious that, in dealing with
religion, psychiatrists were not concerned with a
candidate's views on transubstantiation or
parthenogenesis, that they might advise his
rejection on grounds of heresy: rather were they
attempting a fundamentally sociological
evaluation of a man's attitude to established
authority, and the manner in which he reconciled
his own views and convictions with those of other
sections of the community.
It was perhaps unsurprising that in view of the
criticisms and the shortage of trained personnel, the
psychiatric examination was withdrawn altogether from the
Regular Commissions Boards (R.C.B.s) in August. One
Major-General in charge of a R.C.B. wrote:
Having sat as president on these Boards for the
past nine months, both with and without the
assistance of a psychiatrist, I am of the opinion
that this order was a mistake....
The presence of a psychiatrist as a member of
these Boards is a definite asset.
Despite this acknowledgment of the value of a qualified
130Ibid., pp. 64-65.
131
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medical opinion in selection, the views of
Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Martel, former Commandant
of the Royal Armoured Corps, although extreme, did
perhaps reflect those held in certain quarters during the
war:
The supporters of the introduction of the
psychiatrist claim that they had success because
after their introduction the proportion of
failures at O.C.T.U. was considerably reduced.
This proves nothing. It is far better to send a
large number of men with fine characters to the
O.C.T.U., even though some of them would fail,
than to send the more cute and brainy types that
would pass through any O.C.T.U., but not command
the respect of the men. The supporters of the new
form of W.O.S.B.Y. also claim that the thousands
of officers whom they produced fought well and
won the war. This of course is quite true but it
is a negative argument. Many of us are quite
convinced that we would have had even more
success in some units if greater weight had been
put on character and less on the cute type of
brain in the selection of their officers....
It seems well that the country should know
that a large section of the Army does not
consider that this side of the work of the
psychiatrist has been successful. Let us keep the
psychiatrist on this valuable work of sorting out
the men in the mass, but let us continue to put
our faith on the experienced regimental officer
for the selection of candidates for both
temporary and regular commissions.
Needless to say, the Brigade of Guards did not draw their
officers from the W.O.S.B.s.
The new selection methods may have provided a greater
sense of meritocracy, but the extent to which they
transformed the social composition of the officer corps
13 2
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must be questioned. Although William Shebbeare noted that
once the W.O.S.B.s started, appearance and manners seemed
to count for less,133 it was also true that no fewer
public schoolboys were commissioned under the new system
than under the old. Whilst three-quarters of candidates
accepted for O.C.T.U.s in a representative sample taken
in 1943 had been educated in the state sector, a quarter
still came from the public schools.134 A further survey
conducted in 1945 revealed over a third coming from
public schools.135 Indeed, it seemed that not much had
changed since William Connor's calculation in 1941 that,
as a fortieth of the nation's children, public schoolboys
had fourteen times as good a chance of becoming
officers.13 6
This was no doubt partly a function of the quality of
education a candidate had received, which enabled him to
show up well during selection. As one soldier recorded:
Of course, there is unfairness in the fact that
the man with a good education stands a better
chance of being chosen than a man with a poor
education. This means an advantage to the rich
and the well-to-do. But the blame rests with the
social system, not the Army. The Army can only
accept things as they are, and prefer the officer
133CaptainX, p. 57.
4Pariiamcntary Debates (Ccmmcns), 5th series, vol. 397 (1943-44),
col. 1435.
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86
who is well equipped "to the officer whose
equipment is less adequate.
According to Henry Harris, a wartime psychiatrist at a
W.O.S.B., it was also a question of educational
environment:
Those who go to boarding schools seem to
mature earlier in their social relationships; and
for this reason the public school seems to
provide better immediately available junior
officer material than the secondary school.
General Adam concluded: "We could have got all the
officers that we wanted if we had a proper system of
secondary education. 1,13 9
Yet there was also evidence to suggest that, despite the
scientific input into the W.O.S.B.s, a good degree of
personal subjectivity in selection still remained. Not
only did Vernon and Parry draw attention to the decision¬
making process which, in their opinion, gave good scope
for the subjective judgements of the Presidents,140 but
after its investigations at a designated Board during
1945, the W.O.S.B. Research and Training Centre's report
noted:
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There is good reason to think that both W.O.S.Bs.
and O.C.T.Us., and probably C.Os. too are
influenced to a considerable degree by the
appearance and general impression of the
candidate or officer.141
"Appearance," it was recorded, could be considered from
three angles; "Liveliness," "Bearing" and
"Acceptability."142 "As a member of one Board," recalls a
wartime officer, "I found them fair, with a leaning
towards the traditional Officer types."143
Towards the end of the war the Army began to consider its
post-war officer selection policy. In November 1944,
faced with the prospect of continuing conscription, the
Standing Committee on Army Post-War Problems suggested a
guiding principle:
We consider that, for the future, a system of
selection must be adopted which gives an equal
chance to men of potential ability regardless of
their earlier circumstances.
It was conceded that on political grounds, as well as
ensuring a common preliminary training, all potential
officers should spend a period in the ranks. Yet the
question of the selection procedure was deferred. In
fact, the view was expressed to the E.C.A.C. that the
141Private Papers of Dr. B. Semeonoff, R.T.C. Report No. 160.
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chief merit of the wartime system was that it tempered
the discontent of rejected candidates, but this would be
less important in peacetime.145
The decision was eventually taken to retain the
W.O.S.B.s but with modifications. Despite the Expert
Committee's acknowledgment of the contribution of
psychiatry and psychology to the selection of leaders,146
in September 1946 the Crocker Committee recommended that
not only psychiatrists but also psychologists should be
removed as permanent members of the W.O.S.B.s. Moreover,
it was argued, the responsibility for the recommendation
of candidates for commissions should lie with commanding
officers rather than P.S.O.s.147
During 1943 psychiatrists had been removed as permanent
members of the R.C.B.s. In August 1946 the Ritchie
Committee completed the process of exclusion by proposing
that psychologists be deleted from R.C.B. establishments
as well. It was further advocated that colonels of
regiments should be given more responsibility to inquire
into applicants' background and suitability for regular
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Despite the objections of the Director of Army Psychiatry
and the Director-General Army Medical Services that the
scientific procedures and medical safeguards could only
be carried out properly by experts,149 the new Adjutant-
General, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O'Connor,
supported the change in policy. He argued that the
strength of feeling in the Army against psychologists and
psychiatrists made it advisable that they be withdrawn
from the Boards.150
Bernard Ungerson, the Chief Psychologist to the War
Office during this period, concluded:
The technical side of W.O.S.Bs., that is the
psychologist and psychiatrist component in the
Boards, was never properly accepted by all senior
officers, nor, as is now well known, were we able
to persuade the Army that such members were
essential. Since 1946, the Boards have consisted
only of military members, in spite of the
contrary advice from all the very senior
psychologists and psychiatrists who advise the
War Office in these matters.
The Director of Army Psychiatry noted: "The Ritchie and
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32/12134, D.G.A.M.S. to Brig. A.G. Co-ord., n.d. [but 1946].
150WO 32/12134, Office Note by A.A.G., 5 December 1946.
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Crocker Reports put the clock back - the former to the
cavalry age and the latter to the Lewis gun age."152 It
seemed that the participants who did most to guarantee a
more equitable selection system were no longer required.
During the course of the war, the War Office made
important changes to the way in which it chose its
officers. Whilst in the pre-war Army officers continued
to be drawn from a limited cross-section of the nation
and were chosen largely for their claims on gentility,
the initiatives taken by the military authorities to
improve the supply of candidates and the introduction of
scientific selection methods seemed to give practical
expression to the notion that every soldier had a field-
marshal's baton in his knapsack, and that ability, rather
then wealth and the correct educational background, was
the sole prerequisite for commissioned rank. As the
journalist, J. L. Hodson, recorded:
The old notion that playing polo and running
a Rolls-Royce car are necessarily marks of a good
officer is out of date; war knocks such ideas on
the head. Leadership is the thing; and that
springs from a broad field.
However, whilst it was evident that the public school
class continued to enjoy certain advantages over other
social groups during the war, it is perhaps revealing
152WO 32/12134, D. of A. Psych, to D.S.P., 10 October 1946.
153
J. L. Hodson, "Officers and Men," The Spectator 168 (June 1942),
p. 550.
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that Trevor Royle's investigation of the post-war Army
recalls that not only were officers still required to be
socially acceptable to most officers' messes, but that
many national servicemen did not apply for officer
selection because they were unable to afford the extra
expenses of commissioned rank.154 Indeed, the
Parliamentary Labour Party Defence and Services Group
drew attention to the continuation of a hidden "means
test" and other special arrangements which preserved the
prestige regiments for the wealthy classes.155 Moreover,
it is relevant to note that during the post-war era not
only did public schoolboys continue to predominate in the
officer intake to Sandhurst, but by the 1960s it was
estimated that they still formed an absolute majority of
all new officers.156
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4. PROMOTION
Once the Army had commissioned its new officers, it faced
the problem of ensuring that the most competent of them
were promoted to fill the higher ranks- During the First
World War the heavy fighting and high officer casualty
rate ensured that promotion was conducted to a much
greater degree on merit than ever before, and a number of
Territorial and New Army officers made rapid advances
within the Army's hierarchy.1 Yet it was clear that
considerations of seniority, or Buggins' turn, still
remained. Despite the influx of "civilian officers," the
officer corps was to remain, particularly at the rank of
lieutenant-colonel and above, the preserve of regular
officers. It was, as one commentator has indicated, a
function of a "craft-unionism," and a social and
professional prejudice against "amateurs" which had been
a long standing feature of regular attitudes towards
... . 2
auxiliaries.
During the inter-war years promotion within the Regular
Army officer corps up to the rank of lieutenant-
colonel was usually conducted on a regimental and Corps
basis and mainly by establishment. As a general rule
1
Lord Haig's Final Despatch; cited in Pari iammtary Debates
(Ccmmcns), 5th series, vol. 358 (1939-40), cols. 1081-1082; Ian
Beckett, "The Territorial Force," in fl Nation in Arms. A Social
Study of the British Arm/ in the First World War, eds. Ian F. W.
Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1985), p. 141.
2Beckett, pp. 141-144.
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vacancies were filled according to seniority. However,
with the reduction in the size of the Army and a surplus
of senior officers as a legacy of the war years, there
arose a chronic block in promotion, particularly in the
cavalry and infantry regiments where establishments were
relatively small, and it was not unusual for subalterns
to have had over ten years service and captains over
twenty.3 Certain Corps tried various schemes to speed up
the promotion of the more able officers, but this merely
added to inequalities in the rate of promotion between
different Corps and regiments.4
It was not until the officer recruiting shortages of the
mid-1930s compelled an improvement in the career
prospects of young officers, that any real reform was
undertaken. In December 1937 the Willingdon Committee,
which had been appointed to examine the whole question of
officer supply, recommended that all establishment
promotion be stopped and a system of time-promotion
adopted.5 With the consent of the inter-departmental
3
Gerald F. Spillman, "Manpower Problems in the British Army. The
Balancing of Resources and Commitments" (D.Phil. thesis,
University of Oxford, 1985), p. 122.
4
Public Record Office, War Office Papers [hereafter WD], WD
32/4461, Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army
Officers, December 1937, pp. 34-35.
5
Ibid. , p. 129.
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Warren-Fisher Committee,6 Hore-Belisha announced in July
1938 that all officers up to the rank of major would be
guaranteed promotion at stated intervals in their career,
subject to efficiency. Promotion to lieutenant would be
awarded after three years, from lieutenant to captain
after eight years, and from captain to major after
seventeen. Promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel
and above would be by selection for the purpose of
filling particular appointments. Simultaneously,
reductions in the retirement ages of major and above were
announced, with majors being retired at forty-seven and
lieutenant-colonels at fifty.7 On 5 August 1938 nearly
2,500 officers were promoted.8
In essence, the reforms provided a compromise between
guaranteeing a more assured career path for all officers
and ensuring that the most able were appointed to
command units and fill the Army's higher ranks. However,
even allowing for antedates to service for the most able,
it was still a system of seniority in which length of
service rather than merit alone was the chief criterion
for the advancement of the majority of the Army's
officers. In the opinion of one officer, it placed a
5
Public Record Office, Admiralty Papers, AEM 116/3638, Report of
the Committee on the Conditions of Service of Officers of the
Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force, July 1938, p. 29.
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 338 (1937-38),
cols. 3301-3302.
8R. J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (London:
Collins, 1960), p. 132.
95
"premium on mediocrity."9
The effects of the new methods of promotion system were,
though, obscured by the outbreak of war. In January 1939
the Liddell Committee presented a report outlining a
wartime promotion code for Army officers,10 and this
formed the basis of the system adopted in September.
Under the wartime code regular officers were allowed to
retain their substantive ranks and accumulate service
towards substantive promotion. However, a new structure
of acting, temporary and war substantive ranks was
transposed onto this. In essence, this was designed to
allow officers to be promoted to fill vacancies in war
establishments as and when it was required, yet at the
same time provide a certain underlying continuity of
advancement. An officer would progress up the ranks in an
acting, and after a defined qualifying period, a
temporary capacity. Yet concurrently he would be
confirmed as war substantive, tenable for the duration
of the war, in the rank immediately below his highest
temporary appointment. Provided he had achieved temporary
status, no officer would thus have to revert more than
9
Lt. -Col. Graham Seton Hutchison, "Selection and Education of an
Officer," Ann/ Quarterly 42 (April 1941), p. 73.
10WO 163/68, Report of the Committee on Commissioning, Promotion
and Relative Seniority of Officers in War Time, C.C.A.C.130., 4
January 1939.
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one rank on displacement.11
Although promotion from second lieutenant to lieutenant
was to be automatically granted after eighteen months,
provided service was deemed satisfactory, commanding
officers of units, normally lieutenant-colonels, were to
control promotion up to major.12 Appointments to
lieutenant-colonel and above were entrusted to selection
boards of senior officers.13 The peacetime retirement age
limits were also put into abeyance, officers being
retained as long as their services were required, and the
pre-war system of annual confidential reports on officers
suspended because of the sheer administrative burden of
reporting on so large a number of wartime officers.14
Moreover, it was announced that apart from the granting
of regular substantive rank, all wartime promotion was to
be based solely on merit.15 "There is, thus, every
chance," promised Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State
for War in 1940, "for the young officer of outstanding
11
WO 32/4543, Conditions Governing the Cnmmissicning and Promotion
of Ann/ Officers in. War Time, War Office, 28 August 1939.
12WO 32/10583, M.S. to P.U.S., 4 August 1939.
13WO 163/88, "The System of Confidential Reports on Officers,"
Memorandum by M.S., E.C.A.C./P( 42)56., 29 April 1942.
14
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15Pariiamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 351 (1938-39),
col. 939.
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merit to reach high rank."16
On the outbreak of the war, the Army had at its disposal
14,500 serving Regular Army officers, 19,000 serving
Territorial Army officers and 20,000 Regular, Territorial
and Supplementary Reserve officers.17 To these were added
the new temporary wartime officers as they came off the
production lines, eventually numbering some 210,000.18 It
was laid down that the relative seniority of officers of
the same rank on the outbreak of the conflict was to be
judged, in the case of serving regulars, by the original
date that such rank was granted, and for other officers
by the date of calling up or mobilization. However, it
was instructed that Regular Army Reserve officers would
be judged senior to serving territorial officers and
other categories of reserve officers whose war seniority
bore the same date. Seniority in any rank granted after
mobilization was to be calculated on the date of
appointment.1 9
In view of the strenuous demands of the war as it
16Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 363 (1939-40),
col. 1136.
17
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Office Monograph compiled by Maj.-Gen. A. J. K. Pigott, 1949, p.
79.
18WO 277/16, "Morale," War Office Monograph compiled by Lt.-Col.
J. H. A. Sparrow, 1949, p. 21.
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developed, it was vital that able, young, junior officers
were given the opportunity to rise quickly up the
promotion ladder, particularly to the rank of lieutenant-
colonel and above, if the military efficiency of the Army
was to be maintained. Moreover, as the Secretary of
State, Sir James Grigg, was to point out in 1942, suiting
people to the correct jobs, getting the right leadership
and promoting the right officers was "about the most
important single consideration in affecting the morale of
the Army, the most important thing to get done."20
However, in the early years of the war it became apparent
that this was not always occurring. One factor in this
problem was that, despite efforts to remove inefficient
officers, the Army was not displacing enough of the older
reserve, territorial and regular officers, whom it had
urgently needed to fill establishments in the first
months of the war, but who were clearly unfit, on
physical or temperamental grounds, for their posts. The
War Office did provide an administrative procedure which
allowed reports to be submitted by superior officers on
subordinates who were considered to be unfit for their
present employment, or who were recommended for some
other employment. This was consolidated in 1941 with the
introduction of Army Form B.194(F) which was a
recommendation for a change to a more suitable
20WO 259/64, Transcript of Off-the-Record Conference with Press
Editors, 18 March 1942.
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employment, and Army Form B.194(E) which war an adverse
report. Both reports could be submitted at any time.21
Yet although a number of officers were displaced under
this system, and 171 were relegated to unemployment
between July and November 1941, 2 2 it was clear that for
fear of disloyalty, or reluctance to render reports on
subordinates against whose character there was no
complaint, the system was not operating with full
effectiveness. As Lieutenant-General Montgomery, a Corps
commander in Britain in 1941, noted: "I have said all
this before many times. But I still go round the Corps
and find bad C.O.s and old and useless Majors. Some
Commanders do not seem to know how to get rid of bad or
unsuitable officers."23
The result was that the Army was retaining substantial
numbers of officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and
below, particularly in the fighting units, who were not
only unfit for their posts, but were blocking the
advancement of younger and better trained officers who
were becoming available in greater numbers. Indeed, by
the Summer of 1941 the average age of infantry unit
21W0 163/88, E.C.A.C./P(42)56.
2 2
WO 163/50, "Age Limits for the Retention of Officers,"
Memorandum by P.J.G., A.C./P(41)61., 6 November 1941.
23Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Allfrey Papers,
Allfrey 1/5, Corps Commander's Personal Memoranda for
Commanders, by Lt.-Gen. B. Montgomery, 1 June 1941.
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comrr.anders was still forty-five years and nine months.24
In a paper to the Army Council in November, the Military
Members outlined the problem:
The Military Members of the Army Council have
become increasingly aware of the opinion
generally held by divisional and other senior
commanders that their commanding officers are too
old; and a number of cases have occurred where
those commanders have felt obliged to recommend
the removal of commanding officers, some of them
Regular officers with excellent records, because
they were showing signs of losing their drive and
efficiency as a result of their age, which has
often been about 47 or 48.
At the same time, the paper continued:
there is evidence that a number of junior
officers of and beyond middle age, who were
called up or voluntarily offered their services
at a time when the supply of trained officers of
a younger type was not enough to fill
establishments, no longer have the physical
fitness and mental agility to enable them to
carry out their duties with full efficiency.
Not only was it stressed that positive measures had to be
taken to reduce the ages of commanding officers, lest the
Army be sent to active operations with a large number who
would be likely to fail in battle, but it was argued:
If an adequate flow of promotion, acting and
substantive, is to be maintained and full use is
to be made of the capabilities of the younger
officers who are now showing themselves fitted
2 4
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for higher responsibilities, vacancies must
somehow be created for them.
To this end, the Military Members proposed a number of
measures. Primarily, it was recommended that the age
limit for appointment to a Field Force unit command
should be forty-five, the age dropping by a year every
six months until the upper age limit was forty-three. In
addition, it was proposed that no officer should be
retained in command of a Field Force unit who had reached
the age limit for the retirement of a regular lieutenant-
colonel, namely fifty, and that officers in command of
non-Field Force units should be retired at fifty-five.
Furthermore, whilst it was recognized that there were a
number of posts which could be held by junior officers up
to a reasonably advanced age, it was contended that all
officers of the rank of major and below who were over
forty-five should be scrutinized to assess their fitness
for employment, and that no officer should be retained in
any capacity in the Service beyond fifty-five.28
The enforcement of arbitrary age limits was, however,
regarded with a good deal of unease by other members. Not
only was it considered that age was no real criterion of
physical fitness and mental alertness and that maturity
of judgement usually began to develop at the age of






the Army of potential commanders of higher formations.
The Germans, it was noted, paid no attention to the ages
of their commanders. Moreover, it was argued, the Middle
East was already 700 short of its officer establishments
and, at a time of acute manpower shortages, the policy of
discharging officer material suffering only from
disability imposed by an arbitrary age limit would not
only be indefensible in Parliament, but would be hard to
justify to the Ministry of Labour as the Army pressed the
department to meet its manpower requirements.29
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, the Vice-Chief of
the Imperial General Staff at the time, recorded:
I am no politician but I should have thought that
properly presented a splendid case could have
been put to the public. Headlines 'Rejuvenating
the Army' 'Blimps to Go' etc & etc. Yet here we
were the three head 'Blimps' in the War Office
trying to get some freshening ^up in the Army and
the politicians defeating it!
The Finance Member, Duncan Sandys, was, nevertheless,
commissioned to investigate the problem, along with the
Military Secretary, Lieutenant-General A. N. Floyer-
Acland, and the Adjutant-General, General Adam, who were
2 9
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the War Office authorities concerned with promotion.31
Taking into account anxiety over age limits, in a paper
to the Executive Committee of the Army Council (E.C.A.C.)
in December it was proposed that a special review be
carried out of all officers of the rank of lieutenant-
colonel and below, with a view to assessing their fitness
to perform the duties of the positions they held.
The draft Army Council Instruction (A.C.I.) submitted to
the Committee noted:
It has become evident that there are now a
number of officers, who for a variety of reasons
(such as advancing age, physical or mental
slowness, lack of determination or drive,
overstrain, unadaptability of temperament or
character), are not able with full success to
discharge their present duties. It is only fair
to them personally, to the army as a whole and to
the cause for which we are fighting, that these
officers should be replaced without delay by
others better suited to perform these duties.
Under the review, reports on officers below the rank of
lieutenant-colonel were to be submitted by commanding
officers of units. Reports on commanding officers were to
be completed by brigade or equivalent commanders.
Governed purely by an officer's ability to perform his
duties under the exacting conditions of war, and not in
any way prohibiting the normal submission of reports
31
WO 163/86, Minutes of the 37th Meeting of the Executive
Ccrmittee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./P(41 )37., 5 December
1941.
32WO 163/86, "Review of Suitability of Officers," Draft Army
Council Instruction prepared by F.M., Appendix "A" to
E.C.A.C./P(41)121., 20 December 1941.
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under existing arrangements, reporting officers were
either to recommend an officer for retention in present
employment, removal to less active employment or
relegation to unemployment. The A.C.I, continued:
Every effort will be made, in the case of
officers who are thus displaced, to find for them
some other more suitable and less exacting
duties. However, a proportion will necessarily
have to be reverted to unemployment. On the other
hand, in view of the steady increase in the
number of fully trained officers of the younger
"type, there need be no anxiety about the
possibility of providing, by promotion within
units or by cross-posting, a sufficiency of
suitable and well-qualified officers to fill the
vacancies created.
Although this was considered a more politically
acceptable approach, doubts were expressed about the
administrative practicability of processing the 100,000
reports that would be rendered under the scheme,
particularly if the review was to be completed before the
recommencement of the operational season in the Spring of
1942. It was further questioned whether enough vacancies
would be created without enforcing some form of age
limit.3 4
The matter was referred to a conference of War Office
Directors who reported in January 1942. Their assessment
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scope of the review needed to be limited. It was thus not
only proposed that the review should be largely confined
to officers in Home Commands, but that attention should
be devoted to those officers who, it was deemed, had
reached the age at which some falling off in physical and
mental efficiency would be expected. This age was set at
forty-five. It was also recommended that within this
review there should be a special scrutiny of officers
over fifty-five, with instructions that those over that
age should only being retained if they had particular
qualifications or experience. Under this modified scheme
it was calculated that 16,962 officers would be reported
3 5
upon.
Although fears were still voiced that the scheme might
have embarrassing political repercussions, on 16 January
the E.C.A.C. consented to the proposed review.36 In
February arrangements were made with the Ministry of
Labour to help dismissed officers find civilian
employment, and the Ministry stated their intention to
request the Regional Manpower Boards to consider officers
who applied to them for employment as replacements for
younger men in reserved occupations who could be released
3 5
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for the Armed Forces.37 Against a background of growing
press and public criticism over the efficiency of
regimental officers, and the failure of the Army to give
youth a chance,38 the Secretary of State, Sir James
Grigg, gave his consent and the scheme came into
operation at the end of the month, the bulk of the
reports being submitted by the end of April.39
Under the review, 17,636 officers were reported upon.
13,804 were graded "R", retention in present employment,
1,966 graded "S", removal to less active employment, and
1,866 graded "T", relegation to unemployment. 296 "T"s
were later reclassified on appeal.40 Subject inevitably
to considerations of self-interest endemic in any scheme
of officers reporting confidentially on fellow
officers,41 it did, in the opinion of soldiers like
William Shebbeare, serve a useful purpose. "Under this
scheme," he noted, "a good many officers were either
retired or placed where they would do little harm. It was
a creditable measure."42
37WO 163/90, The Retention of Officers in Wartime: A.C.I. 422 of
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38WO 259/64, D.P.R. to S. of S., 7 March 1942.
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1942: 28th April, 1942., E.C.A.C./P(42)54., 28 April 1942.
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41Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Packenham-Walsh
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A further problem for the military authorities, however,
lay in the fact that junior officers were not always
being promoted with sufficient speed into vacancies that
were created. In 1941 the War Office did call for a
quarterly report, Army Form B.194(D), to be submitted by
commanding officers on officers who were recommended for
promotion to a unit command. Yet apart from the
stipulation that all second lieutenants would be
automatically promoted to lieutenant after eighteen
months, provided service was satisfactory, there was no
4 3
administrative provision for advancement within a unit.
What became apparent was that not only was there a
tendency on the part of some commanding officers to rate
the efficiency of their formations higher in importance
than an individual's promotion, and thus refrain from
submitting reports that would entail losing their most
efficient officers,44 but there was also evidence to
suggest that there was still an unwillingness to promote
officers over the heads of their more senior colleagues.
"The present system has many disadvantages, " wrote
General Adam, "the chief of which, to my mind, is the
reluctance of C.O.s to promote even outstanding 2nd
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author Alan Wood, serving as an officer in the Royal
Artillery, are worth recording at length:
Most men with outstanding qualifications get
commissions eventually if they try hard enough.
If another Napoleon were to enter the British
Army to-day as an ordinary conscript, it is quite
possible that he would be given a commission - in
time. Perhaps after a year. But what is
absolutely certain is that he would never rise
above the rank of captain before the war was
over. To begin with, his promotion would depend
on zealousness in upholding the Army's little
ways and on exactitude in obeying orders: and
another Napoleon could not conceal his impatience
with the Army and his knowledge that his
superiors were his inferiors. Moreover, promotion
in the Army goes, above all else, by seniority. A
brilliant officer will rise a few ranks above the
average for his years of service. A dud will
remain a few ranks below. That is all. So the up
and coming soldier, who was a ranker at the
beginning of the war, has to push his way through
three layers of senior officers who have got a
start on him, who still hold a monopoly of the
higher ranks, and who are quite incompetent to
run an army without his help.
Consider these layers in turn. Analyse the
Army officers from another standpoint, in terms
of seniority. First, officers of the Regular
Army....
Secondly, the Territorial officers....
Thirdly, there is the bunch of Old Etonians
who joined up immediately on the outbreak of war,
who were promptly recommended for commissions....
These are the three layers of the military
ruling classes, reading from top to bottom in
order of seniority, keeping up their relative
positions and keeping down the aspiring
subaltern. However high he rises in his own layer
as time goes on, members of the other layers will
have moved up too. Similarly, the Old Etonian in
Layer 3, however swift his promotion, is likely
to find a Territorial in Layer 2 one rank ahead
of him: even if he burst through this layer in a
meteoric jump, he will still find himself under
the orders of a Regular in Layer 1.
Plainly this whole system of promotion has to
be revised. It makes no provision for emergence
to high rank during this war of another Napoleon,
who became a general at twenty-six: or of amateur
soldiers like Cromwell and Washington. Promotion
by seniority may work all right in peace-time in
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the Regular Army, where the ambitious soldier has
a lifetime in which to climb his way up. It is no
use for the amateur soldier-for-the-duration, who
is only in the Army for the purpose of winning
this particular war, and is not interested in the
possibility of his becoming a general twenty
years hence. The situation now is even worse than
in 1914-18, because there has been so little
fighting so far. Far too few senior officers have
been killed; while far too few junior officers,
who should replace them, have had actual
experience under fire. Thus the top layers in the
Army are even more firmly on top to-day than they
were in the last war.4
In discussion of these problems at the beginning of May
1942, the E.C.A.C. agreed that surprise checks should be
made upon the manner in which commanding officers were
submitting A.F.B.194(D)s, with a view to taking
disciplinary action against any C.O. who was taking an
unduly parochial attitude.47
Moreover, General Floyer-Acland outlined a scheme which
was being experimented with in one division in South
Eastern Command as a means of improving advancement
within units. The "Red and Blue" scheme, as it was known,
required commanding officers, in their periodic returns
of officers, to underline in "blue" those subalterns and
captains who were worthy of advancement, and in "red"
captains and majors who were unfit for their posts. Using
these lists it was intended to cross-post officers
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between units with the aim of downgrading those marked
"red" and speeding up the promotion of those marked
"blue." The Military Secretary recorded:
Although this is not a scheme entailing
confidential reports, it is a method by which it
is hoped to improve the distribution of good
regimental officers in battalions, and it is
designed to have the effect of outstanding junior
officers being brought within the range for
recommendation for command, at an earlier age
than would have been the case had they been left
to rely mainly on regimental seniority.
The scheme was, however, regarded with a good deal of
mistrust by some members of the E.C.A.C. It was contended
that an extensive system of cross-posting was out of
keeping with the traditions of the British Army, and that
it would be particularly resented by officers in the
cavalry and infantry regiments. General Adam, though,
sprang to its defence. He argued that not only had it not
been lightly undertaken and that events had already
compelled a great deal of movement on the part of
officers, but that the general efficiency of a unit
should be known to formation commanders and if a
commanding officer's "red" and "blue" statement did not
fairly accurately reflect that state of efficiency, then
that fact would catch the eye.49 Despite tie opposition
of General Paget, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, Sir





extension to other commands at home.50
A reduction of the probationary period of a second
lieutenant to six months accompanied this initiative. In
a submission to the E.C.A.C. in June 1942, Adam argued
that this was vital not just in terms of improving the
financial prospects of junior officers and thus the
supply of officer candidates,51 but also in terms of
stimulating unit promotion:
The present rule hinders the promotion to
captaincy of the outstanding second lieutenant
(with consequent loss to the Service) since his
commanding officer is reluctant to promote him
over the heads of the lieutenants; the promotion
of a first rate junior lieutenant would be more
practicable.
With the support of Grigg, the reduction was announced to
the Army at the end of September and all those second
lieutenants who had completed six months of satisfactory
service prior to 1 October were promoted to lieutenant.53
The "Red and Blue" scheme was destined to last only six
months. In March 1943 Paget forwarded reports from his
Army Commanders to the War Office, and stated that they
50
WO 163/89, Minutes of the 77th Meeting of the Executive
Ccrnmittee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)38., 18 September
1942.
51
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52WO 163/89, "Time Promotion of Second Lieutenants," Memorandum by
A.G., E.C.A.C./P(42)88., 16 June 1942.
5 3
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were unanimous in their opinion that the scheme did not
justify the amount of work and expenditure of paper
involved in its administration. Not only was it noted
that there were very few officers being marked "red" by
commanding officers, and such cases were already dealt
with by A.F.B.194(E)s or (F)s, but that the percentage of
officers marked "blue" was also small, and for most of
those, vacancies in their own units were in view.54 It
appeared that the scheme had been scuppered.
In these circumstances Adam was compelled to request a
cancellation. In discussion, the E.C.A.C. recalled that
it had had some doubts about the scheme at the time of
its inception, and agreed that in the light of the
reports it would be a mistake to perpetuate it.55
It was contended, though, that fresh endeavours should be
made to ensure that the qualifications for the promotion
of junior officers were brought to notice. To this end, a
new A.C.I, was prepared by the Adjutant-General and the
Military Secretary and issued in July 1943. It announced
the discontinuation of the "Red and Blue" scheme, but
emphasized the responsibility of commanding officers in
ensuring that outstanding junior officers were either
promoted within units, or brought to the attention of
54WO 163/90, "Confidential Reports cn Officers: The 'Red and Blue'
Scheme," Memorandum by A.G., E.C.A.C./P(43)42., 5 April 1943.
5 5
WO 163/90, Minutes of the 105th Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(43)15., 9 April 1943.
113
higher authority if no vacancy within a unit could be
foreseen.5 6
By the latter half of the war there was evidence to
suggest that junior officers were enjoying speedier
promotion. Certainly, a good number of older officers
continued to command non-fighting units,57 prompting The
Economist to remark that "the Army at home remains, in
some respects, as hidebound, as unsympathetic and as
favourite-ridden as ever."58 However, by 1944 William
Shebbeare observed:
In many fighting units the average age of the
Majors is about 28 and there are plenty of
Colonels of 30. Most of these young Colonels and
Majors are regular soldiers and, while it is true
that before the war young men with brains seldom
chose the army for a career, the great
characteristic of these officers is that they are
5 9
young.
Indeed, by the end of the war Army Quarterly noted that
the average age of battalion and regimental commanders
had fallen to thirty-two.6°
Yet what continued to be evident, and what Shebbeare
5 6
WO 163/91, Minutes of the 117th Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M( 43)27., 2 July 1943;
V£> 163/52, War Office Progress Report, A.C./G(43)21., July 1943.
5 7
WO 163/90, "Senior Command Appointments," Memorandum by A.G.,
E.C.A.C./P(44)43., 17 May 1944.
58Editorial, The Economist 145 (October 1943), p. 580.
59Captain X, pp. 17-18.
60Editorial, Anoy Quarterly 53 (January 1947), p. 153.
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alluded to, was that proportionately few non-regular
officers rose to the ranks of lieutenant-colonel and
above. One soldier recalls that staff major was regarded
as the ceiling for temporary wartime officers,61 whilst
Colonel Greenwell, M.P for The Hartlepools, contended:
I submit that after five years of war it is not
unreasonable to say that man for man the
Territorial Army officer and the Regular Army
officer ought to be of the same standard of
efficiency, but it may be said that it would be
easier for a cable to go through the eye of a
needle than for a Territorial Army officer to
aspire to a rank higher than that of major, and
certainly the command of formations such as
brigade and higher seems to be almost exclusively
though not entirely, reserved for Regular
officers.
This was no doubt a function of the fact that officers
with greater seniority and experience were generally
considered to be the most meritorious. However, some
"amateurs" always felt there was an element of
unjustifiable discrimination against them. Jack Houghton,
a territorial officer who served in a battalion of the
Wiltshire Regiment, recalled:
Eventually the time came when my good friend the
C.O. had completed his three year tenure of
command. One day the Brigadier came to me and
told me that 'Monty' , who was now our Army
Commander had arranged for me to take over
command. I was to be immediately promoted Lieut-
Colonel and would take over my duties the
following day. I got back that evening and the
Adjutant produced a telegram from the War Office,
61
Peter Harris, letter to the author, January 1988.
6 2




_ _ to command the battalion! ! For once
General Montgomery had been over-ruled! Of course
I was bitterly disappointed, especially as I knew
that
_ was much junior to me. However, he had the
advantage of being a regular soldier, and by this
time we Territorials had learnt that they always
had priority over us.
According to another correspondent, rumour had it that in
the second battalion, the Irish Rangers, no territorial
would be allowed to command even a company whilst the
battalion was in Britain.64 In fact, Lieutenant-Colonel
A. T. A. Brown, a territorial commanding the second
battalion, the Monmouthshire Regiment, recorded that
regular officers who found themselves in subordinate
ranks could sometimes cause difficulties within a unit.
"It was apparent," he wrote, "that a few of these Regular
Officers were not finding it easy to serve under a
Territorial Commanding Officer, and it became necessary
to keep a close watch on attitudes and performance."65
Indeed, Frederick Bellenger, who was to become Secretary
of State for War in 1946, went as far as to argue that:
"Territorial officers may have got promotion while they
were territorials, but, when the war broke out, the
regular officers did their best to displace them on every
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64
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By fair means or foul, the result was that the command
appointments, and thus the day-to-day control of the
Army, remained very largely in the hands of the
professionals throughout the war. At the end of 1942 it
was recorded that three-quarters of officers holding the
rank of lieutenant-colonel and above were regular or
regular reserve officers.67 By the end of the conflict it
was calculated that nine out of ten officers who had held
the rank of brigadier and above had been regulars.6 8
Whilst this was no doubt militarily adroit in many
senses, it did, in the opinion of some of those serving,
have certain implications for Army life over these years.
As G. K. Lewis recorded in November 1943:
Wealth and birth remain the passport to the
higher ranks. The rank above major almost
invariably, that above colonel invariably, is
filled by the 'right sort' of people.... The
Select Committee on National Expenditure has
remarked on the ease with which titled socialites
obtained high ranking commissions in the early
days of the A.T.S. One can well imagine, then,
the state of things in the older Regular Army.
All this has bred a very special social and
political bias about the upper 'ten thousand' in
the Army. It influences everything: the incidence
of promotion, the scope offered to new ideas, the
66Parliamentary Debates (Caimans), 5th series, vol. 409 (1944-45),
col. 135.
67Parliamentary Debates (Cannons), 5th series, vol. 383 (1942-43),
col. 2235.
68Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 427 (1945-46),
col. 9.
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conception of the art of leadership.69
Although it was conceded that temporary and war
substantive rank would need to remain in the interim, the
priority of merit in the promotion of officers was not to
last long into the post-war era. Its continuation was
clearly unpalatable to a number of officers as they
sought to reorganize the Regular Army officer corps. In
December 1945 a conference of War Office directors noted:
Officers were still being given temporary
promotion by merit (as opposed to seniority)
although it was becoming increasingly difficult
to assess pure merit now that the fighting had
ceased. As a result there were, for example,
senior officers with much administrative
experience who were being kept in extra-
regimental employment or in subordinate posts
whilst their juniors remained in command of
regiments or battalions and, although they had
undoubtedly commanded them well in battle and
during active service conditions, it had to be
recognised that they did not all possess the
administrative qualifications or experience
necessary to hold such appointments under
present-day conditions.
In January 1946 the E.C.A.C. endorsed the directors'
recommendation that promotion be recentralized at the
earliest opportunity in order that it could be "tempered
very much by seniority."71
69G. K. Lewis, "Blimp's Successor," The Tribune, no. 359 (1943),
p. 10.
70WO 163/98, "War-Time Promotion Code: Modifications Necessary to
meet Present Conditions," Memorandum by A.G.,
E.C.A.C./P(45)131., 31 December 1945.
71W0 163/98, E.C.A.C./P(45)131; WO 163/99, Minutes of the 246th
Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Army Council,
E.C.A.C./M(46)2., 11 January 1946.
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Indeed, despite the acknowledged success of the
"juniors," it was reiterated in March that the post-war
officer's career would continue to be determined, as in
the pre-war Army, by substantive promotion linked to
years of service, with the command appointments filled by
selection. Certainly, the experiences of the war had
proved the need for an accelerated system. Promotion to
lieutenant, captain and major was to be after two, six
and thirteen years respectively. Moreover, it was
announced that the retirement age for all lieutenant-
colonels would be reduced to forty-five.72 What was
implicit in this system, though, was a certain conflict
of interests. As the Military Secretary noted in November
1946:
In peace the average age of a unit commander
is between 40-45, or will be as soon as the
reorganisation of officers into their correct
ranks and ages has been accomplished. It is a
satisfactory age for a commanding officer in
peace in view of career, length of service and
pension.
From experience in two world wars it has been
conclusively proved that the best age for the
commander of a unit, certainly in the R.A.C.,
Infantry and certain other Corps in the Army, is
between the ages of 28-36.
Within a few months of V.E. Day Army Quarterly held that
7 2
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the average age of unit commanders had risen to forty-
i *
two.
During the war the War Office made a number of important
initiatives in the field of promotion. Whilst the
advancement of officers in the pre-war Army continued to
be governed largely by matters of seniority, the military
authorities not only instructed that promotion was to be
based solely on merit, but took a number of practical
steps to seek to ensure that the Army became a more
genuine carriere ouverte aux talents. However, whilst
opportunities may have existed for young officers of
ability to progress up the ranks regardless of their
antecedents, not only was it clear that the command
appointments continued to be monopolized by regulars, but
it is perhaps also relevant to record that a year after
the end of the war it was reported that soldiers were
complaining of their senior officers that there were "far
too many old men in the Army not pulling their weight."75
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75WO 163/281, Ccmmittee on Army Life. Report by Lt.-Col. R. C. H.
Kirwan and Lt.-Col. D. H. A. Mackenzie, n.d. [but July 1946].
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5. OFFICERS AND MEN
A vital problem upon which the War Office was forced to
focus its attention was the establishment of a good
working relationship between its officers and men. The
trench warfare of 1914-18, in which junior officers and
men were forced to live together in close proximity and
in appalling conditions for long periods of time, did
provide greater opportunities than hitherto for the
development of closer inter-rank relations.1 However, the
officer-man relationship had always been, and would
continue to be in the post-war era, a distant and in many
senses a feudal one. Primarily, the King's commission
continued to confer upon officers superior living
conditions and numerous other privileges denied to the
rank and file. Similarly, whilst officers were expected
to take a paternal interest in the welfare of their men,
the style of leadership employed remained essentially
"autocratic" in nature.2 Implicit in the efforts in the
latter 1930s to widen the social basis of the officer
corps, and in particular in Hore-Belisha's proposal that
as part of their training officer cadets should spend a
year in the ranks, was the recognition that the modern
1G. D. Sheffield, "The Effect of the Great War on Class Relations
in Britain: The Career of Major Christopher Stone DSO MC, " War
& Society 7 (May 1989), p. 91; H. Essame, "The P.B.I.," Ann/
Quarterly 100 (July 1970), p. 205.
2Maj .-Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, The Ann/ in toy Time (London: Rich &
Cowan, 1935), p. 222; Lt.-Col. Graham Seton Hutchison,
"Selection and Education of an Officer," Ann/ Quarterly 42
(April 1941), p. 73.
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recruit needed to be led with rather more tact and
sympathy than in former years.3 Nevertheless, the
military authorities continued to devote little attention
to problems of man-management. In a volunteer Army
composed of well-disciplined regular soldiers, led by
officers whose social and educational background marked
them out as natural leaders, anything more was considered
unnecessary.4 In fact, Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Bingham,
who came to earn a certain notoriety in this field, noted
that whilst the subject of "animal management" received
voluminous treatment from the Army authorities, the human
beings in the Army seemed to have been ignored.5
Entering the Service in 1939, William Shebbeare
characterized his officers as almost a species from
another planet who gave the impression that they were
dealing with a herd of cattle:
Officers in the army are a race apart. To the
new recruit they appear to have no connection
with the army at all. It seems to him that if the
Officers' Mess blew up in the nicjht, the life of
the unit would go on undisturbed.
3Public Record Office, War Office Papers [hereafter WO], WO
32/4463, Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army
Officers, December 1937, p. 10; R. J. Minney, The Private Papers
of Hare-Belisha (London: Collins, 1960), p. 53.
4Brig. C. M. L. Elliot, "Group Psychology and Leadership," Ann/
Quarterly 55 (October 1947), p. 88.
5Lt.-Col. R. C. Bingham, "Man-Management," Jinny Quarterly 41
(October 1940), p. 121.
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The establishment of a close and comradely relationship
between officers and men was of central importance to the
morale and thus the fighting efficiency of the Army. Yet
as the war developed it became clear that this was not
occurring. By 1942 Army morale reports were commenting on
a serious "us" and "them" attitude on the part of
soldiers towards their leaders which was undermining the
very solidarity of the Army.7
One factor in this problem was that whilst the comforts
and privileges accorded to officers were generally
accepted if they were borne of military necessity, those
for which there seemed little justification apart from
the notion that gentility was part and parcel of the
officer's status, were resented by many of the citizen
g
soldiers. As one Army morale report argued:
The morale and fighting spirit of the Army as a
whole would be enhanced if the ordinary soldier
could be reassured that differentiations due to
social tradition and the subordination involved
in military discipline do not imply a fundamental
conflict of interests. Anything, on the other
hand, that strengthens his belief in the
existence of a fundamental gulf or barrier
between himself and his leaders has an immediate
7WO 163/161, Draft Morale Report, May-July 1942, M.C./P(42)1., 11
September 1942; WO 163/161, Morale Report, August-October 1942,
M.C./P(42)3., 15 December 1942.
8
David Englander and Tony Mason, The British SaLdiear in World War
11 (Warwick Working Papers in Social History, 1984), p. 8; Tern
Harrisscn Mass-Observation Archive [hereafter M.O.-A.], FR 1485,
12 November 1942.
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and marked adverse effect on morale.9
Certainly, the restrictions of wartime did serve to
narrow differences in the day-to-day standard of living
between officers and men. Shortages of accommodation
meant that officers' messes could often be spartan in
their provision. Rationing ensured that the standards of
cuisine in the mess were rarely as sumptuous as in
peacetime. The shortage of manpower also acted to reduce
establishments of officers' batmen.10 However, aware of
the feelings of the rank and file, and the readiness of
the press and parliament to attack the Army for
perpetuating an outdated class system, the War Office did
take positive steps to try to alleviate some of the more
insupportable inequalities which came to its attention.
One area that the War Office was compelled to re-examine
was the latitude given to local commanders to reserve
hotel lounge bars and other establishments for the
exclusive use of officers, whilst other ranks were often
confined to the less salubrious public bars. Although on
the outbreak of war the Army Council declared that it
would not prohibit officers and other ranks from taking
meals and refreshments together in public places, it was
also laid down that it was not conducive to good
discipline for officers and men to be seen drinking
9W0 163/161, M.C./P(42)1.
10
WO 163/102, "Servants and Batmen," Memorandum try A.G.,
E.C.A.C./P(47)1., 1 January 1947.
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together in public bars, and commanding officers were
enjoined to issue suitable instructions to that effect.
This countenanced the reservation of lounge bars for
officers' use only and led inevitably to a good deal of
resentment on the part of other ranks, particularly in
congested areas and in view of the fact that airmen of
all ranks were free to go where they pleased.11
Indeed, in August 1942, following parliamentary questions
on the subject and several incidents in his Cardiff
constituency, the Secretary of State for War, Sir James
Grigg, called for a reassessment of this policy. Although
there was strong support on the Executive Committee of
the Army Council (E.C.A.C.) for a continuation of the
practice on the grounds of maintaining discipline, it was
recognized that this was a particularly delicate matter
and one that had to resolved in tandem with the other
Services.12 Yet after inter-Service discussions, General
Adam, who had represented the War Office, reported to the
E.C.A.C. in October that the R.A.F. remained implacably
opposed to any policy of reservation in favour of
officers. Their view, it was noted, was that officers,
unlike other ranks, had their own messes and when a
situation arose which made it difficult for officers and
11
WO 163/89, Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of the Executive





men to frequent the same bars, to avoid ill-feeling on
the part of other ranks any prohibition which might be
imposed should be confined to officers since this would
bear less harshly upon them. Moreover, it was recorded,
it would be contrary to the American forces' long
established policy and custom to countenance any form of
discrimination between officers and men, and to their
desire to avoid providing grounds for disaffection
amongst their troops.13
In these circumstances, bearing in mind the difficulty of
issuing instructions that were at variance with the Air
Ministry, and the fact that publicans could not legally
put up reservation notices unless ordered by the military
authorities, Adam proposed that the general R.A.F. policy
in these matters should be adopted. Thus, no instructions
were to be issued to prevent the joint use of bars by
officers and men, but in circumstances which made it
necessary in the interests of discipline to take action
to segregate the ranks, local commanders were to allot
certain bars to other ranks only.14 On 16 October 1942
the E.C.A.C. agreed to this revised policy.15 This was
confirmed by the full Army Council at the end of the
13WO 163/89, "Use of Hotels: Segregation of Officers and Other
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month16 and communicated to the Army in December.17
Another area of contention for the War Office was the
officer's right to make private medical arrangements if
that was his inclination, whilst other ranks were
compelled to receive treatment only in military
hospitals. In fact, because it was considered that
virtually all of the medical services of the country, in
the form of the Service and Ministry of Health
organizations, were already available to the soldier-
patient who could be seen by specialists of the first
rank, and through difficulties over such matters as the
continuity of medical histories, convalescence and
establishing the time at which a patient became fit for
duty, this policy was reaffirmed in October 1941.18
However, in a paper to the E.C.A.C. in October 1942, the
Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Frederick Bovenschen,
identified this as a particular area that was open to
criticism in that there was one law for officers and
another for other ranks, and that in view of the fact
that there were men in the ranks who had demanded the
facilities open to officers, for "political and domestic"
16WO 163/51, Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Army Council,
A.C./M(42)5., 28 October 1942.
17
WO 163/89, Minutes of the 90th Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)51., 18 December
1942.
18WO 163/89, "Medical Arrangements: Officers and Other Ranks,"
Memorandum by P.U.S., E.C.A.C./P(42)137., 14 October 1942.
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reasons it would be desirable to eliminate this
differentiation.19 The first inclination of General Adam,
who as Adjutant-General had responsibility for Army
Medical Services, was to recommend that this privilege be
withdrawn from officers. Not only was it contended that
patients were generally returned to duty more quickly
under military rather than private treatment, but it was
feared that disaffection could be created if wealthy
soldiers were given access to better conditions, if not
better treatment, than their less affluent comrades.20 In
view, though, of the wariness of the E.C.A.C. over the
implications both in terms of the extra military staff
and accommodation that would be required to care for the
ten per cent of officers who utilized the private sector,
and the problems involved in enforcing surgical treatment
upon officers who might have less confidence in military
doctors than those of their own choosing,21 it was
considered, on reflection, that the differentiation
should be eliminated by offering the officers' privilege
to other ranks. This option, it was argued by Adam, at
least offered equality of opportunity to soldiers as well
as having the positive advantage of being in line with
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whether in the final analysis the imposition of a common
source of medical treatment upon all ranks could be
supported in law.22 On 20 November the E.C.A.C. agreed to
the change23 and the new regulations came into effect at
the beginning of 1943.24
Perhaps the most glaring case of insupportable privilege
which came to light within the War Office concerned the
extraordinarily comfortable lifestyle officers were able
to enjoy on the troopships, whilst other ranks often had
to endure conditions of abject squalor in the cramped
lower decks. As one soldier observed:
One might have thought that conditions on a
troopship would involve a degree of propinquity
that would induce a socially levelling effect
such as occurred among civilians in Britain
during the Blitz. But instead the officers
maintained as distinct a stratification as
possible, and sometimes attempted to rationalize
it as being necessary for military purposes,
which was absolute poppycock.
Indeed, by the beginning of 1942 Army morale reports were
detecting a good deal of bitterness on the part of the
soldiers which was undermining relations between officers
22WO 163/89, "Medical Arrangements: Officers and Other Ranks,"
Memorandum by A.G., E.C.A.C./P(42)47., 16 November 1942.
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and men. One report observed:
The wide difference between the
accommodation, food, and general amenities of
officers and other ranks on board ship is
frequently mentioned, sometimes with great
resentment that such a state of affairs should be
allowed in this democratic age.26
Another concluded:
It was easy to explain to the men that trooping
was an operation of war and that their intense
discomfort was inevitable and must be accepted in
the same spirit as discomfort in the front line;
but it was not so easy to justify, in view of
this explanation, the luxurious quarters and six
course dinners enjoyed by officers in the same
..2 7
ships.
The military authorities took action to improve matters.
In the Spring of 1942 an investigation of conditions on
troopships was undertaken. As a result of this, the
shipping companies undertook to reduce the accommodation
allotted to officers and officers' messing scales were
cut. This was followed by a further cut towards the end
of the year. Moreover, six inspectors of troopships were
appointed to monitor conditions and efforts were made to
improve the amenities for troops on the ships.28
2 6
WO 163/88, Morale Report, January 1942, issued with
E.C.A.C./P(42)37., 1 April 1942.
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However, whilst efforts were made to narrow some of the
inequalities between officers and men, the most pressing
problem for the War Office lay in what it came to regard
as the poor standard of man-management on the part of its
junior officers. Whilst prepared to concede the necessity
of officers leading a somewhat detached life from their
own and of following even the worst leader, it was clear
that better educated than ever before, less willing to
participate in artificial manifestations of respect to
those above them, and generally more socially
sophisticated, the wartime recruits were going to require
tactful and sympathetic management if their willing
cooperation was to be maintained. As one soldier noted:
In the old Army there was a blind obedience,
the result of strict discipline, which was often
confused with loyalty to one's officers and to
the Army. Today there is a much more questioning
quality in the loyalties of the other ranks. The
N.C.O.s. and men nowadays are not blindly loyal
to their senior officers just because the latter
happen to hold the King's commission. They first
wish to satisfy themselves that their officers
are thoroughly capable, and, as intelligent men,
they take mental note of every action, look and
word of their seniors, and assess them either as
simply officers who have to be saluted or as good
officers whom they would follow to hell and
back.2 9
These sentiments were recognized by the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, when he
stressed to senior officers in August 1940 that in view
2 9
quoted in C. W. Valentine, The Hunan Factor in the Army
(Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1954), p. 62.
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of the new type of soldier the Army was receiving,
greater care would be necessary in the handling of men.30
Yet although it might well have been thought that the new
wartime officers, all having served a period in the
ranks, would have brought a new degree of sympathy and
understanding to their relations with their men, it was
ironic that as the war progressed not only did many of
the products of the "democratization" of the officer
corps fail to display much capacity for man-management,
but they seemed to go to great lengths to distance
themselves from their charges. Indeed, there seemed to be
almost an inverted social snobbery on the part of
officers once they had been elevated to commissioned
rank. One soldier wrote of "beardless young O.C.T.U.
products, who are much too delighted with their new
uniforms seriously to bother about such trivial matters
as morale."31
The issue was thrust into the public domain by
Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Bingham, the commander of the
168th Officer Cadet Training Unit, who argued in a
controversial letter to The Times in January 1941 that
the problem of man-management was the direct result of
commissioning men who did not have the "old school-tie"
30WO 199/1649, Minutes of the G.O.C.-in-C's Conference, 7 August
1940.
31
Socialist Subaltern, letter to the Editor, The Neu Statesman and
Nation 21 (March 1941), p. 240.
132
instincts for leadership and responsibility for their
fellow man. "This aspect of life is completely new to
them, " he noted, "and they have largely fallen down in
it in their capacity as Army officers."32
Although Bingham's comments enraged left-wing opinion and
forced the War Office to dismiss him on the grounds of
contravening King's Regulations by publishing his views,
his sentiments were echoed by many serving in the Army.
"Socialist Subaltern," writing in The New Statesman,
recorded:
Unfortunately little improvement has resulted
from the gradual broadening of the basis of the
officer-class, since the new grammar school
officers have just as little understanding of
working-class psychology as the most feudal-
minded Old Etonians; indeed, they often make
worse officers, or tend to assimilate the
latter's general outlook without at the same time
assimilating that touch of rebellious cynicism
about spit-and-polish, etc., which often makes
the old Etonian a surprisingly popular officer.
This view was corroborated by the author Alan Wood in the
Royal Artillery:
These imitations have all the disadvantages
of the genuine product (apart from being slightly
more intelligent). Instead of supplementing the
Old Etonian officer with the qualities he lacks,
they merely duplicate his deficiencies. They have
none of his advantages. They have not shown their
patriotism by joining up the moment war broke
32Lt.-Col. R. C. Bingham, letter to the Editor, The Times, 15
January 1941, p. 5.
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out: they are conscripts like everybody else.
They have no snob appeal in the form of breeding,
poise or wealth; since most of them are
unsuccessful members of the professional classes,
they have no particular knack of handling men.
These are the typical cadets you find in the
O.C.T.U.'s today, the type whom Colonel Bingham
described as being worse leaders of soldiers than
men with the old school tie: and there is not the
slightest doubt that he was right. 4
Even the Editor of The Tribune belatedly conceded:
COLONEL BINGHAM has got his; and the Pressmen
have settled down to roost like rooks at evening.
Now the noise is over I can say that after all
there was an element of truth in what he said. I
did not say so before, because it was only just
that the Right should be punished for an
infraction of discipline, for once. The Left cops
it quite often enough.
However, whilst both Left and Right were agreed that the
middle classes were no good, as the war went on the War
Office also became concerned about officers who should
have displayed the "old school-tie" instincts. As one
Army morale report noted:
It is, perhaps, significant that one of the
Commanders who register complaints in this matter
is Commander of a Guards Brigade Group:
presumably the regiments under his command draw
upon promising sources, yet he finds that 'many
young officers on joining have no idea of man-
management . '
Thus, whilst assessing that the shortcomings of Army
34Boomerang [Alan Wood], Bless 'Bb All. An Analysis of the Morale,
Efficiency and Leadership of the British Army (London: Seeker &
Warburg, 1942), p. 52.
35Editorial, The TribiMie, no. 215 (1941), p. 4.
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officers were due in part to a lack of suitable officer
material arising from the fact that most candidates for
commissions did not have a background which helped them
to adopt the right attitude towards their men, the
military authorities also came to the conclusion that
they were the result of a selfishness and negligence on
the part of young officers from whatever background they
were drawn. In fact, what came to light was a basic
ignorance of the concerns of the majority of men serving
in the ranks which often made the young officer shy and
uncertain of the right approach to them.37
One of the interesting by-products of this issue was a
call by some military commentators for an extension of a
public school training to wider sections of the
3 8
community, even though it was a criticism on the part
of others that the "old school tie" training was out of
touch with the social realities of the modern world, and
often left its products with an inbred snobbery and
little knowledge of the lives of men in industrial
occupations.39 However, regardless of the educational
debate that was taking place, by 1942 Army morale reports
were portraying a worrying catalogue of mismanagement on
the part of young officers. "Several Commanders report,"
3 7
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39Hutchison, pp. 72-73.
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one noted, "that young and newly joined officers are
'woefully ignorant' of man-management and lack interest
in their men."40 In similar vein another commented: "It
is evident that there is still a deplorably large
proportion of officers who fail to care properly for
their men's welfare and to inspire their men's
respect."41
For the War Office the military implications were clear.
Not only was poor man-management highlighted as being one
of the principal causes of absence without leave,42 but
was seen as being the most important factor in the
growing gulf between officers and men which was
threatening to undermine the solidarity of the Army. As
one morale report concluded:
The problem is largely one of officering: the
troops are ready enough to feel friendliness,
respect, and admiration for the right type of
officer.... The troops' letters show, however^
that such a relationship is far from universal.
"In far too many cases, it continued, officers "are
looked on as a race apart."44
40
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Indeed, the view was put forward by General Paget, the
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, to the Army Council in
1942 that the key to the remedy of low morale in the Army
and to improving its military efficiency lay in "the
training of a corps of officers, whose efficiency,
example and instinctive interest in their work and the
troops would compel the respect of the men."45
The War Office took a number of measures to improve
matters. Primarily, the introduction of the War Office
Selection Boards by General Adam in the Spring and Summer
of 1942 was conceived as a means of contributing to an
improvement in the standard of man-management and a
specific group procedure was designed to evaluate the
ability of potential officers to manage their men. Henry
Harris, a psychiatrist attached to the Boards, described
this:
The Human Problems Session is a series of 8
stress interviews in which candidates - one as
officer, the other a stooge or "other rank"
dramatise the handling of personal or
disciplinary problems. Each candidate functions
once as an Officer and once as a Stooge. The
group sit round in a semi-circle and criticise
and discuss the handling of each situation before
going on to the next.
The ordinary problems that arise in any
relationship between officer and subordinate,
manager and employee are dramatised: and the
purpose of the session is to induce each
candidate to project his spontaneous social
attitudes so that one may note his appreciation
of interpersonal relationships, the degree of
spontaneity and effective improvisation he is
4 5
WO 163/51, Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the Army Council,
A.C./M(42)3., 11 August 1942.
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likely to show in handling them and the extent to
which his own attitudes are naturally group
cohesive^ group disruptive, group dependent or
isolate.
Designed to test a potential officer's empathy,
encouragement, firmness, tact, bringing others into the
picture, and motivation or identification with the field
of activity,47 Harris was in no doubt as to the value of
this facet of the selection process:
One's own conclusion - after being allowed to
participate in many hundreds of these sessions at
7 WOSB Winchester, 10 WOSB Chester and 5 WOSB
Wormley - was that this was possibly the most
valuable single technique in WOSB procedure.
In addition, greater emphasis was placed on man-
management skills in the training of officers. Although a
few lectures on the "art of leadership" were given to
officer cadets, in the early stages of the war the five-
monthly average period of training at Officer Cadet
Training Units (O.C.T.U.s) comprised a strict regime
given over largely to the inculcation of physical
endurance and technical military efficiency. The position
was further complicated by the fact that O.C.T.U.
commanding officers were largely left to develop their
own idioms and so there was little uniformity of
46Henry Harris, The Group Approach to Lea(5exrship-Testing (London:
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practice.
However, after studying the Army morale reports, in the
Spring of 1942 Adam asked the Director of Military
Training at the War Office to re-examine their methods
and curricula with a view to improving man-management.50
During the Summer and Autumn revised methods of training
were put into place. After having been selected for
officer training, cadets were sent in the first instance
to new pre-O.C.T.U. Training Centres. There candidates
underwent an intensive course of basic military
instruction and testing, and the time a candidate spent
at these centres, no more than eight weeks at the
maximum, was determined by his state of training on
arrival. Not only did this have the advantage of helping
to ensure that all candidates arrived at O.C.T.U.s at a
common standard of elementary fitness and training, and
that time and space were not wasted in training men who
would eventually be found unfit for commissioning, but it
allowed for a respectively shortened O.C.T.U. course,
reduced to an average of four months, to concentrate its
efforts much more in developing the skills required for
man-management.51
49WO 277/36, "Training in the Army," War Office Monograph compiled
by Lt.-Col. J. W. Gibb, 1961, pp. 6, 254, 263.
50WO 163/88, E.C.A.C./P(42)37.
51
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At a conference with O.C.T.U. commanders in April 1942
the new approach was outlined. Although cadets were still
to be encouraged to take a pride in their physique,
appearance and military skill and knowledge, a new bias,
it was noted, had to be given to O.C.T.U. training in
general. Steps had to be taken, it was stressed, to
engender confidence and bring out personality, inculcate
a sense of responsibility, and improve the ability of
cadets to handle men.52 This change in emphasis was
reflected in instructions that a more informal and
discursive atmosphere was to be created in which
candidates were positively encouraged to make bold
decisions and give solutions to problems that were
unorthodox. Greater provision was also to be made for
5 3
cadets to command each other on a day-to-day basis.
Moreover, a new standardized O.C.T.U. syllabus was
adopted, coming into effect in September,J4 which set
aside specific training time for the study of man-
management and made this part of the core curriculum for
whatever Arm an officer was to serve in.55
Arising out of this, some new training techniques were
developed. As many cadets had never spoken in public
5 2
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before, all were expected to deliver a "lecturette," a
ten-minute talk to their "platoon" on any subject of
their choosing, in order to hone communication skills.56
The use of plays was encouraged in order to dramatize the
various human problems that the officer would confront.57
Army psychiatrists were also dispatched to O.C.T.U.s to
lecture on the psychology of morale and leadership.58 One
such specialist, Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. M. Wilson,
compiled notes for those who might be called upon to
discuss these questions. "Officers and men," he wrote,
"cannot be attached and removed like articles of
equipment. A unit is a living organism in which grafting
is as difficult as in trees."59 Of further note was the
production, at the suggestion of Army psychiatrists, of a
special film for officer cadets in 1943, entitled The Way
Ahead. This illustrated the growth of the officer-man
relationship and the emotional rewards of the officer's
duties. Although eventually made by Two Cities, an
external commercial company, it was written according to
psychiatric prescription and was, in the opinion of
56Capt. R. Bemays [hereafter Bemays (1)], "Reflections on a Tour
of O.C.T.Us.," Jinny Quarterly 48 (April 1944), p. 95.
5 7
WO 163/53, War Office Progress Report, A.C./G( 44)41., November
1944.
5 8
Privy Council Office, Report of an Expert Committee en tte Work
of Psychologists and Psychiatrists in tin Services (London:
HMSO, 1947), p. 58.
5 9
Robert H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Armj in the
Second World War (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 198.
141
Brigadier J. R. Rees, suggestive of a way in which
psychiatry could play a positive role in solving some of
the problems of social reconstruction.60
Perhaps most significantly, the military authorities
recognized that methods of leadership needed to be
modified in accordance with the needs of the wartime
recruit. The changes were incorporated in two pamphlets
for officers which were expected to become the officers'
"bibles" in these matters; The Soldier's Welfare, first
issued by the War Office in July 1941, and Comrades in
Arms, produced in June 1942. These publications were
notable for being the first official attempts by the Army
to explain in simple form not only the importance of man-
management, but how results could best be achieved.51
Major R. A. C. Radcliffe, a wartime officer working on
Adam's staff, provided an illuminating commentary on
these works for Army Quarterly. Although Radcliffe noted
that twenty-five years previously the industrial age had
largely destroyed the feudal relationship between master
and man, the majority of soldiers during the First World
War, he argued, had been content to receive orders and
obey them without much questioning, and the officer who
Report of an Expert Cnmnrittee on the Work of Psychologists and
Psychiatrists in the Services, p. 57; John Rawlings Rees, The
Shaping of Psychiatry by War (London; Chapman & Hall, 1945), p.
88.
61
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had shown his men reasonable kindness and had looked
after their physical requirements had usually been
successful in establishing the right relationship.
However, he recorded, the results of popular education
and other social improvements, the greater suspicion in
society towards those who represented a ruling class in
any form, and the more complex nature of social life in
general had made the officer's task of establishing a
good working relationship with his men a far more
difficult and demanding one than his father's had been in
1914-18, and new methods were consequently required.
These publications outlined the methods the officer
needed to adopt in these changed circumstances.62
A typical sentence in Comrades in Arms seemed almost
revolutionary in its wording when it stated;
The army is getting older men who have been
possibly keen trade unionists with strong
political views as well; very often they will
come into the army suspicious and resentful of
its authority, and it will be necessary to
understand their point of view and make the
necessary allowances.63
Indeed, whilst in bygone eras officers might have
addressed soldiers in a rather condescending manner, any
suspicion of patronage was now frowned upon. The
62Maj. R. A. C. Radcliffe, "Officer-Man Relationships," Anvy
Quarterly 46 (May 1943), pp. 113-114.
Comrades in Arms; quoted in Tern Harrisscn, "The British Soldier:
Changing Attitudes and Ideas," The British Journal of Psychology
35 (January 1945), p. 36.
143
Soldier's Welfare warned officers not to talk down to
their men, to use plain words of one or two syllables, to
avoid eloquence and never to use sarcasm.64 In addition,
Comrades in Azrms stressed the importance of always
keeping in mind the well educated in the ranks and noted
that the officer who showed his awareness and
appreciation of their better education, both by the way
he talked to them and by the way he employed them, would
turn potential rebels into loyal and useful soldiers.55
Furthermore, whilst officers might have formerly regarded
the soldier's place as being "not to reason why but to do
and die,"66 Comrades in Arms now instructed officers that
it was necessary to explain the reasons for orders if the
men's full cooperation was to be achieved.67 The
Soldier's Welfare advised officers that the soldiers'
views should be positively sought over most matters
affecting their welfare, and that such action
6 8
strengthened discipline and was not a sign of weakness.
Comrades in Arms even encouraged officers to take part in
"free for all" discussions with their men over
particularly controversial issues as a means of defusing
64
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6 9
discontent and developing a sense of camaraderie.
Moreover, whilst officers might once have assumed that
soldiers could be left to amuse themselves in their spare
time, The Soldier's Welfare now informed them that not
only did they have an obligation to uphold the traditions
of the Army by playing games with the men, but they had a
positive duty to arrange entertainment and promote
schemes of education as well.70 On top of this, whilst
officers had always been expected to provide some sort of
advice for soldiers with personal or domestic worries,
The Soldier's Welfare advised them that their role in
this respect assumed a far greater importance than ever
before. Officers were encouraged to acquaint themselves
with the various welfare organizations to which a soldier
could apply for assistance, allot a certain time in the
week when they could be approached privately on these
matters, give practical help and advice when they could,
and to remember that it simply helped a man just to talk
through his troubles with a sympathetic listener.71
In summing up his commentary, Radcliffe recorded that if
one compared the officer-man relationship in the current
Army with the relationship at any other period of its
history, the conclusions were clear. Firstly, the
69
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relationship was more difficult and complex, but, if
achieved, was more akin to real comradeship. Secondly,
the relationship demanded more work for the junior
officer, but at the same time he received more help and
guidance in doing it.72
What the guidance the officer now received demonstrated,
he argued, was that the Army had not ignored developments
that had been taking place in civilian society. On the
contrary, he noted:
realizing that an army recruited both in
officers and men from civilians must to a large
extent reflect the ways of living of those
civilians, it has studied those ways, and then
shaped its methods of dealing with them
accordingly."
Yet what was implicit in this guidance and what the Army
was trying to instil in its officers, he continued, was
that the secret of success in modern leadership lay not
only in working with the men and getting them to
cooperate with their leader, rather than just issuing
orders that had to be obeyed, but in understanding and
appreciating their men's mental and emotional needs as
well as their physical ones.74
Whilst these initiatives were obviously of vital
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between officers and men, of particular note also was an
element of social idealism in military thinking. As
Radcliffe concluded:
Certainly it is my firm belief and hope that
the officer-man relationship in the army today is
laying the foundation of a better and healthier
community spirit in this country after the war.
As the war went on there was evidence of an improvement
in the relationship between officers and men. The Army
morale report for August to October 1944 noted that "both
Commander's reports and censorship extracts indicate that
relations are generally satisfactory."76 Again, at the
beginning of 1945 it was recorded that "commanders
generally are well satisfied with the relations between
officers and men."77
However, whilst the relationship may have improved,
questions have to be asked about the extent to which the
gulf between the two was really eradicated. Although the
War Office may have tried to revise some of the
inequalities between officers and men, it was clear that
officers continued to receive many privileges denied to
the rank and file. Whilst officers were entitled to
travel first class on the railways, other ranks were
75
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consigned to third-class carriages, and often, it was
recorded, were barred from empty first-class
accommodation despite the great overcrowding on the
trains.78 Although a soldier could only buy sports
clothes from shops and had to have a certificate signed
by his officer to that effect, it was noted that officers
could buy all sorts of civilian clothing merely by
certifying that they were for their own personal use.79
Whilst restrictions on the use of Army transport were in
place in order to conserve fuel and rubber, it continued
to be alleged that officers were misusing vehicles for
their own private leisure pursuits.80 Although women were
conscripted to war work, the number of officers' wives
who managed to escape being called up and followed their
husbands around the country was described as a major
scandal of the war.81 Even in the administration of
justice in the Army there appeared to be anomalies. This
prompted a debate in parliament in the Summer of 1942
over different penalties being applied to officers and
men for similar offences, and although the War Office
refuted all accusations of leniency, it was admitted that
78Parliamentary Debates (Ccmmons), 5th series, vol. 379 (1941-42),
col. 636; Ibid., vol. 397 (1943-44), col. 2040.
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unlike other ranks who could be sentenced to a period of
detention, the Army Act only allowed officers to be
reprimanded or dismissed, and that in dismissing an
officer from the Service consideration had to be given to
the fact that an officer's chances of securing a civilian
8 2
livelihood would be severely prejudiced.
What was perhaps most significant in this respect,
however, was that despite the restrictions of wartime the
fundamental rights of officers to a separate mess, to be
valeted by batmen, to more comfortable accommodation when
it could be secured, and to a better general standard of
day-to-day living than the men, remained unchallenged.
This factor was particularly stressed by William
Shebbeare. Writing in 1944 he noted:
The whole daily routine of an officer is far more
luxurious than that of his men. He gets up an
hour later, he is called by a batman who brings
him a cup of tea and hot water, lays out his
clothes and cleans his uniform. Throughout the
day he eats his meals not in a drab mess-room but
in the more comfortable atmosphere of the
officer's mess dining room, where he is waited on
by the mess waiters. He can sit and read the
papers in an armchair by the fire in the ante¬
room. And so on. I know that when I first became
an officer I was amazed at the incredible
increase in my comforts. This comfort is a
8 3
serious barrier between officers and men.
In his opinion the greater comforts the officer was
accorded had two important implications. Firstly, they
6 2




quickly made an officer forget the relative discomforts
he had suffered a few months previously as a soldier in
the ranks. Secondly, they tended to instil in the men the
impression that officers were pampered, disliked
undergoing discomforts and were never really "in the
war". He outlined his solution to the problem:
I do not think the way to destroy this barrier is
necessarily to reduce the standard of living of
the officers: I would much rather see it done by
raising the standard of living of the men. In the
squadron I am in, every troop has a furnished
quiet room, with games and papers and a fire.
Some of these rooms are more comfortable than
anything to be found at the officers' mess. But
however it is done, somehow or other officers
must stop leading cushy lives by comparison with
their men.
Interestingly, Shebbeare's analysis was shared by
another military commentator, C. R. N. Routh, who argued
in an article in Army Quarterly in July 1944:
The standard of living in the modern army will
probably have to be raised: so long as the
material comforts of the officers' mess are so
infinitely greater than those of the private
soldier, so long will there be some gulf between
officers and men. 5
Significantly, this was one of the points raised by the
Parliamentary Labour Party Defence and Services Group in
a submission to the War Office in December 1946. "There
should be, " it was recorded, "a general lifting of the
84
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standard of life and conditions of the O.R. nearer to
8 6
that of the officer." Although after consideration of
the matter the Army Council agreed that the private
soldier was entitled to a reasonable standard of life and
conditions, and that improvements would be made to that
end, it was perhaps a sign of the Army's post-war
retrenchment that it was concluded that it would be
neither "possible" nor "desirable" to attempt to
assimilate the standards of officers and other ranks.87
What was perhaps most important, however, in the
continuing gulf between officers and men, was that
despite evidence of an eventual improvement in the
8 8
standard of man-management of young officers, questions
have to raised about the extent to which the new training
and guidance given to officers in these matters took full
effect. Indeed, Army morale reports continued to give the
War Office grounds for concern over the standard of man-
management of its young officers. The report for May to
July 1943 noted that eight commanders were of the opinion
that the standard of care and interest fell short of what
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it should have been.89 The report for August to October
1943 recorded that whilst soldiers were as ready as ever
to appreciate the right type of officer, such officers
were not as numerous as might be hoped.90 The report for
November 1943 to January 1944 stressed the "deplorable
state of man-management prevailing," and pointed out:
This is, no doubt, especially true of officers in
technical arms and in large establishments where
the rapid turnover of personnel makes it
difficult for the right relationship to be
established; but there is no doubt that a certain
unjustified complacency prevails even in units
where such extenuating circumstances do not
exist. "9 1
The feelings of soldiers were summed up by the serving
National-Liberal M.P., Richard Bernays, who argued in an
article in Army Quarterly in August 1943 that whatever
guidance and instructions cadets received in these
matters, young officers still displayed an alarming lack
of interest in or concern for their men, and that the
first feeling a recruit had towards his officer was that
were was still "an apparently unbridgeable gulf between
them." In fact, he recorded:
What impressed me was how little practical
expression I found of the Army Council's
intentions with regard to the relationship
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between officers and men. These are set out
admirably in those two War Office publications,
'Comrades in Arms' and 'The Soldiers Welfare.' If
that spirit of sympathy and understanding really
permeated the atmosphere of the Training Camp^
then there would be little cause for complaint.
In accounting for these difficulties, the military
authorities continued to highlight the shortcomings of
the officer material they received. This was particularly
stressed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Sparrow, Assistant
Adjutant-General at the War Office, who argued after the
war that whilst the lack of an "old school tie"
background with its traditions of leadership certainly
prevented a very large proportion of officers from
understanding and practising the art of man-management,
the "old school tie" officer suffered correspondingly
because of a lack of awareness of the background from
which his men were drawn. He concluded:
The response of the regimental soldier to the
demands made upon him is an indication less,
perhaps, of the degree of efficiency achieved by
the War Office, than of the quality of society
that produced him. The War Office had to work on
the material that came to its hand. Of this, it
is enough to say that the shortage of good
officer material was perhaps the gravest of all
enemies to military morale, and 'man-management'
was the lesson that a large proportion of
officers found it hardest to learn.
However, what was perhaps most significant, and what the
9 2
Lieut. R. Bemays, "Man-Officer Relationships," Ana/ Quarterly
46 (August 1943), p. 249.
93WO 277/16, "Morale," War Office Monograph compiled by Lt.-Col.
J. H. A. Sparrow, 1949, p. 21.
153
military authorities themselves came to recognize, was
that no matter what training and guidance in man-
management a young officer was given, the most important
influence on his performance in this respect was the
example and supervision of the senior officers in his
unit, and in particular his commanding officer. As the
Army morale report for November 1943 to January 1944
itself admitted: "It is upon C.Os. and company commanders
that the chief responsibility for the state of man-
management must rest."94
Indeed, despite the constant efforts of the War Office to
impress upon commanding officers the need to develop good
man-management practices in their units, a process that
led to General Adam issuing a special letter on the
9 5
subject in June 1943, the problem was that many of
these officers, the majority of whom were regulars,
seemed unable to grasp either the importance of man-
management in a wartime citizen Army, or the new
techniques that were required. Not only did morale
reports acknowledge that some of these officers lacked an
awareness of the needs of the wartime soldier, but that
some in themselves were not really interested in their
men and therefore did not take pains to ensure that their
94WO 163/53, A.C./G(44)22.
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junior officers took an interest in them.96 Moreover,
some clearly resented the methods of man-management that
the War Office was trying to promote. One officer, Major
M. J. P. M. Corbally, wrote of his concern that the
position and authority of the officer had been undermined
by gutter-inspired ideologies which decried those
9 7
qualities in a man which raised him above his fellows.
Instead, he argued:
The Cadet must be suitably influenced and
educated in the idea that, by taking the King's
Commission, he has removed himself completely and
irrevocably from the life, ideals and interests
of his erstwhile comrades in the ranks; that
never again can he be 'one of them' and that,
from now on, his attitude and outlook, code of
manners and behaviour, and standards generally,
must be entirely different.
For William Shebbeare, the problem was due more than
anything to the social background of these officers:
The regular officers now remaining in the army
are admittedly the cream of the pre-war regulars,
but they all share the outlook common to all
regulars. These officers who remain all hold the
rank of Major or above. It is therefore they who
set the whole tone of how other officers
behave.... It is not simply that these officers
belong politically to the Right. It is not simply
that they look on trade unions as trouble making
organisations without understanding how great is
the protection a trade union gives to a working
man. Nor is it just that they have no idea what
life was like for the present-day soldier who was
96WO 163/53, A.C./G(44)4.
97Maj. M. J. P. M. Corbally, "The Officer-Producing Class,"
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 91 (May 1946),
pp. 205.
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unemployed and on the Means Test in the days when
his officers were pig-sticking and playing polo.
It is above all that the combination of these
things makes the average regular officer - good
fellow though he is - incapable of seeing things
as his men see them, of understanding what his
men are thinking, of knowing how things will
strike his men. It is for this reason that the
men are apt to look on their officers as a
totally different species of human being from
themselves.
In illustration of this, he continued:
After I had been some months in the army, I
and a number of my fellow-soldiers who were
considered 'potential officers' were given
occasional lectures by senior officers. I
remember my amazement at hearing one Major tell
us: 'After the war fox-hunting people must be
ready to make welcome in the hunting field rich
men from the towns who have little knowledge of
the country life. It is no good laughing as we
usually do at nouveaux riches who have made their
own fortunes in trade. If we are going to keep
hunting going, we must depend on subscriptions
from these people, and so I feel we should be
ready to welcome them and make friends with
them. ' And then, as if feeling he had said
something shockingly unorthodox and seditious, he
added, with a delightful smile I have never
forgotten, 'I don't know whether you think what
I'm saying is terribly socialistic.' The more you
ponder this remark, the more I think you will see
it to be a sublime example of how some officers
can fail to comprehend any of the social events
r- , . 10 0of our time.
Whatever the shortcomings of new wartime officer
material, as one Adjutant of an O.C.T.U. argued in 1944:
"Our cadets have got the right instincts in them. What I
am afraid of is what will happen to them when they come




under some senior officers I know of in the Army."101
Another officer wrote on the same lines at the end of the
war: "The Army still gives too much authority to men who
believe that officers and other ranks are made of
different clay."102
Certainly, the Army learnt from its wartime experiences
and more effort was employed in the post-war era in the
training and guidance of Regular and National Service
officers in man-management. In January 1949 the Army
Manpower Committee pronounced that this was a subject
fully dealt with in the Army training system.103 Yet not
only did one survey reveal that by 1960 only some
fourteen hours over two years were devoted to matters of
leadership in the Sandhurst syllabus, which half of the
cadets found "of little use" or "useless,"104 but one
young officer, Simon Raven, could write with some
incredulity of his experiences of the post-war Army, not
only of officer training continuing to create a distinct
class of human being, naturally designed to impose its
will on all inferior classes, but of fellow officers who
described their men as "pets" who needed to be humoured
101Bernays (1), p. 96.
102WO 163/281, "Why I Wouldn't Sign On Again," published article by
Hubert Cole, n.d. [but 1946].
103WO 163/515, Army Manpower Committee. Final Report. January 1949.
104
J. E. Adair, "New Trends in leadership and Management Training,"
journal of the Royal United Service Institute 112 (November
1967), p. 317.
157
with sugar and whipped when disobedient.105
During the war the War Office was compelled to make
important changes in terms of the officer-man
relationship. Whilst relations in the pre-war Army had
been characterized by inequalities in living conditions
and other privileges accorded to commissioned and non¬
commissioned ranks, and by a style of leadership that
remained essentially "autocratic" in nature, the military
authorities sought not only to reduce some of the more
indefensible inequalities, but to inspire in its officers
a more "democratic" style of leadership which, in the
view of Tom Harrisson, "set the seal of approval on the
fullest human associations in place of the formal."106
Together these initiatives seemed like a blueprint for
the breaking down of the old feudal relationship between
officers and men. However, whilst Major Radcliffe argued
that the Army was setting "a practical example to the
country in the true meaning of social service and
community in a modern democracy,"107 there were those who
would have begged to differ. As one wartime soldier,
James Rochford, recalls:
I vividly remember walking with 4 other mates
along a street in Brussels shortly after the
liberation when we turned a corner and saw all
105Simon Raven, "Perish by the Sword," Encounter 12 (May 1959), pp.
46-47.
1 °6Harrisson, pp. 35-36.
107Radcliffe, p. 122.
158
these restaurants and bars. We hurried along to
get a nice glass of cool wine. As we reached the
corners of two buildings 2 MPs stopped us and
asked us couldn't we read and pointed to a yellow
circle with a blue line across the middle. Above
it was the words 'OUT OF BOUNDS TO OTHER RANKS.'
We were turned back by the MPs whose specific job
was just to make sure no 'cattle' got through. As
we turned away I saw officers sat at the pavement
tables pouring champagne out for their whores, it
was then I finally realised that all that guff
about fighting a war for freedom and democracy
was a load of bullshit. Nothing would ever change
no matter how many thousands of us died nothing
—
i J 108would alter.
As an adjunct to this, it is perhaps worth recording the
post-war findings of the Report into the Army's Working
Day in 1948, which, in its assessment of officer-man
relations, not only drew attention to the existence of
"the many barriers setting up group distinctions and
militating against group understanding," which it was
argued, "results in ineffective leadership due to mutual
ignorance of each group and lack of confidence of either
group in the other, " but also came to the reluctant
conclusion that "the average young Officer has little or
no interest in the N.C.Os and men comprising his own
small command." "Time after time," it was recorded, "we
heard with almost monotonous regularity - 'They don't
take no interest in us' from the men."109
10 8
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A further area that the military authorities were forced
to focus their attention on, and one linked to the
relationship between officers and their men, was the
whole question of welfare provision for the Army. During
the 1914-18 war voluntary bodies such as the Salvation
Army, the Young Men's Christian Association and the
Soldiers' Sailors' and Airmens' Forces Association acted
on their own initiative to supplement the efforts of
formations in providing certain rudimentary welfare
services for the troops. However, in the inter-war
Regular Army, composed as it was of long-service troops
living in static conditions, the welfare of the soldier
continued to be regarded, as it always had been, as first
and foremost a matter for units and regimental officers.
Indeed, not only did no official welfare organization
exist in the Army, but what official welfare provision
was made was limited just to a few basic amenities and
recreational facilities such as sports grounds by the
Army Sports Control Board and canteens by the NAAFI.
Little or nothing, for instance, was provided officially
to help cope with a soldier's personal or domestic
problems.1 Moreover, as one officer recalled: "Only about
fifty per cent, of Regular officers in time of peace in
1
Public Record Office, War Office Papers [hereafter WO], WO
32/14569, "The Place of the Army Welfare Service in Post-War
Planning," Memorandum by D.A.G.(A)., A.P.W.P./P(45)47., 2
October 1945; WO 277/4, "Army Welfare," War Office Monograph
ocmpiled by Brig. M. C. Morgan, 1953, pp. 1-2.
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most units take any real interest in their men's welfare
of their own volition."2
Whilst Hore-Belisha sought to promote the soldier's
welfare in the late 1930s through the building of new
barrack accommodation and the setting up of schools of
cookery as part of the effort to stimulate recruitment,3
the introduction of conscription with the passing of the
Military Training Act in the Spring of 1939 did serve to
initiate debate within the War Office on the creation of
a new welfare organization in the Army. Anticipating the
special welfare needs of militiamen, not only for
improved amenities and recreational facilities but also
for special help with personal and domestic problems
arising out of their conscription, it was proposed by the
then Adjutant-General, General Sir Gordon Finlayson, and
Major-General Adam, who in the Summer of 1939 was in post
at the War Office as Vice-Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, that a number of specially selected civilian
officers be appointed to assist units over welfare
matters; an initiative which the Deputy Director-General
of the Territorial Army, Lieutenant-General Sir John
Brown, pointed out, had its parallels in civil life where
a welfare officer was appointed to all large works and
2Lt.-Col. Graham Seton Hutchison, "Selection and Education of an
Officer," Rcrnj Quarterly 42 (April 1941), p. 73.
3R. J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-BeJJsha (London:
Collins, 1960), pp. 46-47.
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factories.4 However, not only was there a good deal of
opposition to this proposal on the part of senior
officers on the grounds that it went against the tried
and trusted methods of the Service and would undermine
the traditional responsibility of regimental officers for
the care of their men,5 but further progress on this
issue was halted after the government's ruling that apart
from the award of War Service Grants to soldiers for whom
normal Service pay and allowances were inadequate to meet
family commitments, no further public monies would be
available for welfare schemes.6 On the eve of war welfare
provision was still very much geared along Regular Army
lines.
Within a few weeks of the outbreak of the war, though,
the War Office came to recognize that some sort of
welfare organization needed to be instituted in the Army.
The thousands of new recruits embodied into the Service
brought with them a number of pressing welfare problems.
The wartime citizen Army was different from the peacetime
Regular Army in the fact that for the first time it was
4
WO 163/67, D.C.I.G.S. to A.G., Appendix "A" to C.C.A.C.260., 26
June 1939; WO 163/67, Minutes of a Meeting of the Standing
Committee on Compulsory Military Training, Appendix "B" to
C.C.A.C.260., 26 June 1939; WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 3-4.
5W0 163/67, Appendix "B" to C.C.A.C.260.
6WO 163/67, Minutes of a Meeting of the Standing Committee on
Compulsory Military Training, 12 July 1939, C.C.A.C.281., 17
July 1939; WO 163/47, Proceedings of the 26th Meeting of the
Informal Army Council, 21 July 1939; WO 163/47, Proceedings of
the 27th Meeting of the Informal Army Council, 4 August 1939; WO
277/4, Morgan, p. 5.
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cut off from all aspects of home life that were valued so
highly. The lack of amenities and recreational facilities
was one particular problem that played on the mind of the
soldier. As William Shebbeare noted: "Ask any bachelor
soldier what he most dislikes about army life and I think
he will tell you that it is the lack of any home comfort,
the dreariness and lack of colour."7 Another was the
enforced separation from families which often brought
with it a host of pressing personal and domestic worries.
"It is surprising to hear the chaps when they talk about
their homes, " wrote another soldier, "many are married
and have young children and even the toughest is full of
g
concern for his wife and family. The "anxious soldier"
was in fact to become a recognizable character of the
war.9 It was clear that these matters needed to be
addressed if the morale and thus the fighting efficiency
of the Army was to be maintained.
Yet it was equally clear to the War Office that a
reliance on the efforts of regimental officers alone
would not be sufficient to cater for the welfare needs of
the wartime soldiers. Not only were they considered to be
fully engaged in training the new troops and thus less
7
Captain X, [William G. C. Shebbeare], A Soldier Locks Ahead
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 1944), p. 156.
g
Tom Harrisson Mass-Observation Archive [hereafter M.O.-A.], T.C.
29/2/E, 1 September 1940.
9Maj . R. A. C. Radcliffe, "Officer-Man Relationships," Amy
Quarterly 46 (May 1943), p. 121.
163
able to devote time to welfare matters, but many of the
personal problems they were likely to confront were
regarded as outside the ken of the average junior
officer.10 Moreover, although on the outbreak of war
various voluntary organizations and other bodies began to
organize welfare provision for the Army, the service was
largely patchy, uncoordinated and some areas which were
almost denuded of troops received some assistance, whilst
others which were overcrowded received little.11
It was in these circumstances that, at the invitation of
Hore-Belisha, Lieutenant-General Sir John Brown, a
territorial officer, peacetime architect and a founder
and former chairman of the British Legion, was appointed
War Office Adviser on Welfare, and on the basis of the
scheme that had been discussed in the Summer, and with
the cooperation of Territorial Army Associations, a
network of voluntary, unpaid Command, County and Sub-
County Social Welfare Officers was established around the
country in November 1939.12 The Sub-County Social Welfare
Officers, or Local Army Welfare Officers as they
subsequently became known, formed the backbone of the
10WO 32/14569, A.P.W.P./P(45)47; WO 277/4, Memorandum on Social
Welfare in the Army at Heme, 1 November 1939, Appendix "IB" to
Morgan, p. 178.
11
WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 6.
12
Ibid. , pp. 6-8.
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organization.13 Drawn mainly from the ranks of retired or
ex-Army officers, but coming to encompass Town and County
Councillors, Justices of the Peace and other persons of
local standing and influence, a number of whom were
women,14 it was made clear that they were not intended to
interfere in welfare arrangements already existing in
units. Their function was to get in touch with commanding
officers in their locality and, in cooperation with
voluntary organizations and other bodies in the vicinity,
provide what help and assistance they could in terms of
securing various amenities and recreational facilities
for the troops, as well as giving advice on personal
problems. In this respect, one suggestion was the setting
up of information bureaux in military camps along the
lines of those being set up to advise civilians.15
Inevitably, they also came to assume the role of liaison
officers between the Army and the civil population,
handling complaints and misunderstandings arising from
the "military occupation" and seeking to settle disputes
amicably. By 1940, some 700 of these officers were in
13
A Local Army Welfare Officer, "Six Years of Army Welfare,"
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 91 (February
1946), p. 52.
14WO 32/14569, "The Future of the Heme Voluntary Army Welfare
Organization," Appendix "B" to the Report of the Sub-Ccmmittee
on the Future of the Army Welfare Services, A.P.W.P./P(49)21.,
28 September 1949.
15
WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 7-8; WD 277/4, War Office letter to
General Officers Qenmanding-in-Chief, All Commands at Heme, 1
November 1939, Appendix "1A" to Morgan, pp. 176-177; WO 277/4,
Memorandum on Social Welfare in the Army at Heme, pp. 178-180.
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place.16
Whilst the voluntary welfare organization was being set
up around the country, it also came to be recognized that
a central welfare organization needed to be established
at the War Office. By the Spring of 1940 there was some
concern over the morale of the Army and in particular the
prevailing mood of boredom amongst the troops, inactive
and isolated from normal facilities as many of them were
1 7
whilst the "phoney war" continued. At the instigation
of the Army Council, in March 1940 a committee was set up
under the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Haining, to look into the
question of welfare in the Army. The committee reported
in May that much good work had already been done but
pointed out that a certain amount of confusion and
overlapping still remained. Although it was reiterated
that unit officers should continue to be the chief factor
in caring for the soldier's welfare, it was recommended
that in view of the extended needs of the new citizen
intake, and the necessity of ensuring that the assistance
of voluntary agencies was mobilized effectively to serve
what was a nation in arms, a new Welfare Directorate be
16Lt.-Col. J. C. Atkinson, "The Local Army Welfare Officer," The
Journal of the Royal Norfolk Regiment 9 (May 1957), p. 39; A
Local Army Welfare Officer, pp. 52, 55.
17
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created in the War Office to exercise general control and
supervision over welfare provision for the Army.
Moreover, it was advocated that the state had a
responsibility to look after the needs of those it had
called upon to abandon civil life for service in the
Army, and that funds should be provided by the government
for welfare.18
Whilst the Haining Report was being considered events
were moving apace. The evacuation of troops from Dunkirk
brought with it new welfare demands and fresh concerns
over the Army's morale. Furthermore, for the first time
Service welfare appeared upon the parliamentary horizon
in the form of a well-reported debate on the provision of
amenities at railway stations, and the opinions expressed
made it clear that members expected proper facilities to
be made available for the troops. It was in these
circumstances that in July 1940 the Army Council agreed
to the formation of a Directorate of Welfare, and the
Treasury was persuaded to provide funding.19
The Directorate was headed initially by Lieutenant-
General Sir John Brown who was made Director-General of
Welfare. By the end of 1940, however, the expected
invasion following Dunkirk had not occurred and the Army
1 8
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was facing a long winter of equipping and training which
would place a heavy strain upon morale. With this in
mind, the Army Council decided to reorganize and expand
the Directorate and in December Major-General Harry
Willans, a territorial divisional commander, former
General Manager of the Association for Promoting the
General Welfare of the Blind and a peacetime executive
with a large catering firm, was appointed as the new
Director-General of Welfare; a post that from the Summer
of 1941 was placed under the direct control and
administration of the Adjutant-General, General Adam.20
At the end of 1940 it was also agreed that to assist them
in their duties the voluntary welfare officers be granted
the right to wear uniform if they so chose and given
honorary commissions; the Command Welfare Officers
earning the rank of colonel, the County Welfare Officers
that of lieutenant-colonel, and the Local Army Welfare
Officers that of captain. To accompany this, from January
1941 a direct line of communication was established
between the War Office and the welfare officers through
the issue of a monthly Welfare Memorandum containing
directives, information and advice.21 In March, Major-
General Willans outlined the guiding principles of Army
Welfare:
20




The object of Army Welfare may be stated
simply as being the maintenance of the morale of
officers and men, primarily to fit them to carry
out their duty as soldiers when the time comes,
be it sooner or later, with the utmost possible
efficiency; secondly in order that their
relations with the civilian population may be
such as to ensure the maximum co-operation
between the Army and the nation in the national
effort; and thirdly that they, the soldiers, may
in due course be better citizens as a result of
their service in the Army. In order to achieve
this object it is necessary to cater for the
whole needs of the man - the needs of his mind,
his body and his spirit, or to put it
differently, to aim at a high standard of
physical, mental and moral well-being which
together will result in a contented soldier and
so in a contented Army. It is to be noted that
his needs are not solely canteens or concerts,
footballs or food - though these are important in
their way; far more important than merely
physical requirements are his mental and
emotional needs.
With the establishment of the welfare organization, the
details of which were included in such pamphlets for
officers as The Soldier's Welfare which was produced by
the Welfare Directorate and ran into four editions, so it
became possible to set about providing for the welfare
needs of the Army at home in a coordinated fashion. To
add to this, from 1943 full-time serving Welfare Officers
were also appointed to the major overseas commands to
organize welfare services abroad.23
In the first instance, a range of amenities and
recreational facilities were laid on for the troops.
2 2
Maj.-Gen. H. Willans, "Army Welfare and Education," The Journal
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Indeed, the importance of giving soldiers something to do
in their spare time was emphasized by the fact that
"boredom" came to be identified by morale reports as an
important factor in the incidence of absence without
leave.24 As one Anti-Aircraft commander commented:
I consider one of the main difficulties to be
overcome is boredom, particularly in the long
winter months. Every endeavour is being made to
stimulate the men's interests and to keep their
minds active but this problem with so many small
detachments... is not easy of solution.
At the forefront of much of this work were the Local Army
Welfare Officers. They visited units, assessed their
needs and did whatever they could to improve the living
conditions of troops in their areas and provide them with
means of rest and relaxation; whether that meant simply
organizing hot baths in nearby houses, mobilizing local
ladies to mend clothing or arranging for soldiers to
spend an evening a week in a local resident' s front
room.25 However, under the auspices of the Welfare
Directorate a variety of services were built up.
To supplement the canteen provision of the NAAFI, whose
resources were unable to meet the demands of the
24
WO 163/51, Morale Report, February-May 1942, A.C./G. (42)20., 12
June 1942.
25
WO 163/88, Morale Report, January 1942, issued with
E.C.A.C./P(42)37., 1 April 1942.
26Willans, pp. 249, 251; A Local Army Welfare Officer, p. 54;
Atkinson, p. 39; War Office, The Soldier's Welfare. Notes for
Officers, 16 July 1941, pp. 35-36.
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expanding Army and whose premises soldiers often found
too institutional, a network of static and mobile
canteens was organized for the troops run by such bodies
as the Women's Voluntary Services, the Young Men's
Christian Association, the Salvation Army, the Church
Army, the Catholic Women's League and TOC H, which
together with the other philanthropic agencies with a
religious background came together to form the Council of
Voluntary War Work (C.V.W.W.). Supervised by the Local
Army Welfare Officers and with the emphasis on the
creation of a real home atmosphere, some 7,000 canteens
of this type were established at camps, towns and main
line railway stations across Britain, and several hundred
more were dispatched overseas. Further to this, a network
of hostels was organized in cooperation with the C.V.W.W.
where troops on leave or in transit could obtain
comfortable board and lodgings at 1/6 a night. Watched
over by Local Army Welfare Officers, these were
established in thirty-six major cities and towns around
the country with a number also set up for soldiers
abroad.2 7
Various welfare gifts for the troops were also arranged
2 7
Harry Miller, Service to the Services. The Story of the NRAFI
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by Army Welfare. The provision of warm clothing was taken
in hand and teams of voluntary knitters were organized
across Britain and supplied with wool at subsidized
prices to produce cap-mufflers, gloves, pullovers,
scarves and gumboot stockings. Moreover, with the
assistance of contributions in cash and kind from the
various Service welfare funds set up by Lords Lieutenant,
Lord Mayors, Lord Provosts and various newspapers around
the country, as well as bodies such as the Nuffield Trust
which donated £1.5m towards Service welfare provision, so
it became possible to supply the troops with such
articles as playing cards, dart boards, sports equipment
and gramophones. All these goods were made available to
units at home through Local Army Welfare Officers or
dispatched to those overseas by an Army Comforts Depot at
Reading, an establishment run initially by volunteers
from the Berkshire Territorial Army Association but taken
over by the Welfare Directorate in 1943. By the end of
the war it was estimated that some 14 million items had
2 8
been distributed to the Army through this depot.
Hobby schemes were also laid on for the troops. In the
Spring of 1940 the Haining Committee recommended in its
report that the natural world offered a stimulating
2 8WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 3, 13-15, 62-105, 172; Willans, p. 255; A
Local Army Welfare Officer, p. 54; Atkinson, p. 39; The
Soldier's Welfare, 1941, pp. 35, 40.
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outlet for many troops, especially in isolated posts,29
and at the beginning of 1941 a Hobby Gardening Scheme was
set up by the Welfare Directorate in Home Commands. Under
this scheme, tools and seeds were supplied by Local Army
Welfare Officers to soldiers with an interest in
horticulture, plots of ground were made available by the
Director of Quartering at the War Office to those working
on the scheme, and head gardeners, chairmen of allotment
associations, park superintendents and others were
appointed as advisers to units in their village or
district. Command competitions were organized and judged
by the Ministry of Agriculture, and Eastern Command went
so far as to exhibit vegetables at the Royal
Horticultural Society's Show and won a silver medal for
its produce.30 In 1943 a Bird Watching Scheme was also
established in Home Commands in association with the
Nature Observations Sub-Committee of the Royal Society,
under which troops with an interest in bird life
monitored the flight of wood pigeons and fulmer petrels
across Britain. A similar scheme was set up in the Middle
East to study the movements of sand grouse.31
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Live entertainment also came to be arranged by Army
Welfare. Whilst Local Army Welfare Officers were on hand
to arrange for local amateur voluntary groups to put on
theatrical shows for troops in their areas, or sought
where possible to negotiate discounts for soldiers at
local theatres,32 in the early months of the war the Army
relied mainly on the NAAFI organization for its live
entertainment. Under the NAAFI, this was provided by the
Entertainments National Service Association (E.N.S.A.).
Founded and directed by the impresario Basil Dean from
the Drury Lane Theatre, E.N.S.A. was composed of
volunteers from all branches of the professional
entertainment world who were paid £10 a week for their
services.33 Yet dissatisfaction with E.N.S.A. soon grew
within the Army. In May 1940 the Haining Committee, which
had considered the provision of entertainment, reported
that although E.N.S.A. was performing a valuable service,
evidence had not only come to light that the growing
demand for entertainment was not being met, but that the
standard of entertainment provided was not all that it
should have been. Whilst it was acknowledged that
assistance from external professional sources would
continue to be needed, it was suggested that the Army
3 2
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should seek to develop its own sources of
entertainment.3
Matters came to a head after the evacuation of the troops
from Dunkirk. Not only were there more troops in Britain
than ever before needing to be entertained, but criticism
of E.N.S.A. reached a new peak. Whilst soldiers in more
accessible regions complained that the entertainment was
often low brow, those in remote areas complained that
despite extravagant publicity they had never received any
entertainment from E.N.S.A.35 What determined policy,
though, was the spiralling costs of entertainment to the
NAAFI. The evacuation of the Army from Norway and France
had created a £1.4m deficit for the NAAFI. In the
meantime, the costs of E.N.S.A. had risen to £lm a year
and in agreeing to underwrite NAAFI's debts the Treasury
was pressing for reductions in expenditure. It was in
these circumstances, and with the view being held in some
circles in the War Office that the Army could provide a
better service than E.N.S.A. at less cost, that in July
1940 the Army Council decided to cut professional
entertainment by 50%.36
The decision came as a bitter blow to E.N.S.A., who were
3 4
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forced to dispense with the services of a number of
employees, and created an atmosphere of suspicion and
resentment between Drury Lane and the War Office which
continued throughout the war.37 However, it provided the
stimulus for the Army to organize its own live
entertainment. To this end, in the Summer of 1940 the
Welfare Directorate appointed Entertainment Officers to
Home Commands. These were drawn from serving officers
with professional experience in the field whose function
was to assist units in forming their own concert parties,
and to aid them in this task special grants were made
available for musical instruments, stage scenery and
3 8
theatrical properties. George Black, producer of
wartime shows at the London Palladium, the Hippodrome and
the Prince of Wales Theatre, was also appointed as
honorary entertainment adviser to the Army.39
At the beginning of 1941 it was further proposed by the
Welfare Directorate that a number of War Office concert
parties be formed from amongst serving performers in the
Army. These parties, it was suggested, would form a
central pool that would be available for service in any
part of a command where entertainment was difficult to
obtain, and would serve as samples of the standard and
37Dean, pp. 142-157; WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 45, 48-49.
38WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 24-25 , 50; Willans, p. 252; The Soldier's
Welfare, 1941, pp. 36-37.
39
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type of entertainment that it was thought would be most
enjoyable to a military audience.40 There was another
advantage. Unit performances might be cancelled at a
moment's notice on the whims of officers who took a
dislike to an artist or production. The new organization
would supplement the efforts of unit parties and fill
gaps caused by cancellation.41 Although the plan put a
strain on manpower because it entailed withdrawing men
with expertise from units,42 and met with some opposition
within the War Office from those who disapproved of
soldiers performing such unmilitary duties as tap-dancing
or saxophone-playing,43 with the backing of General Adam
the Central Pool of Artistes was set up under the Welfare
Directorate in October 1941 for a six-month trial
period.4 4
Under the direction of Colonel Basil Brown, a businessman
who before the war had been involved with the York
Repertory Theatre, and based at Nissen Hut 13, Royal
Ordinance Depot, Greenford, the Central Pool of Artistes,
or "Stars in Battledress" as they became better known,
40WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 50.
41
Richard Fawkes, Fighting for a Iesugh. Entertaining the British
and Anerican Armed Forces 1939-1946 (London: MacDanald & Jane's,
1978), p. 40.
42WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 50.
4 3
Eric Maschwitz, No Chip on mj Shoulder (London: Herbert Jenkins,
1957), p. 149.
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Fawkes, p. 40; WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 50.
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consisted initially of some fifty artistes all of whom
were professional entertainers before their call up. The
first performances were given in December 1941 and six
months later a special command performance was arranged
for the Secretary of State for War, Sir James Grigg. This
met with his approval and in May 1942 a new base was
found at the Duke of York's Barracks in Chelsea and
additional performers were recruited.45 By 1945 the Pool
was some 200 strong and included amongst its number such
performers as Charlie Chester, Terry-Thomas, Harry
Secombe, Spike Milligan and Norman Vaughan. Janet Brown,
the singer and impressionist, joined from the A.T.S. and
became the first female member.46
Variety was regarded as the most popular form of
entertainment but "Stars in Battledress" made efforts to
cater for a range of tastes. Serious music, in the form
of a sextet led by the violinist Eugene Pini, was sent on
tour and, it was concluded, succeeded in persuading a
number of soldiers that chamber music was as good as the
4 7
latest jazz tune. Drama also came to be featured. The
first moves to set up a specific play unit in the Army
came in fact from outside the Central Pool of Artistes.
At the end of 1941 the actor Charles Cameron formed the
45Fawkes, pp. 40-43.
4 6Adam VIII, chap. 6, p. 11; Fawkes, pp. 41, 43 , 45-47; John
Graven Hughes, The Greasepaint War. Shou Business 1939-45
(London: New English Library, 1976), pp. 182-184.
47Fawkes, p. 44.
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London District Theatre Unit to tour productions around
the areas where E.N.S.A. did not visit, and he obtained
the release of some twenty men and women with various
levels of expertise in the theatre to perform under the
direction of Sergeant Stephen Murray. By 1943 the work of
the London District Theatre Unit, along with that of
E.N.S.A. play companies, repertory theatres and one-off
Army productions, persuaded Army Welfare to set up a
special "Stars in Battledress" play section. The first
play performed was Terrence Rattigan's West End success
Flare Path. Directed by Murray Macdonald, who had run a
season of plays at the Garrison Theatre at Salisbury, it
starred Wilfred Hyde White, Kenneth Connor and Faith
Brook. This was followed by another West End play, Men In
Shadow by Mary Hayley Bell, which featured William
Kendall, George Cooper and Geoffrey Keen. Both plays were
set during the war and utilized contemporary experience
to strengthen the resolve of the audience.48 It was
estimated that for many soldiers this came to represent
their first taste of serious drama.49
Overall, by the Autumn of 1942 the Army itself was
providing the largest share of live entertainment for




WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 51.
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performances a month.50 Moreover, in 1943 "Stars in
Battledress" made their first overseas tour to the Middle
East and this was followed by further tours, with a party
being landed in Normandy as early as D.Day plus eight.51
It is perhaps also worthy of note that although the
quality of E.N.S.A. shows was never free from criticism
(one soldier relating that "the R.A.F. should have
dropped them over Germany, it would have shortened the
war by 12 months.")52 there was evidence to suggest that
they were not always so badly received. Early in 1941 the
War Office sent out a questionnaire to ascertain the
opinion of troops on E.N.S.A. performances of all kinds,
and some 70% of the replies were either enthusiastic or
appreciative.5 3
Whilst the matter of live entertainment was being
considered, Army Welfare also turned its attention to the
provision of cinematic entertainment. Again, whilst Local
Army Welfare Officers were on hand to arrange for local
voluntary groups to give film shows to troops in their
areas, or where possible negotiate discount seats for
soldiers at local cinemas, the Army relied initially on
E.N.S.A. to provide cinematic entertainment for the
50WO 163/51, War Offiae Progress Report, A.C./G(42)34., September
1942.
51
WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 51.
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troops.54 In May 1940, though, the Haining Committee had
suggested that the Army should consider providing its own
cinemas,55 and following the decision to cut professional
entertainment in July, steps were taken in this
direction. Early in 1940 the Directorate of Military
Training at the War Office had set up a mobile cinema
organization for the showing of its training films. In
August it was agreed that they should also be used to
show entertainment films. To this end, a small section
was set up in the Welfare Directorate, under the expert
guidance of Major Alfred Davis, to select and supply
films, Cinema Officers with knowledge of the field were
appointed to Home Commands to organize film shows, and
orders were placed for an extra 300 mobile and portable
cinemas. During 1940-41 some £100,000 was spent on
providing films for the troops.56
With the demand for both training and entertainment films
increasing, in August 1941 the decision was taken to
rationalize the use of cinema in the Army and a new
Directorate of Army Kinematography (D.A.K.) was
54Ibid., pp. 24, 81, 83, 96; The Soldier's Welfare, 1941, p. 37.
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established at the War Office under the direction of Paul
Kimberley, the Managing Director of National Screen
Service and a governor of The British Film Institute.
This assumed overall responsibility for the provision of
films and special Kinematographic Sections of skilled
technicians were formed throughout the Army to maintain
film libraries and show the films.57 In July 1942 the
Welfare Directorate section that handled film matters was
absorbed into this organization, but close cooperation
was maintained between the two directorates.58 By 1944
annual expenditure on recreational films had reached some
£360,000 and during that year royalties were paid for the
right to exhibit 107 full-length British and American
films, 60 shorts, 48 Disney cartoons and 104 newsreels to
troops at home and overseas.5 9
Further to this, it is worth recording that D.A.K.'s film
production unit, which came to include amongst its number
such figures from the film world as Carol Reed, Thorold
Dickinson, Freddie Young, Peter Ustinov and Eric Ambler,
and which earned complaints from Wardour Street about the
5 7
WO 32/9772, "Memorandum on the Use of Cinematograph Films in the
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Army's creaming off of civilian talent, took on
responsibility for the Army's production of its own
training films in 1941, and produced a range of new films
at the former Fox studios at Wembley which were, it was
considered, one of the most effective means of imparting
information to the "cinema minded" citizen soldier.60
Indeed, the recognition of the value of this medium for
military instruction was illustrated by the fact that
whilst in 1930 some 80 silent films were available for
this purpose, by the Spring of 1944 over 200 up-to-date
films were in circulation on all aspects of collective
and individual training, with over 500 copies of one
particular film distributed.61 As part of this effort,
D.A.K. produced a special film for recruits in 1942
entitled The New Lot. Made at the suggestion of and in
collaboration with Army psychiatrists, the film was
specifically designed to raise morale by suggesting to
the troops ways of overcoming the emotional problems of
separation from home and the compensatory rewards of
military life.62
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Army Welfare further became involved in broadcasting, a
matter to which the Army had given little thought since
the introduction of the wireless into general use after
1918. Whilst Local Army Welfare Officers did what they
could to procure wireless sets from local organizations
or private individuals for troops in their areas, efforts
were made centrally to secure sets under Lend-Lease
arrangements for distribution either through welfare
officers to units at home or dispatch abroad. By 1943 the
Army was planning on the scale of one set to every
seventy soldiers.63 However, the welfare authorities also
became concerned with programming matters. From early in
1940 wireless programmes for the Services were provided
by the BBC through its daily Forces Programme. This came
to include a number of features dealing with Army
matters, such as John Hilton Talking, Radio Reconaissance
and Into Battle, but was essentially a light
entertainment programme interspersed by news bulletins.54
Although an Army Liaison Officer was appointed to
Broadcasting House in 1940,65 as the war developed
63Atkinson, p. 41; Willans, p. 252; die Soldier's Welfare, 1941,
pp. 35, 37; The Soldier's Welfare, 1943, pp. 29 , 33-34; WO
163/161, Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the Morale Committee,
M.C./M(43)3., 26 March 1943; WO 163/52, War Office Progress
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criticism of the BBC began to be voiced within the Army.
In a note to the Secretary of State in March 1942 General
Willans complained that the Forces Programme was not
being utilized as such, was merely an alternative
programme of inferior quality and that the name was
retained only for its goodwill. Standards, he argued,
needed to be raised and the Forces given a say in the
direction of a real Forces programme.66
Accordingly, after a survey had been undertaken of
Soviet and German Forces broadcasts, of which the latter
strongly suggested that broadcasts had been provided by
the Forces for the Forces, with the backing of General
Adam a new broadcasting section was set up in the
Welfare Directorate in July 1942. Under the direction of
Major Eric Maschwitz, a former Director of Variety at
the BBC and editor of The Radio Times, its function was
to liaise with the BBC and seek to improve the Forces
Programme and make better use of it for the Army.67 In
August an Army Broadcasting Committee was also formed,
under the chairmanship of General Willans, which was
composed of representatives from all interested War
Office directorates and was designed to advise and
assist the section in the formulation of broadcasting
66WO 259/62, D.G.W & E. to P.S./S. of S., 18 March 1942.
67
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policy.
Indeed, on the basis of a survey undertaken by the
broadcasting section amongst 1,000 troops from 100 units
in Home Commands, the results of which emphasized the
importance of broadcasting as a medium for influencing
the troops, a policy directive was drawn up in November
as to the way in which efforts should be made to
influence the BBC.69 Not only did this recommend that the
general guality and presentation of entertainment and
news programmes for the troops needed to be improved, but
that broadcasting be better directed towards building
pride and team spirit in the Army, improving the Army's
image with the general public and educating it in such
matters as the causes of the war, war aims and post-war
conditions.70 On the recommendation of General Adam, this
was agreed by the Executive Committee of the Army Council
(E.C.A.C.) in December and confirmed by the full Army
Council and the Secretary of State, Sir James Grigg,
68
WO 163/89, "Army Broadcasting Committee," Memorandum by
D.A.G.(B)., E.C.A.C./P(42)114., 18 August 1942; WO 163/89,
Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of the Executive Committee of the
Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)34., 21 August 1942; W0 163/89,
Minutes of the 74th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the
Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)35., 28 August 1942.
6 9
WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 55; WO 163/89, "Army Broadcasting:




subject to careful supervision of broadcast scripts.71
The BBC were persuaded to agree to the directive and in
January 1943 a weekly joint War Office-BBC committee was
established.72 Through this efforts were made by the
broadcasting section to shape the Forces Programme in
accordance with the needs of the Army, and in
consultation with the BBC new regular features for the
troops, such as Army Voice and Army Hour, were planned
to War Office specification.73
Whilst the broadcasting section liaised with the BBC over
the Forces Programme, so it was also given the task of
developing the Army's own overseas broadcasting network;
a facility that became increasingly important as the Army
took on a more active and extended role abroad, and the
Germans sought to jam the Forces Programme and fill the
air waves with their own propaganda.74 To this end, an
Overseas Recorded Broadcasting Service was set up at the
Fortune Theatre in Drury Lane under the direction of
Captain Frederick LLoyd, the pre-war manager of the Scala
71
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Theatre in London, to record a range of programmes on
acetate discs for dispatch abroad,75 and by the end of
1942 some 125 hours of air time per month had been
acquired from twenty-two overseas broadcasting stations.
This was followed in 1943 by the development of the
Army's own overseas stations in the major theatres
producing programmes on the spot for the troops.76
Army broadcasting affairs in the Middle East were placed
under the direction of Colonel Richard Meyer, who before
the war had been involved in the establishment of Radio
Normandie and Radio Luxembourg; in the Central
Mediterranean they were controlled by Colonel Gale
Pedrick Harvey, a radio journalist and playwright; Major
Bryan Cave-Brown-Cave, who had been a peacetime BBC drama
producer, directed matters in the Far East and Major Jack
Dibb, a journalist from the Yorkshire Post, directed
those in the Near East.77 Under Major John McMillan, a
pre-war executive with the International Broadcasting
Company, a Field Broadcasting Unit consisting of four
mobile radio transmitters with studios was also
7 8
dispatched to accompany 21st Army Group into Europe.
A popular aspect of Army broadcasting overseas was
75Maschwitz, p. 148.
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message programmes, such as Cairo Calling from the Middle
East and Calling Blighty from the Far East, in which
soldiers recorded messages for broadcast to their
families in Britain. Moreover, when John McMillan
discovered on arrival in Hamburg that a direct telephone
line had been laid on to an exchange at Goodge Street
Station in London, so was born the Two-Way Family
Favourites programme which continued to link soldiers in
Germany with their families at home for a generation
after the war.79
Of note also was the inclusion of Army psychiatrists as
advisers on broadcasting matters. Not only were they
represented on the Army Broadcasting Committee and
subsequently on the War Office-BBC committee, but they
were particularly influential in modifying the Forces
Programme to counteract the hold which the German
broadcasters seemed to be developing over British troops
in the Middle East towards the end of 1942, through the
popularity of the song Lili Marlene. In fact, General
Adam personally arranged with Norman Collins at the BBC
for Lieutenant-Colonel T. F. Main, an Army psychiatrist
who had toured the troops in the area, to discuss his
findings with the staff responsible for the Forces
Programme on his return, and on the basis of his report
the programme was amended in order to produce a
79Doreen Taylor, A Microphone and a Frequmcy. 40 Years of Forces
Broadcasting (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 8, 24, 43-44, 51.
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"corrective and tonic" effect on the troops' morale.80
Among the most notable areas of responsibility assumed by
Army Welfare was the provision of Army newspapers. In the
more populated regions of Britain civilian newspapers
could be obtained by Local Army Welfare officers for
troops in their areas or bought by the soldiers
themselves. But in the outlying parts of the country, and
more especially overseas, commercial distribution
problems meant that civilian newspapers were often
unobtainable and there was real newspaper starvation. As
a consequence, formations and units both at home and
abroad began to produce their own newspapers. However,
without any central control and coordination not only did
their finances become chaotic and their use of precious
supplies of paper prove wasteful, but their content was
considered in some instances to be harmful to the war
effort. Indeed, the Welfare Directorate was compelled to
take action with regard to one such publication, The
Orkney Blast, produced under the auspices of the Orkney
and Shetland Command, which had featured a series of
cartoons which were regarded as being detrimental to
recruitment for the A.T.S. It was for these reasons, and
with requests from overseas commands for assistance in
Report of an Expert Oonmi ttee an the Work of Psychologists and
Psychiatrists in the Services, p. 57; Adam VIII, chap. 6, pp. 6-
7; Robert H. Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Arm/ in the
Second World War (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp.
221-222.
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providing publications, that in August 1943 a new section
was set up in the Welfare Directorate, headed by
Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. T. Chisholm, the former editor
of The Financial Times, with responsibility for the
direction and control of Army newspapers at home and
abroad.81
This was a timely development. At the end of September
1943 the Evening Standard published an editorial which
had recently appeared in Eighth Army News, a newspaper
for the troops in Italy, which had been founded by
Warwick Charlton, a serving officer and radical former
Daily Sketch journalist, who was determined to produce a
truly soldier's publication rather than merely a
propaganda journal for the authorities. The editorial on
Anglo-Italian policy, which argued that the Eighth Army
soldiers could not regard the recent supporters of
Mussolini as true allies, prompted a memorandum from
Churchill to Sir James Grigg in October demanding to know
why a paper of this kind was commenting on political
matters clearly outside its province and liable to cause
great harm. Grigg responded that the newspaper in
question was under the control of General Montgomery, who
in fact supported it as a valuable element in sustaining
morale, but was able to inform the Prime Minister that
arrangements were being made within the War Office for
81S. P. Mackenzie, "Vox Populi: British Army Newspapers in the
Second World War," Journal of Contemporary History 24 (October
1989), pp. 665-666; WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 127-128.
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the supervision of Army newspapers.82
With the establishment of the new section in the Welfare
Directorate financial policy was laid down, the supply of
newsprint was controlled and news and other editorial
material was supplied to the papers totalling many
thousands of words weekly. This included a round-up of
Service news, political news, general news and sports
news, as well as special stories, features and
photographs. Similar material was sent to Army
Broadcasting Units overseas to assist them in their news
8 3
bulletins and feature services.
Moreover, an editorial directive was drawn up which, in
the opinion of General Adam, required the most careful
consideration.84 Whilst it was recognized that the
newspapers provided an excellent safety-valve for the
troops and that opportunities should be offered in
correspondence columns for the publication of critical
views, editors were reminded that papers should present
both sides of an argument, should seek to improve
knowledge rather than inform opinion, and that they
82Mackenzie, pp. 666-669; WO 259/77, Prime Minister's Personal
Minute, Serial No. M.627/3., 4 October 1943; WO 259/77, P.J.G.
to P.M., 12 October 1943.
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should not oppose military or government policy.85 "Many
thought that too much liberty was given in the
correspondence columns," Adam later recalled, "but I
believe it was better to err on the generous side."86
Under the Welfare Directorate some twenty-four newspapers
came to be administered, serving soldiers all around the
world. In 1945 the Press Lord, Viscount Camrose, told
Chisholm that his branch's activities represented the
largest group of newspapers in existence at that time,
whether measured by geographical spread, volume of
8 7
circulation or size of staff. Whilst the editorial
staff of the newspapers were drawn from serving
journalists from all wings of the press, they came to
include a number of well-known radicals. Besides Warwick
Charlton's Eighth Army News, S.E.A.C. , a newspaper
produced for troops in the Far East, was run by Frank
Owen, the former editor of the Evening Standard which had
been a regular government critic. Union Jack, a paper for
soldiers in the Central Mediterranean, was overseen by
Hugh Cudlipp, ex-editor of the Sunday Pictorial and
another dissenting voice. Indeed, the staff of Union Jack
came to include none other than William Connor, the
columnist "Cassandra," who had become notorious for his
85WO 277/4, "Instructions to Editors of Army Newspapers," n.d.
[but 1944], Appendix 15 to Morgan, pp. 267-268.
86Adam VIII, chap. 6, p. 9.
87Ibid., chap. 12, p. 7.
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vitriolic attacks on the military and political
establishment in the Daily Mirror, the most widely read
civilian newspaper amongst the troops, but heartily
despised by the authorities for its left-wing tendencies.
Although it was rumoured that Connor had been called up
to put an end to his writings, it was significant that
his appointment was on the specific instruction of
General Adam. Adam was prepared to take a risk with
talented journalists like Connor in the hope that they
would keep Army newspapers popular and in so doing help
8 8
to sustain morale.
With such men on their staffs it was perhaps inevitable
that Army papers, particularly those overseas, remained
controversial. Following further complaints from
Churchill, as well as some senior commanders in the
field, about the dissident tone of Eighth Army News and
Union Jack., General Lord Burnham, Director of Public
Relations at the War Office, was sent to the
Mediterranean Theatre in April 1944 to investigate the
matter.89 Although he reported that the papers were very
much of the Daily Mirror school in which "a generally
unpleasant and cynical slant is given to the actions of
authority, and there is a sort of general suggestion of
conspiracy in high places against the common man," he
nevertheless concluded:
88MacKenzie, pp. 667-668, 671; Adam VIII, chap. 6, pp. 8-9.
89Mackenzie, pp. 672-674.
194
I do not like to let this report go without
stating my opinion that, by and large, a very
good job has been done. As newspapers, these
papers are very much more readable and
informative than those produced by our Allies
with larger staffs, more assistance and support
from home, and greater opportunities.
Very much of the credit for this is due to
Cudlipp, and a lot of praise should be given to
Charlton of 'Eighth Army News' to set against his
unpardonable indiscretions. Staffs have been
enthusiastic and have worked extremely hard and
in the face of every sort of difficulty. It is
not surprising to find that some of them suffer
from the defauts de leur qualites.
They suffered perhaps from a lack of guidance
and understanding of the function of Army
newspapers.
This is now being corrected, and all should
be well.90
Both Adam and Grigg accepted Burnham's views, Grigg
noting that he was "quite content to leave things where
they are for the present."91 Although Churchill remained
dissatisfied, suspecting a whitewash, he restricted
himself to suggesting that more responsible journalists
be placed on the staffs of the papers.92
As the war drew to a close and attention began to shift
towards a possible general election, Army newspapers
continued to be a source of contention and were accused
by the Conservative Party of adopting a partisan approach
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to domestic political issues.93 In fact, Ralph Assheton,
the chairman of the party, personally approached Grigg,
his fellow Conservative, over what he considered to be
the amount of left-wing propaganda that was appearing in
Service newspapers. Despite Grigg's assurances over
impartiality, Assheton wrote to him in January 1945
complaining that "it has once more been brought to my
notice that there is still a distinct political bias
towards the Left in all the newspapers which are produced
for Forces overseas."94
It was notable, however, that conscious of their value in
sustaining morale the War Office remained remarkably
supportive of its newspapers. With the help of Chisholm's
branch, a reply was drafted by Grigg which not only
refuted Assheton's assertions, and recorded that what
criticisms had reached the War Office came as much from
the Left as the Right, but argued that even if it was
possible to find a leaning to the Left in one or two
papers this was by no means marked nor called for serious
criticism.95 Indeed, Grigg further countered:
That Army papers should, if left to themselves,
lean to the Left seems to me to be only a
reflection of what is happening in the newspaper
93MacKenzie, pp. 677-678.
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world generally, and I don't see how you can
blame us if in the outside world you cannot
attract the rising generation of journalists away
from the Left or prevent newspapers which one
would have expected to be neutral in their colour
adopting a pink coat.9
Reflecting on the editorial staffs and the accusations of
political bias after the war, General Adam came to the
conclusion that they did a difficult job very well.
"Personally," he recalled, "I think they kept a very fair
balance."9 7
A further sphere of responsibility assumed by Army
Welfare was the supply of books and other recreational
reading matter to the Army. Whilst Local Army Welfare
Officers sought to obtain books from local organizations
for troops in their areas,98 in the more remote parts of
Britain, and in particular overseas, books again were in
short supply. To assist in this matter, and with the
support of the War Office, in November 1939 the Lord
Mayor of London launched a national appeal for gifts of
money or books, under the title of "The Service Libraries
and Books Fund, " and a Central Book Depot was set up by
the City of London Territorial Army and Air Force
Association at Finsbury, from which reading material was
distributed through welfare officers to troops at home or
9 6WO 259/69, draft letter from Sir James Grigg to Ralph Assheton,
31 January 1945.
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dispatched abroad.99 In association with the Depot the
welfare authorities were able to offer special
concessionary schemes to the troops. Selections of one
hundred Penguin and other similar paper-backed books were
made available to units at home and abroad, if they so
chose, for 35 shillings with carriage paid. A Forces Book
Club was also introduced by which units subscribing £3 a
year could obtain ten books a month, post free wherever
they were stationed.10 0
However, by 1943 the Central Book Depot's task had become
so great, with not only a million books but half a
million periodicals and magazines sorted and distributed
each month to all three Services, that the Welfare
Directorate was obliged to take over its administration
and Colonel Chisholm's section was given this task. The
opportunity was further taken by the Welfare Directorate
at this time to coordinate properly the supply of
civilian newspapers to overseas commands, and with a
special allocation of newsprint from the Paper
Controller, by the end of the war a quarter of a million
papers were being flown daily to the Forces in North West
Europe alone.101
99Col. A. C. T. White, The Stay of Rray Education 1&43-1963
(London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1963), p. 160; WO 277/4,
Morgan, pp. 16-17; The Soldier's Welfare, 1941, pp. 36-37.
100
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Interestingly, the provision of books, magazines and
civilian newspapers also became a matter of some
controversy. In his letter to Grigg in January 1945 over
left-wing Army newspapers, Assheton not only enquired why
it was that the Daily Mirror, and the leftish magazine
Picture Post, seemed to be the most widely distributed
civilian publications amongst the troops overseas, but
further complained: "It has also been brought to my
attention that there is considerable Left Wing bias in
the books available in Service libraries."102
In his reply to Assheton, Grigg remained equally unmoved
by these assertions. Not only was it pointed out that the
distribution of civilian newspapers was fixed in
proportion to their audited circulation at home, and the
Daily Mirror had one of the largest circulations, but the
selection of magazines was made by an inter-departmental
committee under a civil servant, Sir Herbert Creedy, and
whilst the number of copies of Picture Post was in any
case to be reduced to make way make for other magazines,
the choices sought to cater for as wide a taste as
possible and were not influenced by party politics. It
was recorded, moreover, that whilst the Creedy Committee
made every effort to ensure that a fair balance of
opinion was maintained in the selections of books sent to
the troops, supplies were largely dependent upon
102WO 259/69, letter frcm Ralph Asshetcn to Sir James Grigg, 24
January 1945.
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donations from the public, and Grigg concluded:
I am not in a position to say whether gifts from
the public contain an undue preponderance of
leftist books, or whether, if they do, it is
because the public is anxious to get rid of such
books or anxious that the troops should have the
benefit of them.103
Whilst Army Welfare made efforts, then, to provide a
range of amenities and recreational facilities for the
troops, so its remit also came to extend to such matters
as arranging transportation for soldiers at home on leave
from overseas, and various schemes were administered
through Local Army Welfare Officers. In April 1940 a Get-
You-Home Scheme was organized across the country with the
backing of the Ministry of Transport, under which
volunteer drivers from such bodies as the British Legion
and the Rotary Club were provided with extra petrol
coupons to drive soldiers home from railway stations
after the hours when public transport was available. In
the Summer of 1940 a Leave Petrol Scheme was also
initiated by which certain categories of soldiers could
apply for supplementary petrol coupons and special
temporary car and motor cycle permits during their stay.
Moreover, at the end of 1944 a Families Liaison Scheme
was established which enabled officers stationed in the
distant theatres of war to be granted extensions of
leave, free travel warrants and petrol coupons of up to
103WO 259/69, draft letter from Sir James Grigg to Ralph Assheton,
31 January 1945.
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300 miles to visit the families of officers and men of
their units so as to give them news of their relatives
serving abroad.104
A further area of Army Welfare's work, and one that
became increasingly pressing as the war dragged on and
soldiers faced periods of extended separation from their
families, was an attempt to alleviate some of the
personal problems of the troops. Indeed, the importance
of helping soldiers in these matters was emphasized by
the fact that "home worries" came to be identified by
Army morale reports as another important factor in
absence without leave.105 As one summary concluded:
Practically every report, whatever its
source, provides illustrations of how the
soldier's home life affects his keenness,
efficiency and morale.106
Again, at the forefront of much of this work were the
Local Army Welfare Officers who interviewed concerned
soldiers, gave advice where they could, or referred them
to the various statutory or non-statutory agencies in
104WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 38-39, 73, 101; WO 277/4, "Leave Petrol
Scheme," Appendix 9 to Morgan, p. 251; WO 277/4, "Get-You-Hcme
Scheme," Appendix 10 to Morgan, p. 252; WO 277/4, "Families
Liaison Schema," Appendix 11 to Morgan, p. 253; A Local Army
Welfare Officer, p. 54.
105
WO 163/88, Morale Report, January 1942, issued with
E.C.A.C./P(42)37., 1 April 1942.
106WO 163/52, Morale Report, February-April 1943, A.C./G(43)17., 3
July 1943.
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their areas that could best help them.107 However, the
Welfare Directorate made special efforts to relieve
certain problems.
One particular problem was the anxiety of soldiers over
the fate of their families under air raids; an anxiety
compounded by the knowledge that troops in outlying
military camps lived in comparative safety compared with
those in towns and cities.108 By the late Summer of 1940
air raids on Britain had become almost a daily
occurrence, and soldiers were naturally anxious to know
if their relatives had been injured in the raids. The
situation, though, was complicated by security
regulations which made it impossible to ascertain from
newspapers even the names of the localities that had been
raided, and this led to many rumours and unnecessary
fears. At this time London was the area most affected by
the bombing and the London District Welfare Officer
evolved an Air Raid Enquiry Scheme under which soldiers
could make enquiries at his office about the well-being
of relatives, and would, after a short interval, receive
a reliable report on the matter.109
This scheme was limited initially to the Metropolitan
107Willans, p. 249; A Local Army Welfare Officer, pp. 52-53;
Atkinson, pp. 38, 40; The Soldier's Welfare, 1943, pp. 28-29.
108M. 0. -A. , TC 29/2/A, 23 September 1940; Roland Wild, The Rest of
the Day's Your Oun (London: Robert Hale, 1943), p. 219.
109WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 25, 34.
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Area. However, with air raids spreading to almost every
region the Welfare Directorate decided to institute a
similar scheme to cover the entire country and, after
consultations with the Home Office and the Ministry of
Health, an extended Air Raid Enquiry Scheme was brought
into operation early in 1941. Under this scheme, Army
personnel stationed in Britain were instructed to address
all communications regarding air raid enquiries to the
Town Clerk, or Clerk of the Urban or Rural District
Council nearest their home, and those abroad to the
Overseas Department of the Soldiers' Sailors' and
Airmen's Forces Association (S.S.A.F.A.). To avoid
confusion and delays, each soldier was also advised to
ensure that his relatives carried a card containing his
name and Army particulars, and requesting that he be
notified if the holder was killed or seriously injured in
a raid. In each locality a searcher service was organized
by Local Army Welfare Officers from amongst members of
S.S.A.F.A., the Soldiers' Sailors' and Airmen's Help
Society (The Help Society), the Women's Voluntary Service
or any other local organizations with members willing to
help. Their duty was to see that after a raid all
enquiries about injuries to relatives or damaged property
were thoroughly investigated and promptly replied to.
Military Assistance Officers were also appointed to Home
Commands to help soldiers whose homes had been hit over
matters such as extensions of leave or advances of pay.
Moreover, whenever a town had received a particularly
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heavy raid, a Forces Enquiry Office was set up in the
vicinity. Normally staffed by S.S.A.F.A., its function
was to advise Service personnel and their families over
civil matters such as claims, evacuation and funeral
arrangements.110
Another problem was that of matrimonial disputes between
soldiers and their wives; often the result, it was
alleged, of infidelity on the part of wives unable to
stand the strain of prolonged separation.111 Various
suggestions were made as to how the question of
infidelity should be approached, including making
special broadcasts on the BBC's Mostly for Women
programme and enclosing a leaflet on the subject with
issues of family allowance books, both of which were
deemed inappropriate for a matter of such delicacy.112
However, in April 1942 the Welfare Directorate took the
practical step of introducing a Reconciliation Scheme
with the aim of resolving differences between husband and
wife before a wife's family allowance was stopped and a
home broken up without good cause. Under this scheme,
soldiers whose normal domestic relations had ceased, or
110
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who had strong reasons to believe they had ceased, were
instructed to report the matter to their commanding
officer. Those who were temporarily estranged were free
to do likewise. Commanding officers were then empowered
to refer cases directly to the Local Army Welfare Officer
in whose area a soldier's wife lived, if that soldier was
serving in Britain, or via the Overseas Department of
S.S.A.F.A. if the soldier was serving overseas. Once in
receipt of a case, the Local Army Welfare Officers either
visited the soldier's wife to investigate the matter with
a view to effecting a possible reconciliation, or
arranged for probation officers who were willing to give
up their spare time to undertake this task. A report was
then submitted to the commanding officer on the outcome
of the investigation before further action was taken by
the soldier.113 The fact that some 44,000 divorce
applications, of the 94,000 dealt with through the Army
Legal Aid Scheme between 1942 and 1945, were subsequently
abandoned, gave grounds to believe, it was concluded,
that the Reconciliation Scheme had achieved a measure of
113
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Indeed, a further problem, and one arising in large part
from matrimonial disputes but also from a variety of
other concerns such as difficulties over insurances,
tenancies, building society obligations and hire purchase
agreements, was the need to provide the troops with some
form of legal assistance in civil matters. In some areas
Local Army Welfare Officers were able to procure the
services of a civilian Honorary Army Welfare Solicitor
who was willing to advise or act on behalf of soldiers
without charge.115 However, it soon became apparent that
for troops with insufficient means to engage a private
lawyer, the legal facilities available to them were
inadequate. In the first instance, whilst soldiers could
obtain legal advice from such voluntary bodies as the
Citizens' Advice Bureaux or the Poor Man's Lawyer
Societies, these organizations were too few and scattered
to be able to deal with more than a fraction of the cases
that came before them as a result of the practical and
legal problems created by the war.116 Moreover, the
position was complicated by the fact that not only was
114WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 37-38.
115Ibid., pp. 35, 95; Willans, p. 249; A Local Army Welfare
Officer, p. 53.
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18, 20-21; WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 35-36; WO 163/88, "Army Legal
Aid Scheme," Memorandum by Sir Claud Schuster, 17 March 1942,
issued with E.C.A.C./P(42)34., 24 March 1942.
206
there little organized provision for those on low incomes
to conduct litigation in the inferior courts beyond what
assistance Poor Man's Lawyers were able to give,117 but
the official Poor Persons Procedure that enabled
proceedings to be taken in the High Court, which was the
tribunal that settled divorce cases and to which the bulk
of Poor Persons work was addressed, was found to be
inappropriate for the needs of a wartime conscript Army.
Under the Poor Persons Procedure, which operated in
England and Wales and was run along similar lines in
Scotland, those persons whose income from all sources did
not exceed £2 a week, or in special circumstances £4, and
who desired to prosecute or defend an action in the High
Court, submitted an application either to their local Law
Society's Poor Persons Committee, or to the Law Society's
Poor Persons Committee in London. If the appropriate
committee was satisfied that the income of the applicant
was within the prescribed limits and that the case was
sound, it was empowered to grant a Poor Persons
Certificate. This certificate excused the applicant the
payment of court fees and entitled him to the services of
a solicitor to prepare his case and counsel to conduct it
in court. These were drawn from a panel of lawyers who
had agreed to act in cases of this type.118
117
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However, as the war developed not only did the Poor
Persons Procedure begin to break down by virtue of the
fact that increasing numbers of solicitors and counsel
were called up into the Services, and the remainder were
so fully occupied with their ordinary clients that they
found it increasingly difficult to deal with Poor Persons
work, but particular difficulties presented themselves in
the case of servicemen. In the first instance, the fact
that a serviceman was usually removed from his home
locality and thus ceased to have easy access to the
sources of advice normally open to him, hindered his
ability to take advantage of the procedure. But even if
he was in a position to obtain a certificate, it was
difficult for him to prosecute his remedy since the
necessary witnesses and other evidence important to his
case were far distant from him and he was not master of
his own time. The problem was further compounded by
confusion over whether servicemen actually qualified as
Poor Persons under the financial regulations as they
stood. The system of pay and allowances operated in the
Army made it difficult for Poor Persons Committees to
state with any certainty what the weekly income of a
soldier in the ranks actually was. Taking into account
that part of his income which he might have received in
kind, it was clear that it frequently exceeded £2 a week
208
and even the extreme limit of £4.119
It was in these circumstances, and with the view being
taken that as the state had often created problems for
soldiers by taking them away from their homes so it had
an obligation towards them, that in the Summer of 1941
the Welfare Directorate proposed the institution of a new
Army Legal Aid Scheme.120 Following consideration of the
proposals by an expert committee under Sir Claud
Schuster, the Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor,
and with the strong backing of General Adam, the scheme
was presented to the E.C.A.C. in March 1942.121 Under the
scheme, Legal Advice Bureaux were to be set up wherever
possible in units in Home Commands. Located in C.V.W.W
huts or other convenient places, they were to be staffed
by serving solicitors and barristers on a part-time
basis, or by available civilians who were willing to
forego some of their spare time, and were to give advice
to soldiers on civil matters that they might have hoped
to obtain from the Citizens' Advice Bureaux or Poor Man's
Lawyer Societies in civilian life. Open to all soldiers
119
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and non-commissioned officers who could not otherwise
afford the costs of private legal advice, the Bureaux
were to deal with such cases that required simple
solutions and if litigation was required in the inferior
courts they were empowered to assist soldiers in finding
a Poor Man's Lawyer or some other civilian solicitor to
act on their behalf.122
However, if a case was too complex to be dealt with
without reference to text books or seemed likely to
result in litigation in the High Court, it was to be
forwarded to Command Legal Branches, or Command Legal Aid
Sections as they subsequently became known, which were to
be set up in every Home Command. Composed of full-time
senior serving solicitors and barristers, they were
either to give further advice on those cases referred to
them by the Legal Advice Bureaux, or if action in the
High Court was required, were to proceed in one of two
ways. In all non-matrimonial cases, the Sections were to
arrange for applications for certificates to be sent to
the local Law Society's Poor Persons Committee nearest an
applicant's home for consideration in the normal way. In
matrimonial matters, though, the Sections were first to
satisfy themselves that a prima facie case existed and if
necessary were to ascertain the names of witnesses and
arrange for statements to be taken either by their own
122WO 163/88, "Army Legal Aid Scheme."
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staffs or by the nearest Legal Aid Bureau. Once this had
been done arrangements were to be made for applications
to be sent either to the appropriate local Poor Persons
Committee, or if that committee was not readily in a
position to deal with the case, to the London Poor
Persons Committee. If a certificate was granted by the
London Committee it was to refer the matter to a new Law
Society Services Divorce Department set up specifically
to conduct the matrimonial cases of those in the
12 3
Forces.
Furthermore, it was proposed that the arbitrary means
test under which applicants were granted certificates by
the Poor Persons Committees should be amended in the case
of servicemen. Although it was specified that facilities
should not be made available to those who, in the opinion
of the committees, possessed such private means that they
could not reasonably be considered as Poor Persons, it
was recommended that all servicemen up to the rank of
sergeant should be entitled to assistance regardless of
their weekly pay and allowances.124
Subject to the provisos that the scheme was to be
essentially advisory, that those serving on Legal Advice
Bureaux and Command Legal Aid Sections would not





contravention of the Solicitors Act, and that no
questions relating to criminal or military law would be
dealt with,125 the E.C.A.C. and the Secretary of State
gave their approval to the establishment of the Legal Aid
Scheme, and with the agreement of the relevant civilian
legal authorities it was instituted under the
administrative control of the Welfare Directorate in July
1942.126 The R.A.F. was invited to participate and did so
from October 1942, but the Navy declined and set up its
own independent service in July 1943.127 The scheme
applied initially to troops stationed in England and
Wales, with complementary arrangements made for those in
Scotland. Steps were, however, taken in 1943 to extend it
overseas and similar facilities were set up in the Middle
East, Italy, South East Asia and North West Europe, with
the London District Command Legal Aid Section acting as a
12 5 .
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clearing house for cases referred from abroad.
The Legal Aid Scheme was never free from delays because
of the shortage of civilian lawyers, and could be
disrupted by the sudden posting of legal advisers away
from units.129 Moreover, it was criticized in some
quarters for prohibiting those serving on the Legal
Advice Bureaux and Legal Aid Sections from taking any
effective action on behalf of servicemen, and being
limited to soldiers up to the rank of sergeant when many
warrant officers and junior officers were unable to pay
private lawyers.130 However, by the end of 1945 it had
dealt with some 175,000 cases of all types, of which
140,000 were concerned with matrimonial affairs. Of these
cases, some 94,000 divorce applications were made of
which 50,000 were carried through to a conclusion.131
Besides the organization of the Legal Aid Scheme, Army
Welfare further became involved in the granting of
compassionate leave and similar concessions to the
troops. From the beginning of the war soldiers facing
128WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 36-37; W0 163/52, War Office Progress
Report, A.C./G(43)30., October 1943; Report of the Committee on
Legal Rid and Legal Advice in England and Vales, chap. 1, p. 5,
chap. 4, p. 22; Adam VIII, chap. 6, p. 5.
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1944), pp. 135-141.
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urgent domestic hardship could be granted periods of
compassionate leave at the discretion of commanding
officers, and this was subsequently extended to enable
soldiers to apply either for temporary release,
compassionate posting to units near their homes,
retention in the United Kingdom or reversion to the Home
Establishment. However, with the growing volume of
hardship cases and the necessity of ensuring uniformity
between units, from 1942 the granting of these
concessions was centralized in the Adjutant-General's
Department in the War Office, although the final decision
on cases of reversion to the Home Establishment remained
with overseas commands.132 In the Middle East, and
subsequently copied in other commands, these decisions
were taken by a specially convened committee of officers
and other ranks which was seen as the fairest method of
dealing with these matters.133
The problem for the War Office, though, was to frame a
policy that would balance the claims of human sympathy
with the pressing manpower requirements of the Army, and
to assist in this matter a reporting procedure was
established. Under this procedure, compassionate
132WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 31-32; "A.C.I. 1182 of 1942. Release from
Military Service, Retention in the United Kingdom, Posting
Nearer Heme, etc., Temporarily on Compassionate Grounds. - Other
Ranks (excluding A.T.S.)," Appendix "E" to The Soldier's
Welfare, 1943, pp. 66-69; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th
series, vol. 385 (1942-43), cols. 1414-1415.
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vol. 404 (1943-44), ools. 1234-1238.
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applications were submitted either directly to the War
Office for those troops at home, or through the Overseas
Department of S.S.A.F.A. for those abroad. These were
investigated by Local Army Welfare Officers, together
with members of S.S.A.F.A., the Help Society and other
voluntary organizations, who, after visiting a soldier's
home and collecting appropriate evidence, submitted a
report on the case to the War Office. On the basis of
this report the War Office then either made a decision
itself if the soldier was serving at home, or made a
recommendation to the appropriate overseas command.134
Between 1942 and 1945 some 900,000 compassionate
applications were received from home and overseas
commands, with soldiers either making applications
themselves, or increasingly as the war came to an end,
relatives approaching the War Office on their behalf. In
January 1945 alone the War Office received nearly 2,000
personal callers on these matters.135
On top of all this, Army Welfare also came to play a role
in the resettlement of servicemen in civilian life.
Ultimate responsibility for resettlement lay with the
134WO 277/4, Morgan, pp. 32-34; W0 277/4, "Welfare Memorandum. To
All Welfare Officers," 20 July 1943, Appendix 12 to Morgan, pp.
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War Office," Memorandum by A.C.S., E.C.A.C./P( 45)18., 19
February 1945.
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Ministry of Labour and National Service who in 1944 laid
down plans for the establishment of Resettlement Advice
Bureaux across the country and a series of training
schemes for ex-servicemen.136 Yet the view was held by
General Adam and others that not only should use be made
of the knowledge and experience of voluntary
organizations and others concerned with Service welfare
in the resettlement of ex-soldiers, but that the War
Office had a certain moral responsibility for the welfare
of its former employees. Accordingly, following a meeting
with the Ministry of Labour in November 1944, it was
agreed that the Director-General of the Territorial Army,
in consultation with the Welfare Directorate, should
sponsor a system of Service Contact Officers. Drawn from
amongst members of S.S.A.F.A., The Help Society, The
National Association for Employment of Ex-Regular
Soldiers, the British Legion and other similar bodies,
these Contact Officers were to be attached to
Resettlement Advice Bureaux and offer specialist advice
to ex-soldiers if required.137 At the same time the
Welfare Directorate was given the task of liaising with
the Ministry of Labour's Appointments Department over the
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civil employment of ex-officers, and was made responsible
for the collection of information on resettlement
matters. This was passed to the Army Education
authorities who edited a monthly Resettlement Bulletin
and distributed it to the troops.138
In relation to resettlement matters, of further note was
the establishment of special Civil Resettlement Units
(C.R.U.s) for repatriated prisoners-of-war, under the
administrative control of the Adjutant-General's
Directorate of Organization. Drawing on the psychological
difficulties in adjustment experienced by prisoners after
the First World War and during the early years of the
Second, and taking the view that the Army had a
moral responsibility in this field, Army psychiatrists
submitted the plans for such a scheme to the War Office
in 1944. Although this met with considerable resistance
from some senior officers who either regarded the
prisoner-of-war as a "military offender" and undeserving
of special treatment, or thought that these facilities
were simply unnecessary, General Adam took the matter
personally to Sir James Grigg, who accepted it and
negotiated the consent of the Cabinet the following day.
Early in 1945 the first C.R.U. was established and by the
end of the year twenty had been set up across the
138WO 32/14569, "Organisation and Responsibilities of the Army
Welfare Service," Appendix "B" to S.C.W./P(47)3., 9 October
1947.
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country, overseen by a planning staff which included a
psychiatrist, Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. T. Wilson, and a
psychologist, Lieutenant-Colonel E. L. Trist. These units
were attended by former prisoners on a voluntary basis
and, staffed by military personnel assisted by civilian
liaison officers, they provided a range of personnel
selection advice, vocational training facilities and
welfare and psychiatric support, all conducted in an
informal atmosphere designed to ease the process of
transition. Indeed, in a follow-up study of prisoners in
1946, it was found that whilst 74% of those that had
attended C.R.U.s showed evidence of successful
resettlement, only 35% of non-attenders were considered
to be adjusting satisfactorily.139
As an adjunct to all the welfare services developed
during the war, it was notable that these years also saw
the establishment of welfare committees of all ranks in a
number of units in Home Commands. In the pre-war Army a
system of regular mess meetings existed so as to enable
soldiers' representatives to voice their opinion to
officers on food matters.140 However, during the war the
commanders of some formations, such as the Guards
Armoured Division, set up welfare committees to allow
consultation between officers and men on any welfare
139Ahrenfeldt, pp. 226-250; Adam VIII, chap. 11, pp. 2-6.
140Captain X, p. 29.
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matter that was causing concern.141 In fact, one District
Commander so valued these welfare committees that he
issued instructions that they were to be presided over
personally by commanding officers who were to take
immediate decisions on matters arising from their
deliberations. "The measure of the need for a Welfare
Conference," he noted, "will be the outspoken character
of the first few sessions."142 These developments
received official recognition with the announcement in
March 1947 that instructions had been sent out that
welfare committees were to be set up throughout the
„ 14 3
Army.
During the war, then, a vast and complex Army Welfare
organization was built up, involved in the provision of
everything from cups of tea to advice on family
allowances, and coming to encompass sixteen branches
within the Welfare Directorate and, it was estimated,
some 900,000 voluntary welfare workers.144 Certainly,
there was evidence to suggest that its work made an
important contribution towards sustaining morale. Not
141
WO 163/53, Morale Report, November 1943-January 1944,
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only did Army morale reports draw attention to the value
of the welfare efforts made on the soldier's behalf,145
but in June 1945 Major-General Viscount Bridgeman, Deputy
Adjutant-General at the War Office, went as far as to
conclude that:
It must be accepted... that Army Welfare has
come to stay; that it is an indispensable factor
in maintaining morale and that without it the
modern soldier cannot be enabled to reproduce in
his Army life conditions which, in his
estimation, are sufficiently civilised to be
tolerable. 46
At the forefront of much of the welfare effort at home,
and singled out for special praise by General Adam,147
were the Local Army Welfare Officers. They had an
especially onerous task. Having organized a range of
comforts, amenities and recreational facilities for the
18,000 troops in his area, as well as interviewing over
6,000 soldiers with personal problems,148 one welfare
officer noted:
For six years my work as L.A.W.O. has been a
whole time job, and the typing of letters has
rarely been completed until 11 p.m., and even
after dinner and on Sundays one was not safe from
145WO 163/54, Morale Report, August-October 1944, A.C./G(45)2., 17
February 1945; W0 163/54, Morale Report, November 1944-January
1945, A.C./G(45)12., 4 July 1945; W0 163/54, Morale Report,
February-April 1945, A.C./G(45)15., 20 August 1945.
146W0 32/14569, "The Army Welfare Services after the War,"
Memorandum by D.A.G.(A)., 16 June 1945.
147A Local Army Welfare Officer, p. 55; Adam VIII, chap. 6, pp. 15-
16.
148A Local Army Welfare Officer, pp. 52, 54.
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urgent visits of soldiers and their relatives.
There was generally one telephone call during
every meal, and on returning from the morning
round of visits there was always a list of
messages awaiting one. The daily round was in
fact very much like that of a busy doctor -
visits, consultations at home, telephone and
correspondence.149
Besides a good deal of stamina, Local Army Welfare
Officers also required a certain bravado at times. As
another recalled:
A C.O. in another part of the country asked
me to do whatever I could for one of his men
whose wife, living in a semi-detached building
with her four children, had been, to say the
least of it, indiscreet. The woman next door was
making life uncomfortable for her in a manner
which savoured of 'blackmail'. It was necessary
to call two or three times on the wife and I also
made two calls on the woman next door. The first
visit to the latter disclosed that I might also
be the subject of 'blackmail' unless I was
careful. During the second visit I listened in
silence for some time to a species of
vituperation which is the outcome of careful
thought on the part of a woman whose character
and reputation are not as good as she is careful
to advertise. Having heard enough I took up the
attack. 'I have on me,' I said, 'a portable
dictograph which has recorded all you have said
and none of which you can prove on oath. The
punishment for blackmail is about two years penal
servitude.' Whether I really carried a dictograph
is my own affair.150
Despite the value of the Army Welfare organization in
sustaining morale, there were, though, factors which
tended to limit its effectiveness. Apart from the
problems inherent in coordinating the numerous voluntary
149
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organizations, the fact that at their peak number there
were only 1,500 voluntary welfare officers appointed to
serve all the troops across Britain, inevitably meant it
was difficult to provide a comprehensive service for
every unit.151 Moreover, from their inception they were
hampered by never being truly integrated into the
machinery of the Army. At the local level, the constant
movement of units around the country, often with no
notice or prior warning, tended to frustrate the efforts
of Local Army Welfare Officers to provide a continuity of
welfare provision.152 At a higher level, the fact that
the Command Welfare Officer was never even nominally a
member of the military staff of Home Commands, could
often lead to confusion over welfare policy.153 Indeed,
the Welfare Directorate's appreciation of the realities
of welfare work across the country could often be at odds
with the experience of those at ground level. As one
Local Army Welfare Officer recalled:
Almost four times a year County Army Welfare
Conferences were held and sometimes attended by a
staff officer from Army Welfare Service. These
officers seemed to understand little of the
duties of a L.A.W.O. One of them asked me whether
a soldier had ever come to me for advice; he
appeared to be under the impression that our
duties were confined to entertainments, canteens
and woollens. It is the old story of the staff
officer with no regimental experience. The
Directorate of A.W.S. would be more efficient if
151W0 277/4, Morgan, pp. 94, 171.
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every member of it was attached to a busy
L.A.W.O., for say two weeks, accompanied him on
his daily round, attended his interviews at home,
read all his correspondence and listened in to
all his telephone calls. In 1941 the Director-
General issued a directive to all L.A.W.O.s,
exhorting them to organize canteens, concerts and
cinemas on every isolated searchlight site. At
that date in our county the total accommodation
for each site was one small Nissen hut and three
bell tents with three hurricane lamps!154
Perhaps more importantly, there was evidence to suggest
that a number of regular officers regarded the welfare
organization with the utmost suspicion, seeing it not
only as a dangerous pampering of the troops, but above
all as undermining the traditional responsibility of
regimental officers for the welfare of their men. As
Brigadier Cyril Morgan, former Deputy-Director of Army
Welfare, noted:
In the British Army the welfare of the
soldier, in the sense in which the term is
commonly understood, has always been regarded as
the responsibility of the regimental officer.
This principle is fundamental to our whole
tradition of military leadership. Welfare is
inextricably woven into the tradition of man-
management, which is a prime function of the
officer. ... It was so tenaciously held by many
senior officers in the Second World War that they
looked askance upon the introduction of a central
welfare organization at the War Office and the
appointment of local army welfare officers who
were not connected with any particular formation
or unit.15 5
Indeed, it was clear that this view was held by a number
of commanding officers of units, the majority of whom
154A Local Army Welfare Officer, pp. 54-55.
155WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 1.
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were regulars, and upon whose cooperation much of the
success of the scheme depended. As Morgan recalled:
... from the outset, there had been an underlying
suspicion that the appointment of voluntary
civilian welfare officers meant either the
introduction of the atmosphere of the well-
meaning aunt or else the creation of a system of
commissars who might drive a wedge between the
officers and their men. There had been a marked
tendency to regard the visit of the welfare
officer as a possible source of danger in that it
might afford the opportunity to disgruntled men
to air their grievances otherwise than through
the proper channels. The command welfare officer,
Scottish Command, had drawn attention to one
aspect of this point in his first annual report,
but the suspicion was by no means confined to
that command and persisted for some time.
The implications of this for Army Welfare seemed clear.
Not only was there evidence of resentment on the part of
some commanding officers towards what was regarded as a
"spoon feeding" organization imposed on the Army which
merely served to interfere with its more important
tasks,157 but without the positive encouragement of their
C.Os it was evident that a number of junior officers
either chose not to utilize the welfare assistance
available to them, or simply remained ignorant of it. As
one commanding officer of an Army Selection Centre
commented in the Autumn of 1943:
I am convinced that many officers know little
of the value and purpose of Welfare Officers, and
156
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therefore it follows that few of the men even
know of their existence. I know pamphlets galore
have been issued, and here again the C.O. of the
Battalion must ensure that this information is
circulated and I think it requires a mention at
almost every conference.1
In similar terms, a District Commander noted:
There is considerable evidence that in many units
insufficient interest is being taken by officers
in their men's private affairs and domestic
worries.... In spite of many pamphlets issued on
the subject, there appear to be still many
officers who know little of the value and purpose
of Welfare Officers.159
Commenting on the welfare facilities available in the
large Royal Army Ordinance Corps Depot in which he
worked, one soldier wrote in 1942:
Apparently there is also a military welfare
officer. I, and everybody else that I know, was
completely unaware of his existence until a
notice appeared in orders a few days ago to the
effect that he was to be consulted in cases of
air raids, damage and casualties. The same notice
went on to point out at some length that this
welfare officer was not to be bothered with any
soldier's 'grumble' or 'grievance' (the army's
inverted commas as if to indicate that a soldier
could not possibly have a genuine grumble or
grievance).
How long this welfare officer has been here,
where he is, how he can be contacted, whether he
is full or part time^ are all points on which I
have no information.
With Army Welfare forbidden to interfere in the
158WO 163/53, Appendix "A" to Morale Report, August-October 1943,
A.C./G(44)4., 11 January 1944.
1 5 9 Tl_ . .Ibid.
160M.O.-A., FR 1105, 10 March 1942.
225
internal welfare arrangements made within units, it thus
seemed evident that many soldiers continued to rely
largely on their junior officers to cater for their
welfare needs.161 The problem was, as we have seen in the
previous discussion of man-management, that a number of
these officers showed little interest in the well-being
of the men under their command. Indeed, this was
confirmed by the Report of the Committee of Enquiry into
Detention Barracks, which concluded in 1943:
They [the Committee] desire to emphasise as
strongly as possible the importance of good
welfare work in the units from which the men
come, as the principal means of saving men from
getting into the trouble which leads to
detention. They consider that if the admirable
Notes for Officers issued by the Adjutant-General
under the title 'The Soldier's Welfare,' were
fully carried into effect, particularly by
Company and Platoon Officers, perhaps as many as
fifty per cent, of those who are now soldiers
under sentence would never have had to be
committed to detention.
It was ironic that the very existence of the Army Welfare
organization could lead in some instances to a decline in
the standard of internal unit welfare. As one Army morale
report commented in the Spring of 1942: "An idea is
prevalent that all Welfare Officers are paid to attend to
the Welfare side, so it is left to them to 'get on with
161
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the job'." This view was corroborated by one soldier
who wrote that "the existence of a Welfare Department in
the Army has led some officers to suppose that their
obligation to do 'welfare work' for their men has
ceased.1,16 4
In the Summer of 1945 the military authorities began to
consider welfare provision for the post-war Army. Whilst
it was conceded by the Army Post-War Problems Committee
in January 1946 that a number of welfare services such as
entertainment, broadcasting and newspapers could be
provided by commercial agencies in peacetime, it was
recommended that those services to which the soldier and
the citizen had become accustomed in war had to continue
whatever agency operated them. "If compulsory service
remains," it was argued, "it will not do for the Army to
treat the citizen soldier less well than in war."165
However, it was perhaps unsurprising that with the
reduction in the size of the Army, and without the
urgency of wartime, not only was the Welfare Directorate
dissolved in 1948 as a separate and distinctive entity
within the Adjutant-General's department at the War
Office and its functions merged into other directorates,
153WO 163/51, Morale Report, February-May 1942, A.C./G(42)20., 12
June 1942.
164Democritus, What's Wrmg With thB Rrmj (London: W. H. Allen &
Co., 1942), p. 60.
155WO 32/14569, "Future of the Army Welfare Service," Twenty-First
Interim Report of the Standing Committee on Army Post-War
Problems, A.P.W.P/P(46)4., 16 January 1946.
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but in 1949 the decision was taken to abolish the
voluntary welfare organization around the country,
thereby ensuring that responsibility for the day-to-day
welfare of the soldier would continue to lie first and
foremost with regimental officers.166 As Brigadier Morgan
noted: "The wheel had come full circle."167
During the war the military authorities instituted
significant changes in both the organization and range of
welfare provision for the Army. Whilst in the pre-war
Army the welfare of the soldier was looked upon almost
entirely as a matter for units and regimental officers,
the War Office was compelled not only to establish for
the first time a new official welfare organization in the
Army to supplement their efforts, but to develop an
unprecedented range of official welfare services that
included not only the provision of extensive amenities
and recreational facilities for the troops, but also of
special assistance over problems of a personal or
domestic nature. Indeed, what the experience of the war
demonstrated was that the modern soldier needed to feel
part of a truly caring institution if he was to function
with full military efficiency. As Colonel John Sparrow
noted:
166WO 32/14569, Extract frcm the Minutes of the 118th Meeting of
the Standing Committee cn Army Fost-War Problems, 20 October
1949.
157WO 277/4, Morgan, p. 175.
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It showed that sufficient provisions for the
welfare, refreshment and recreation of troops,
and for the relief of their anxieties about
domestic matters, may properly be classed as an
operational need.
However, whilst some officers clearly resented the extent
to which these welfare duties were taken over by the Army
Welfare organization during the war, and were eager to
see them fully restored to units and regimental officers
in peacetime, it is perhaps relevant to record in this
respect the findings of the investigation into the Army's
Working Day in 1948, which reported that:
Though it is axiomatic that every Officer
should be a 'Welfare Officer' to his men, this is
not, certainly under present conditions,
sufficient. In this connection it was regrettable
to find a very large number of men who had never
had the opportunity of talking to any of their
own officers in a natural manner.
According to Trevor Royle, it was indicative of the post¬
war Services' indifference to the well-being of their men
that the philanthropic efforts of voluntary organizations
continued to be such an important adjunct to National
Service life.170
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Educational provision for the troops was another area of
Army life which quickly provoked reassessment. During the
final months of the First World War the Army Council
belatedly came to recognize the value of adult education
in sustaining morale, and under the direction of Major
Lord Gorell sought to organize a range of voluntary
lectures and classes for the troops on non-military
subjects, with the aim of occupying them in their off-
duty hours and returning them to civil life better
informed and qualified citizens than before. However,
whilst this represented a significant advance on anything
that had previously been organized by the Army in this
field, and was followed in 1919 by the announcement that
education was henceforth to be regarded as an integral
part of Army training, and by the establishment of an
Army Educational Corps (A.E.C.) in 1920 to organize
educational provision, the reductions in military
expenditure in the inter-war years, and the need to cut
back anything that did not appear directly relevant to
military efficiency, meant that education in the inter-
war Regular Army was largely reduced to the elementary
instruction of soldiers in military related subjects for
the basic Army Certificates of Education, to which their
230
proficiency pay and chances of promotion were linked.1
Indeed, W. E. Williams, who was to play a leading role in
Army education during the Second World War, noted of this
period that, shrunken in numbers and prestige, the A.E.C.
was not only "deprived of its role of training men for
citizenship and set to the task of peeling the
educational potatoes, " but had also "come to be
considered as one of the lesser castes."2
Although steps were taken by Hore-Belisha in the late
1930s, in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour, to
extend vocational training opportunities to soldiers
towards the end of their service as part of the effort to
promote recruitment,3 the passage of the Military
Training Act in the Spring of 1939 did serve to focus
attention in the War Office on the question of
1
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educational provision for the Army. In anticipation of
the demand for adult education facilities from militiamen
who would have their civilian studies interrupted on
their call up, and as a result of representations from
civilian educational organizations, the War Office gave
its consent to the drawing up of plans by the Workers'
Educational Association (W.E.A.), the Young Men's
Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) and the Universities,
along with the Local Education Authorities and the Board
of Education, for the establishment of a central
coordinating committee and a network of regional
committees to offer a range of voluntary adult education
classes to militiamen on non-military subjects, with the
A.E.C. acting as the link between this organization and
the militiamen.4 However, not only were these plans put
into abeyance by the War Office on the outbreak of war on
the grounds that as the militia had been merged into the
Regular Forces they now no longer applied,5 but the
decision was taken that normal peacetime education had no
place in an Army under active service conditions and the
bulk of the A.E.C. were transferred to cipher duties.6
4Williams (1), pp. 5-6; Hawkins and Brimble, p. 97; Lieut. T. H.
Hawkins, "Education in the British Army," Nature 151 (April
1943), p. 438; N. Scarlyn Wilson, Education in the Forces 1939
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1940].
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For the first few months of the war official education in
the Army virtually ceased.
In the same way, though, that the War Office was
compelled to reconsider its attitude to welfare
provision, so in the early months of 1940 it was also
forced to reconsider its attitude to education. In
defiance of the military authorities, the W.E.A., the
Y.M.C.A. and the Universities revived the plans drawn up
before the war and in January 1940 formed a Central
Advisory Council for Education in H.M. Forces (C.A.C.),
and a network of twenty-three Regional Committees to
provide lectures and classes for the troops, whose
activities soon revealed a demand for education from
amongst citizen soldiers deprived of their normal
peacetime studies.7 At the same time, the military
authorities were subjected to a good deal of pressure
from parliament and the press to coordinate these
activities, with Lord Gorell, and educationalists such as
H. A. L. Fisher and A. D. Lindsay, publicly criticising
the Army for its neglect of educational provision and
calling for the return of the A.E.C. to supervise
7Wilson, pp. 3-5; Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 98-99; Williams (1),
pp. 6-7.
233
educational activity in the Army.8
In consideration of these developments there was some
disagreement within the War Office. Whilst there were
those, such as the Director of Military Training, Major-
General C. C. Maiden, and the Director of Recruiting and
Organization, Major-General L. H. K. Finch, who argued
that some means had to be found to correlate the
educational facilities available with the needs of the
troops, and that the A.E.C. was the best instrument to do
this,9 there were others, such as T. J. Cash of the
Directorate of Finance, who continued to oppose the
concept of education for the wartime Army and maintained
that what the troops required was welfare rather than
educational provision. In February 1940, he recorded:
At the risk of appearing a Philistine, I adhere
to the view which the Army Council formed in
peace-time that there is no place for organised
'Army Education' in war-time, in an Army composed
of all classes, from highly educated to
illiterate, engaged in fighting or preparing to
fight, and that what is wanted is mainly mental
and physical relaxation rather than systematic
8Pariiamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, vol. 356 (1939-40),
cols. 361-363; Gorell, letter to the Editor, The Times, 18
January 1940, p. 7; H. A. L. Fisher, letter to the Editor, The
Times, 18 January 1940, p. 7; A. D. Lindsay, letter to the
Editor, The Times, 9 February 1940, p. 6; Hawkins and Brimble,
p. 98.
9
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education.10
However, what convinced the War Office rhat some action
needed to be taken in this field was the growing concern
over the morale and efficiency of the Army, and in
particular the mood of boredom and apathy which seemed to
have overtaken the troops as the "phoney war" dragged
on.11 In contrast with the mood of their fathers of 1914,
there was little enthusiasm for the war amongst new
recruits. They joined up because they were ordered to and
their priority was to get the job over with as quickly as
possible. Yet here they were, the majority of them,
sitting around in camps in Britain with all the
restrictions and monotony that that entailed, and taking
no active part in the war effort. The mood of the
soldiers was well summed up by Bishop Hensley Henson, who
noted in March 1940:
I am distressed to hear from many sides that the
prevailing temper of the troops is a half cynical
boredom, as remote as possible from the high
crusading fervour which their situation
authorises and requires.... They have neither the
enthusiasm of youth nor the deliberate purpose of
age, but just acquiesce in an absurd and
10WO 32/4725, D.F.(b) to D.R.O., 12 February 1940, Appendix to
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee Assembled to
Discuss the War-Time Role and Organization of the Army
Educational Corps.
11
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Council, A.C.M.(O.S.)5., 12 February 1940.
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unwelcome necessity.12
Education, it was considered, might prove a more
effective means of sustaining morale than canteens and
concert parties alone, and it was in this context that in
the Spring of 1940 the Army Council gave the Haining
Committee the task of drawing up a scheme of adult
education for the troops to go alongside its welfare
provision,13 and, following the defeat at Dunkirk which
promised a further period of inactivity and brought fresh
concerns over morale, consented to its recommendations in
August.14
The Haining Scheme, the details of which were
encapsulated in a pamphlet entitled Education in the War
Time Army, was announced to Home Commands in September
1940. Under the scheme, which was be voluntary and take
place in off-duty hours, a range of subjects were to be
offered to the troops, including the humanities, the
utilities and hobby interests. The providers of education
were to be the Army's own internal resources in the form
12
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M. C. Morgan, 1953, p. 23; Maj .-Gen. C. Llcryd, British Services
Education (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950), p. 16.
236
of serving teachers and lecturers, and those of C.A.C.'s
Regional Committees, Local Education Authorities and any
other civilian bodies willing to help. An Education
Officer was to be appointed from amongst suitable
regimental officers in each unit to stir up interest
amongst the troops, a Unit Education Committee of all
ranks set up to assist him, and an expanded A.E.C. was to
return to educational work to coordinate demand with
supply. The scheme was to be supervised by a new
Directorate of Education in the War Office under F. W. D.
Bendall, a civil servant seconded from the Board of
Education, who was to work closely with the Directorate
of Welfare; this arrangement being formalized in
December 1940 with the appointment of General Willans as
Director-General of Welfare and Education; the Adjutant-
General, General Adam, assuming overall responsibility
for both these areas in the Summer of 1941.1j The aim of
the scheme, Education in the War Time Army recorded, was
to "combat boredom, and so have a strong and direct
effect on morale and efficiency." But of note also was
the hope that education might instil the troops with some
"crusading fervour":
There should be constant opportunities of showing
to all the destructive nature, both as regards
material and culture, of the forces set against
15
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us, and of illustrating how the British Empire
stands for the essential factors of a new and
better life.16
With the establishment of the scheme, a range of
educational facilities became available to the Army over
the Winter of 1940-41. Whilst a number of units began to
organize their own educational activities, usually in the
form of discussion groups,17 C.A.C.'s Regional Committees
laid on some 9,500 lectures, short courses and classes
for the troops on subjects which included politics,
history, geography, economics, science, philosophy, music
and art, and Local Education Authorities provided
practical tuition in commerce, technology and
handicrafts.18 At the end of 1940 arrangements were also
made with the appropriate professional bodies for the
institution of correspondence courses for the Army in
such fields as banking, insurance, law and engineering,
and by March 1941 some 5,000 soldiers had applied for
15WO 32/9429, Education in the Vac Time Army, War Office,
September 1940; quoted in Army Council Instruction 1415,
November 1940.
17Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 114-118; White, pp. 92-93.
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(June 1941), pp. 201-202; "Army Education. Progress in Liverpool
Region," The Times Educational Supplement, no. 1345 (1941), p.
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enrolment.19
Yet although these activities were set to continue and
expand throughout the war years, it soon became evident
to the military authorities that the Haining Scheme was
not sustaining morale as effectively as had been hoped.
In the first instance, it was clear that the soldiers,
the majority of whom had received no organized education
since the age of fourteen and associated it with all the
restrictions of the elementary school classroom, had
little interest in voluntary education in their spare
time on what were perceived to be mainly scholarly
subjects. Furthermore, the irregular duty hours, the
posting of personnel, the movement of units around the
country and the call up of civilian lecturers and tutors
to the Forces, made it difficult to organize systematic
educational provision even for those who wanted it.
Moreover, the success of the scheme depended largely on
the cooperation of commanding officers of units, and it
was evident that a number of them regarded educational
provision as either an unnecessary distraction or
potentially subversive, and appointed the least suitable
of their juniors as Unit Education Officers, hesitated to
set up Unit Education Committees, failed to publicize
educational activities or cancelled them as they saw
19White, pp. 93-94; Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 178-179; Maj.-Gen. H.
Willans, "Army Education and Welfare," The Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution 86 (May 1941), pp. 259-260.
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fit.20 As one A.E.C. officer noted:
one may safely say that the whole scheme
depends upon the C.O.: if he is sympathetic, it
will flourish; if he 'doesn't believe in
education' then practically nothing will get a
successful education scheme working in his
unit.
What all this amounted to was that by the Spring of 1941
it was estimated that 80% of the troops remained
untouched by educational provision.22 It was in these
circumstances, and with news of defeats in the Middle
East and the prospect of a sedentary existence in camps
in Britain for the foreseeable future conspiring to
create fresh concerns over morale, that in the Summer of
1941 the War Office planned a further scheme of education
for the Army.23
20Williams (1), pp. 10-11; Williams (2), pp. 252-254; Wilson, pp.
10-11, 28-29, 31; White, pp. 88-89, 75-76; Tern Harrisscn Mass-
Observation Archive [hereafter M.O.-A.], FR 686, 5 May 1941;
Beryl Course, letter to the Editor, The Times Fdncatirnal
Supplement no. 1390 (1941), p. 607; Ex-Picneer, letter to the
Editor, The New Statesman and Nation 21 (March 1941), p. 273;
Thomas Kelly, "Some Lessons of Army Education," Adult Education
13 (June 1941), pp. 168-169; C. E. M. Joad, "Army Education -
The Case for Compulsion," Hie New Statesman and Naticn 22 (July
1941), p. 79; A W.E.A. Member now in the Forces, "More About
Army Education," The Highway 35 (January 1943), p. 48; Hubert
Webb, "Education and the Army: A Tutor's View," Tte Highway 25
(December 1943), p. 35; Harry Ross, "Army Education," Fabian
Quarterly, no. 38 (July 1943), p. 21.
2divisional Education Officer, letter to the Editor, The New
Statesman and Natien 21 (April 1941), p. 412.
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Adam Papers
[hereafter Adam], Adam VIII, typescript narrative by Gen. Sir
Ronald Adam on "Various Administrative Aspects of the Army




The new scheme had its origins in an experiment carried
out over the previous months by General Adam, then
Commander-in-Chief, Northern Command. Adam had been
concerned over the limitations of the Haining Scheme and
the low morale of his troops, which he considered to be
largely due to their lack of knowledge of the progress of
the war and the reasons for which they were fighting; a
problem compounded by the fact that many of them were cut
off from normal newspaper and wireless facilities.24 As
William Shebbeare confirmed:
I had imagined when I joined the army that we
should have some little talk from our Commanding
Officer on the motives for which Britain fought;
and that throughout our training it would be
recognised that all these lads - conscripts and
volunteers - were showing themselves ready to
give everything, even their lives, for a great
cause, and were therefore men to be respected....
The nearest recognition of this in my own
experience was an N.C.O. who told us 'You are not
here for punishment.'
In order to remedy this, Adam devised a system under
which regimental officers held weekly discussions with
their men during duty hours on current affairs topics,
using information culled from the press. Although no
official assistance was given to this venture, W. E.
Williams, a civilian liaison officer touring commands for
the Directorate of Education, brought back news of the
24
Adam VIII, chap. 6, p. 3.
25Captain X [William G. C. Shebbeare], A Soldier Lodes Ahead
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 1944), pp. 9-10.
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experiment to the War Office and was invited by General
2 6
Willans to draw up a similar scheme for the whole Army.
Having outlined the shortcomings of the existing Haining
Scheme, General Willans submitted the new education
scheme in a paper to the Executive Committee of the Army
Council (E.C.A.C.) on 5 June. In order to appeal to the
troops, and thus sustain their morale more effectively,
it was recommended that the scheme should concentrate
specifically on current affairs rather then scholastic
subjects. Willans recorded:
Education in this sense would lead to a better
appreciation of the real objects for which we are
fighting and opens up a wider and more promising
prospect. It cannot be disputed that if we can
employ men's minds and stimulate their interest
by promoting knowledge, discussion and thought
about the affairs of the world in which they
live, we go far to maintain their morale, and
thus to make them better soldiers. The longer the
war lasts the more important this will be.
Furthermore, to ensure that this education reached all
the troops, it was proposed that the scheme should be
conducted by regimental officers in training time, rather
than by educational experts in off-duty hours. Willans
noted:
The officer must supply his men with information
and must encourage them to discuss and to think
and he must regard this as an integral part of
his task. It must become part of the soldier's
26Adam VIII, chap. 6, pp. 3-4; Williams (1), pp. 13-14.
27WO 163/84, "Education in the Wartime Army," Memorandum by
D.G.W.E., E.C.A.C./P(41)37., 5 June 1941.
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life like his dinner or his sport or his route
march.2 8
Moreover, to supply officers with the necessary
literature, and drum up support for the enterprise in the
Army, it was recommended that a new directorate be set up
in the War Office to conduct the scheme, which would be
separate from the Directorate of Education but come under
the wing of the Director-General of Welfare and
Education. The importance of winning over the support of
commanding officers was particularly stressed by Willans:
The real difficulty is to supply the inspiration,
which must come from the top. Too much stress
cannot be laid on this; like everything else it
is a matter for commanding officers.
In consideration of this new scheme there was a good deal
of concern amongst senior figures in the War Office, the
Secretary of State for War, Captain David Margesson,
voicing his fears that it would serve to encourage
political agitation within the Army, which was contrary
to King's Regulations and all historical precedent, and
doubting that the average junior officer had the ability
to conduct the scheme satisfactorily.30 Willans,
though, persuasively countered these arguments:
A criticism of the foregoing Memorandum has





30WO 32/9735, D.G.W.E. to P.U.S., 3 June 1941.
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door open to political agitation within the Army.
My answer is that the door is now open to
political discussion of any kind; discussions are
encouraged by the existing scheme. Moreover men
who wish to discuss politics will discuss them
and it is far better that they should do so
openly in the light of the facts which have been
intelligently and convincingly presented to them
than they should do so in ignorance or behind
closed doors. Indeed I strongly suggest the
scheme will, in fact, militate against political
agitation. The agitator invariably thrives where
he is dealing with ignorant men or working in
secret and fails when brought into open contact
with facts and knowledge. I submit that this
scheme is calculated to fortify men's minds with
knowledge of the world and that, far from
producing anything in the nature of subversive
opinions, it will go a long way to strengthen
morale and to combat boredom, which itself is the
agitator's (and the German's) best friend.31
Turning to the second area of concern, he recorded:
A more serious criticism is inspired by a
doubt of the ability of the present day officer
to play his part in the scheme. My answer to that
is that we entrust these officers with the lives
of men and with the task of instructing them in
the arts of war, some of which are complicated,
all of which require ability and leadership. We
can hardly sustain the suggestion that we cannot
entrust the same officers with the task of
instructing the same men about the affairs of the
world in which they live.
Moreover, he added, the scheme would positively
contribute towards improving the relationship between
officers and men by affording a further point of contact
between them.33
31
WO 163/84, "Supplement to Memorandum on Education in the Wartime




WO 163/50, Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the Army Council,
A.C./M(41)8., 17 June 1941.
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Although there continued to be an element of unease in
the War Office, in view of the overriding need to sustain
the morale of the troops, the fact that a similar
experiment had been carried out successfully in Northern
Command, and with the provisos that the material supplied
to officers would be carefully edited in the War Office,
and that commanding officers would require to be
satisfied that their officers were imparting the
instruction in a satisfactory manner and no party
politics would enter into the discussions, the Secretary
of State was persuaded to agree to the scheme, and, with
the powerful support of General Adam who by this time had
arrived at the War Office as Adjutant-General, it was
passed by the E.C.A.C. on 9 June and given the consent of
the full Army Council on 17 June.34
During July the proposed directorate was set up in the
War Office, under the title of the Army Bureau of Current
Affairs (A.B.C.A.), and W. E. Williams appointed
Director. To Brigadier-General Lord Croft, the
Conservative Parliamentary Under-Secretary who was to act
as the political watchdog to Army education, this was a
somewhat controversial appointment since Williams, as
Secretary of the British Institute of Adult Education,
Executive member of the Workers' Educational Association
34WO 32/9735, D.G.W.E. to P.U.S., 3 June 1941; WO 163/84, Minutes
of the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Army
Council, E.C.A.C./M(41)16., 9 June 1941; WO 163/50, A.C./M(41)8.
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and Director of Penguin Books, enjoyed a distinctly
reformist reputation.35 However, as one of the leading
young pioneers of popular education in the country, he
was well regarded by Willans and Adam as having the
necessary expertise and inspiration to supervise the
scheme, and Croft contented himself with the Army
Council' s pronouncement that the scheme was to be non-
political .3 6
In August 1941 the details of the scheme were outlined to
the Army in a pamphlet entitled Current Affairs in the
Army. Regimental officers were instructed to hold classes
with their sections or platoons once a week during
training hours. The Directorate would supply officers
with two pamphlets, War and Current Affairs, on which
discussions could be based. War would chart the progress
of the conflict and Current Affairs an analysis of
broader topical issues. The A.E.C, which had been
strengthened by the inclusion of wartime recruits, was to
act as A.B.C.A.'s local agents and give officers any
3 5
Churchill College, Cambridge, Lord Croft Papers [hereafter
Croft], "Welfare and Education. A.B.C.A.," Memorandum by U.S. of
S., 8 January 1943; Croft, "A.B.C.A. and Political Reactions,"
Memorandum by U.S. of S., n.d. [but 1943]. I am grateful to Dr.
Paul Addison for providing me with copies of documents from this
archive.
3 6
Croft, "Welfare and Education. A.B.C.A."; S. P. Mackenzie,
Politics and Military Morale. Current Affairs and Citizenship
Education in the British Amy 1314-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), pp. 93-94.
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assistance required.3 7
The A.B.C.A. scheme was an important military development
in a number of respects. Primarily, it marked the first
occasion on which education was made compulsory amongst
all units of a wartime British Army.38 Furthermore, it
seemed to embody a change in attitude towards the rank
and file soldiers which, in the opinion of William
Shebbeare, reversed the idea that they should not think
for themselves or be interested in the world around
them.39 Moreover, it signified an important shift in the
direction and purpose of wartime Army education. Whilst
the aim of the scheme was still to sustain the morale and
efficiency of the troops, a more specific potency was to
be given to the instillation of "crusading fervour".
Instead of merely offering opportunities for contrast
between Britain and Germany, education was now to
concentrate specifically on the objectives of the war in
the hope that, in the tradition of Cromwell's Army, the
soldier who understood the cause for which he fought was
likely to be a more reliable soldier than one who did
not.40 More importantly, the scheme was to go further and
attempt to teach the troops the rudiments of citizenship.
3 7
WO 32/9735, Current Affairs in the Army. The Outline of a New
Plan, War Office, August 1941.
3 8
Hawkins and Brimble, p. 119.
39Captain X, p. 21.
40WO 32/9735, Current Affairs in the Amy. The Outline of a New
Plan.
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As Current Affairs in the Army recorded:
lack of knowledge about national and
international issues is a chronic condition among
the citizens of this country, and it does not
disappear because a man changes his dungarees or
his pin-stripe trousers for a khaki battledress.
But if an ill-informed or indifferent citizen is
a menace to our national safety, so, too, is a
soldier who neither knows nor cares why he is in
4 1
arms.
Thus, from the outset the targets of current affairs
teaching were citizens, not just temporary soldiers, and
the purpose was to create a better informed electorate as
well as a more effective fighting force.42
However, before the A.B.C.A. scheme could get properly
underway it faced a further hurdle. Churchill, who had
apparently had his attention drawn to the potential
dangers of the scheme by some Conservative M.P.s,43 wrote
to Margesson on 6 October expressing his fears that
A.B.C.A. discussions between officers and men would
undermine the Army's discipline and provide opportunities
for "the professional grouser and agitator with a glib
tongue."44 Margesson replied on 8 October that although




Summerf ield, p. 143.
43AdamVIII, chap. 8, p. 2.
44Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, The Grand
Alliance (Londcn: Cassell, 1950; Harmcndsworth: Penguin Bocks,
1985), p. 739.
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scheme posed no real danger. The Army Council had agreed
that it was important to sustain morale and it would be
closely monitored.45 Churchill, though, remained
unconvinced and wrote again to Margesson on 17 October,
noting: "I hope you will wind this business up as quickly
and decently as possible and set the persons concerned in
it to useful work."46 Presented with this instruction to
disband A.B.C.A., Margesson passed the letter to Sir
James Grigg, at this time Permanent Under-Secretary at
the War Office. What transpired was related by General
Adam:
Sir James Grigg sent for me and showed me the
note. I was very keen on the project and knew
that Sir James was in favour of it and I said
'What can we do'? Sir James opened his desk put
the note at the back of a drawer and closed it
and said 'I wonder if he remembers his notes.'
Very few ministers would have the couracje to have
taken this line and it was successful.
Indeed, having vented his feelings Churchill promptly
forgot about A.B.C.A. and turned his attention to other
matters.4 8
With this initial threat to the scheme thwarted, A.B.C.A.
set about establishing itself under Williams and expanded




Adam VIII, chap. 8, p. 2.
48MacKenzie, p. 101.
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outset the mainstay of its effort was the production of
War and Current Affairs, which were issued to officers on
alternate weeks. War was written by two serving
journalists, Captain Anthony Cotterell of the Daily
Express and Captain Stephen Watts of the Sunday Express,
and provided a summary of the latest military events,
including items on war strategy, tactics, weapons and
battle narratives.49 Current Affairs, on the other hand,
was written by outside civilian experts but edited in the
War Office by Major Guy Chapman, a former W.E.A. tutor
and editor with the publishing firm Jonathan Cape. It
included analyses of both foreign and domestic affairs,
and came to encompass topics that ranged from individual
studies of the Allied and Axis powers to discussions of
the nation's health, education and town planning. By the
end of the war 118 issues had been produced.50
To supplement these pamphlets, and influence those troops
who could or would not take part in discussion, A.B.C.A.
also developed a range of visual aids. During 1942 a
series of travelling A.B.C.A. photographic exhibitions
was organized to reinforce the themes discussed. In
September 1942 an A.B.C.A. poster campaign was launched
along similar lines. From November 1942 an A.B.C.A. Map
49Williams (1), p. 49; A. Cotterell, An Apple far the Sergeant
(Lcrcicn: Hutchinson & Co., 1944), p. 94. According to Cotterell,
War was so named to enable the writers to answer the telephone
with the words "This is War!"
50Williams (1), p. 49; White, pp. 97-98; Guy Chapman, A Kind of
Survivor (London: Victor Gollancz, 1975), pp. 190-191.
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Review was issued to officers twice a month. Edited by
Captain Lionel Birch, former assistant editor of Picture
Post, this portrayed the outstanding events at home and
abroad over each fortnight and sought to place them in a
clear geographical perspective.51
Whilst A.B.C.A. devised the raw materials on which
discussion could be based, it also set about the task of
convincing the Army of the virtues of the scheme. From
the outset General Adam and General Willans made tours of
the troops to promote A.B.C.A., and Williams himself
spent half his time with units, explaining its aims and
methods and submitting himself to cross-examination.
During 1942 a series of weekend courses and conferences
on A.B.C.A. technique was organized by the A.E.C., in
collaboration with C.A.C.'s Regional Committees, and
A.E.C. touring teams were formed to visit units and
formations to give on-the-spot instruction. In January
1943 an official A.B.C.A. school was set up at Coleg
Harlech, under Lieutenant-Colonel Norman Fisher, the
Assistant Education Secretary for Cambridgeshire before
the war, and a more intensive five-day course developed.
Of particular note was the provision of a special course
at the school for commanding officers, whose cooperation
was vital if the scheme was to be effective, and by the
5 Williams (1), pp. 63-66; Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 163-164, 166.
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end of the war some 4,600 such officers had attended.52
Indeed, a year after its introduction the military
authorities seemed well pleased with the A.B.C.A.
scheme's progress. Not only had it seemed to have been
well received by the Army, but was regarded as having
done much to sustain the morale of the troops. In August
1942 the Secretary of State, Sir James Grigg, concluded
that "it is now almost universally accepted that,
whenever officers have taken trouble to work it sensibly
and with keenness, A.B.C.A. has been an outstanding
ii 5 3
success.
However, whilst the A.B.C.A. scheme was set to continue
and spread to many of the overseas theatres,54 less than
a year after its introduction the War Office planned a
further scheme of education for the Army. By the Summer
of 1942 the military situation was still depressing, with
news of further defeats in the Middle East and the Far
East, and it was considered that something more needed to
be done if the morale of the Army was to be sustained,
particularly over the long winter months ahead.55
Furthermore, it was felt that efforts should be made to
52Williams (1), pp. 51-52, 67; Wilson, pp. 51-53; Hawkins and
Brimble, pp. 162, 174.
53P. J. Grigg; preface to The A.B.C.R. Handbook, War Office,
August 1942.
54Williams (1), pp. 133, 158-159, 174-5, 178, 182.
55Summerfield, p. 145.
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provide some educational facilities for the 80% of troops
who were unattracted by the Haining Scheme but for whom
A.B.C.A. had given a taste for education.56 Moreover,
what the A.B.C.A. scheme itself revealed was just how
ignorant of the country's history and institutions the
average soldier was, and it was evident that some
instruction in these matters was needed if current
affairs discussions were to work effectively. As Williams
himself noted:
The earlier experiences of A.B.C.A. brought to
light what its architects had foreseen - the
lamentable lack of background knowledge in the
average platoon discussion. It was a common
experience for discussion to peter out because
there was no one present to confirm or contradict
reputed matters of fact. To consolidate and
reinforce the ABCA bridgehead it was necessary to
devise a method of instructing the Army about the
background of Current Affairs.57
It was with these considerations in mind, as well as the
need to try out educational plans in advance of the
eventual demobilization of the Army,58 that on the basis
of experiments that had been carried out in Scottish and
South Eastern Commands over the previous Winter, and with
the consent of General Willans, a new scheme of education
was drawn up by the Directorate of Education in June
1942, where F. W. D. Bendall had been replaced as
Director of Education by John Burgon Bickersteth, Warden
55AdamVIII, chap. 8, p. 6.
57Williams (1), p. 16.
58AdamVIII, chap. 8, p. 6.
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of Hart House at the University of Toronto, head of
education in the Canadian Corps, and another man regarded
with suspicion by Lord Croft as having reformist
sympathies.5 9
On 21 July the new scheme was submitted in a paper to the
E.C.A.C. by General Adam. Under the proposed scheme,
which was to run in Home Commands over the Winter of
1942-43, three extra hours of compulsory education were
to be held each week during training time in addition to
A. B.C. A. One hour was to be devoted to subjects of a
military value, a second to vocational pursuits and a
third to the study of British life and government and
that of the Allied nations, for which the War Office
would issue a detailed syllabus. Instructors were to be
found from amongst the Army's own internal resources,
assisted where possible by the civilian educational
organizations. Although it was acknowledged that some
units, particularly training units, would be unlikely to
find the extra time to conduct the classes, it was felt
that the majority would be able to accommodate it. The
scheme, noted Adam, would not only assist morale over the
coming Winter, but would give a greater sense of purpose
and direction to education in the Army and would act as a
dress rehearsal for educational activities during the
release period. Moreover, he added, it would encourage
59Williams (1), p. 15; Croft, "A.B.C.A. and Political Reactions."
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the keen commanding officer and enable pressure to be
applied to those who were still perhaps to be convinced
of the value of Army education.50
In consideration of the new scheme on 24 June there was
some hesitancy on the part of the E.C.A.C., the Quarter-
Master-General, General Sir Walter Venning, doubting
whether a further three hours in addition to A.B.C.A.
could be applied to working units without a reduction in
their output, and questioning whether the morale of field
force units would actually be improved by their
implementation. Adam, though, sprung to the defence of
the scheme. Not only did he record that it was quite
feasible for it to be modified in accordance with the
special requirements of working units, but that
experiments that had been carried out amongst field force
units over the previous Winter had been very successful
and had definitely raised the morale of the troops. In
consideration of these arguments, the E.C.A.C. agreed to
the scheme in principle but recommended that General
Paget, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, be consulted
before any further action was taken.61
In a report to the E.C.A.C. on 18 August, General
Willans, who had consulted Paget over the scheme,
60WO 163/89, "Education in the Army during Winter 1942/1943,"
Memorandum by A.G., E.C.A.C./P(42)101., 21 July 1942.
61
WO 163/89, Minutes of the 69th Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)30., 24 July 1942.
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outlined the Commander-in-Chief's views. Paget was averse
to any binding commitment on the Army and preferred that
his commanders use their discretion as to how best to
implement it in accordance with their own circumstances.
Nevertheless, he was in favour of the scheme and attached
particular importance to the hour devoted to the study of
Britain and her Allies, which he considered would go far
to counteract what he regarded as the tendency towards
apathy in the Army.62 Having noted Paget's views, the
E.C.A.C. gave its formal consent to the scheme on 21
August and agreed that any instructions issued on the
subject should be limited to a general directive in broad
terms rather than on any "sealed pattern."53 On 28 August
Sir James Grigg added his approval, subject to
reassurances that positive action would be taken in this
64
matter.
The Winter Scheme of Education, as it became known, was
announced to the Army in a memorandum in September 1942.
Under the scheme, which was to run from November 1942 to
February 1943 and be supervised by the Directorate of
Education, one period a week was to be devoted to the
62WO 163/89, "Education in the Army during 1942/43," Memorandum by
D.G.W.E., E.C.A.C./P(42)113., 18 August 1942.
6 3
WO 163/89, Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)34., 21 August
1942.
5 4
WO 163/89, Minutes of the 74th Meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Army Council, E.C.A.C./M(42)35., 28 August
1942.
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education of the man as a soldier and focus on such
subjects as message writing, map reading, sketching and
mechanics. A second was to be devoted to the education of
the man as an individual and provide time for the pursuit
of hobbies or study for technical or professional
qualifications. A third was to be devoted to the
education of the man as a citizen and involve discussion
of the British Way of Life, the British Empire and the
United Nations. The material for this hour was to be
provided by the Directorate in the form of a booklet,
entitled British Way and Purpose (B.W.P.), which was
intended to offer a systematic and continuous curriculum
of civic instruction against which the more random
current affairs topics of A.B.C.A. could be set. Every
effort was to be made to find suitable instructors for
the scheme from amongst units themselves, but
arrangements were put in hand for C.A.C.'s Regional
Committees and the A.E.C, which had been growing in
strength, to assist where required.65
The Winter Scheme, and the hour devoted to the study of
B.W.P. in particular, marked another important military
development. Not only did it extend the principle of
compulsory education in the wartime Army, and reinforce
the notion of the soldier as a thinkxng being with
65WO 32/10455, "The Winter Scheme of Education," Memorandum by
D.A.E., issued with War Office letter to General Officers
Commanding-in-Chief, All Heme Commands, 7 September 1942;
Williams (1), p. 16.
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interests in the world around him, but it signified a
further shift in the direction of Army education. Whilst
the overriding aim of B.W.P. was still to sustain the
morale and fighting efficiency of the troops by
clarifying the objectives of the war, by focusing on
aspects of Britain worth fighting for, rather than
current affairs, the declared intention of B.W.P., even
more than A.B.C.A., was to inspire in the troops a more
enlightened form of citizenship and a more responsible
participation in the democratic process. As the
memorandum announcing the scheme to the Army stressed:
These talks should have the vitally important aim
of driving home what we and our Allies are
fighting for, as well as our responsibilities as
citizens of a democratic country and as members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
In November 1942 the Winter Scheme got underway and the
B.W.P. hour soon established itself as its most prominent
and distinctive element. The B.W.P. booklets were issued
to units once a month and included four chapters as the
basis for each week's discussion. Written by outside
experts, but edited in the War Office by Major R. L.
Marshall of the A.E.C., they dealt with such topics as
British democratic, social and economic institutions, the
growth and organization of the British Empire and
Britain's relationship with her Allies.67 In order to
66WO 32/10455, "The Winter Scheme of Education."
67White, p. 102; Hawkins and Brimble, p. 139; Adam VIII, chap. 8,
p. 6.
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assist unit instructors in the conduct of the B.W.P
classes, C.A.C.'s Regional Committees organized a series
of short courses on the subject matter and methods
required, and the A.E.C provided touring teams to give
on-the-spot advice. However, since a number of units had
difficulty in procuring their own instructors, and
because of the complexity of some of the topics
discussed, a good deal of the teaching was done either by
panels of C.A.C. lecturers or A.E.C. personnel
themselves, who became involved in a comprehensive
instructional effort for the first time.58
By the close of 1942 the military authorities were
sufficiently pleased with the progress of the B.W.P.
hour, in terms of the reception it seemed to have had
from the Army and its stimulating effect on the morale of
the troops, for General Adam to propose that it, along
with its accompanying booklets, should be continued into
the Summer of 1943 after the other two hours of the
Winter Scheme finished in February.69 This was agreed by
Grigg, subject to the provisos that care would be taken
to avoid any political or propagandist tendencies in the
subjects covered and that Lord Croft should watch over
68Williams (1), p. 17; Wilson, pp. 58, 60-55; Adam VIII, chap. 8,
pp. 6-7;
69WO 163/89, "Education in the Army during the Winter 1942/43,"
Memorandum by A.G., E.C.A.C./P(42)161., 28 December 1942.
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its development.70 The extension was announced to the
Army in March 1943,7 1 General Paget going as far as
issuing a special letter on the subject in which he
stressed the importance he attached to B.W.P- as "a means
of developing a sense of citizenship in the Army which
will pay a high dividend after the war."72
By the Summer of 1943, then, three educational schemes
were operating concurrently in the Army: the voluntary
Haining Scheme and the compulsory A.B.C.A. and B.W.P.
hours. However, it was during this period that A.B.C.A.
and B.W.P. came under challenge from some elements in the
War Office and beyond. During the first year of
A.B.C.A.'s existence, Williams had been careful to avoid
controversy in the topics addressed by Current Affairs
and Lord Croft pronounced himself completely satisfied
with the early issues, which he considered to be
educative, informative and free from political bias.73
From the Summer of 1942, though, Williams had begun to
turn his attention towards post-war domestic issues and
Croft, a Conservative of the most orthodox views, became
uneasy over what he regarded as the leftist bias which
70WO 32/10455, Note by P.J.G., 30 January 1943; WO 163/90, Minutes
of the 96th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Army
Council, E.C.A.C./M(43)6., 5 February 1943.
71
WO 32/10455, "Army Education," Army Council Instruction 352, 3
March 1943.
7 2
WO 32/10455, letter from B. C. T. Paget to All Army Commanders,
and G.O.C., London District, 27 March 1943.
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Current Affairs seemed to be embodying.7 4
Indeed, whilst Sir James Grigg was averse to tying down
A.B.C.A. too much in the material it was producing,75 he
was compelled to take some action over one issue of
Current Affairs at the end of 1942. During the course of
that year Sir William Beveridge had been preparing his
report for the government on the social services, and
when it was published on 4 December it was hailed as the
blueprint for the building of the post-war welfare state
and assumed to indicate the future trend of government
social policy. Williams was anxious that the troops
should have an opportunity to discuss the report and
Beveridge agreed to write a summary for Current Affairs,
which was issued on 19 December.76 Before he set off on
an overseas tour at the end of the year, General Adam had
looked over the draft, which he considered unexceptional,
but had suggested that Williams show it to Grigg before
it was issued in case of political difficulties.77
Yet for some reason this was not done and when Grigg saw
a copy he was alarmed since the recommendations of the
Beveridge Report had met with the disapproval of a number
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official sanction. In these circumstances, and in order
to avoid A.B.C.A. becoming embroiled in political
controversy, on 21 December he ordered the immediate
withdrawal of the issue from circulation; a decision that
created a storm of protest in the press and parliament
over the War Office's suppression of discussion on an
issue of great topicality and importance to the troops.78
Grigg was forced to take some further action in relation
to A.B.C.A. in the Spring of 1943. During the previous
Autumn, Williams had launched an A.B.C.A. poster campaign
under the title of "Your Britain - Fight For It Now." The
posters, which were the work of Captain Abram Games, an
award-winning designer who had worked for the London
County Council before the war, and Frank Newbould, a
designer for the G.P.O. and the Great Western Railway,
included portrayals of romantic landscapes and village
scenes, but a number were intended to reinforce the
reconstructionist themes increasingly being discussed in
Current Affairs.79 One such poster by Games depicted a
pre-war boy with rickets standing amid scenes of poverty
78Mackenzie, p. 134; Henry Page Croft, My Life of Strife (London:
Hutchinson & Co., 1948), pp. 324-325; Parliamentary Debates
(Commons), 5th series, vol. 386 (1942-43), cols. 10-14; "Notes
of the Week," The Economist 143 (January 1943), p. 797; J.
Mackay-Mure, "The Soldier as Citizen," The Spectator 170
(January 1943), p. 27; J. L. Stocks, "Notes and Comments," The
Highuay 35 (February 1943), p. 64.
79Mackenzie, p. 140; Joseph Darraoott and Belinda Loftus, Second
World War Posters (London: Imperial War Museum, 1972), pp. 30-
31, 46.
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and neglect, and superimposed on this was a modern new
health centre symbolising the importance of preventative
health care in post-war Britain.80 This poster was
brought to the attention of the Prime Minister by the
Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, who thought it would
8 1
serve to reduce morale rather than improve it.
Churchill, who had been hostile to A. B.C. A. from the
outset, agreed and wrote to Grigg on the matter on 17
April:
The poster is a disgraceful libel on the
conditions prevailing in Great Britain before the
war. With all our shortcomings, conditions in
this country were a model to Europe and to many
parts of the United States. It is a very wrong
thing that the War Office should be responsible
for such exaggerated and distorted propaganda.
The soldiers know their homes are not like
...82
that.
In his reply, Grigg noted that although the picture of
disease was not intended to represent the soldier's home,
and the health centre with which it was contrasted did
actually exist, the poster would, nevertheless, not be
issued.83 This, though, failed to satisfy Churchill and
in June he instructed the Lord President of the Council,
Sir John Anderson, to investigate A.B.C.A.'s
80Darracott and Loftus, pp. 30-31.
81MacKenzie, pp. 140-141.
82
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activities.84 In July Anderson submitted his report but
found little to concern him. Indeed, he recorded:
My general impression of A.B.C.A. is that it has
proved a most successful experiment, that the
Army Council is to be congratulated on having
decided to launch it in spite of the possible
dangers; and that those responsible for this
organization have shown both initiative and
restraint.8 5
In the light of these findings, Churchill took no further
action but wrote to Anderson that every effort had to be
made to ensure that extra time, money and personnel were
8 6
not absorbed into these activities.
However, whilst A.B.C.A. was becoming an increasing
source of controversy, so the B.W.P. booklets also came
to be seen by Lord Croft as embodying the same leftist
tendencies, and by the Summer of 1943 he had become
sufficiently concerned to draw up a detailed memorandum
for Grigg in which he outlined his views:
When we first discussed the promotion of
talks on current affairs our main aim was to
create an interest amongst all serving soldiers
in the course of this war; knowledge of the
Dominions, India and the Colonies and a broad
outline of British citizenship, the constitution
and methods of government and administration.
Since that time discussions on material
provided by A.B.C.A. and to some extent by
84MacKenzie, p. 141.
8 5
Anderson to Churchill, 30 July 1943; quoted in Mackenzie, p.
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86Winston S. Churchill, The Seocrrl World War, vol. 5, Closing the
Ring (London: Cassell, 1952; Harmondsworth: Penguin Bocks,
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British Way and Purpose, on all home affairs have
tended all the time in the following directions:-
a) the promotion of criticism upon financial,
economic and social structure existing in this
country at the outbreak of war.
b) the suggestion that all soldiers should
regard material considerations as they concern
themselves as the most important factor in life.
c) the suggestion that the pre-war way of
life must never be consented to and that
something better is coming.
d) that the old kind of job in which the man
was serving is possibly inadequate and unsuitable
and not one to which he would wish to go back to.
Whereas these efforts to promote critical
discussion upon the Government of Great Britain
can none of them be described as openly vicious,
the cumulative effect must tend towards
revolutionary ideas, and what is equally
undesirable a grave sense of disillusion, heart¬
burning and anger if and when it is found that
the State is not able to implement all the
promised boons that the soldiers are encouraged
to demand as a right.
I cannot think that the stimulation of this
form of criticism is the duty of the War
Office....
Both D.A.E. and D.A.B.C.A. in spite I have no
doubt of their desire to be impartial and carry
out the spirit of their instructions, are both
ardent Left Wingers and give me the impression of
feeling that their task is to make the Army
political minded with very strong leanings
towards State control and complete Beveridgising
the British citizen.
This tendency is aggravated by the fact that
the A.E.C. Corps are not free from similar ideas
and the Council of Adult Education, which
provides the bulk of the civilian lecturers is
also Left Wing in outlook and particularly
International.
All this may no doubt stimulate interest in
soldiers' discussions, but appears to me to be
quite outside, and I should have thought hostile
to Army policy, which I have always felt should
be kept absolutely free from political bias or
political opinion....
I most strongly recommend that someone with
no political prejudice but with a real knowledge
of affairs should be put in charge of both these
Directorates as Director General.
If an educationalist can be discovered who is
not Left Wing it would be desirable, but rather
than risk a continuance of Army education still
being used as a propaganda medium, I think the
Director General should not be chosen from that
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fraternity but should be an outstanding
personality who will insist on training our men
for the battle of life rather than the battle of
politics.
To illustrate his case Croft appended a detailed critique
of a July 1943 edition of Current Affairs, entitled "When
the Lights Go On, " which he regarded as typical of the
trend of educational material being produced. Analysing
it paragraph by paragraph, he argued that its tendency
from start to finish was to imply that British citizens
had been badly treated before the war, and that the
government should assume a greater responsibility for
providing for them during the post-war years. Indeed, he
concluded:
If every officer is teaching his men on these
lines week after week, what may we well ask are
we going to do when the Army through its official
machinery has built up a divine discontent which
no power on earth can appease?
Grigg's natural tendency was to defend Army education
when he could. Yet as his withdrawal of the pamphlet on
the Beveridge Report demonstrated, he was aware of the
need to avoid political bias. It might, therefore, have
been thought that Croft's memorandum would have struck a
chord with him. That it did not was no doubt partly due
to the rather sweeping criticisms and recommendations it
made, but perhaps more importantly to the fact that
87Croft, "A.B.C.A. and Political Reactions."
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Williams had taken the precaution of showing a copy of
"When the Lights Go On" to Grigg before publication, who,
along with two other members of the Cabinet, had given it
his unconditional blessing. Croft's memorandum thus had
no impact on educational policy and he was destined to
remain merely a suspicious observer for the rest of the
8 9
war.
However, whilst A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. came under attack on
political grounds, they also came under fire on financial
ones. By the Summer of 1943 Sir Eric Speed, the Permanent
Under-Secretary (Finance), had become concerned at the
growing costs of education and requested that the
subject be brought to the attention of the E.C.A.C.90 In
discussion of this matter in September, Speed recorded
that the basis of wartime educational policy had been
laid down by the Haining Committee in 1940, which had
envisaged a voluntary scheme with the intention of
improving the soldiers' morale and military efficiency.
Since that time, he argued, Army education had vastly
exceeded its remit and through A.B.C.A. discussions and
the B.W.P. hour had moved to a largely compulsory
phenomenon whose purpose was no longer concerned with
wartime requirements, but with the wider needs of the
89MacKenzie, p. 161.
90WO 32/10462, P.U.S.(F) to A.G., 12 August 1943.
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post-war world.91 This he considered both unnecessary and
costly and put forward the view that it was "not a proper
charge upon the Army Votes to educate the Army beyond the
standard requisite for its success as a military
machine. "9 2
General Adam, who had taken over day-to-day
responsibility for educational affairs on the death of
General Willans earlier in the year,93 mounted a vigorous
defence of Army education. Primarily, he argued, the
Army Council had, by its very acceptance of A.B.C.A. and
the B.W.P. hour, fully endorsed the educational
developments that had taken place, and all the evidence
he had indicated that these schemes were popular in the
Army and had done much to sustain and improve the morale
of the troops. Furthermore, he noted, the Army needed to
look ahead to the demobilization period and build on the
existing educational activities, and it was imperative
that adequate foundations were laid before that time. The
costs of Army education, he continued, could hardly be
said to be extravagant, amounting as they did annually to
no more than the equivalent of thirty-five tanks or
twenty bombers which could be lost in a single night, and
91
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he called upon the E.C.A.C. to confirm that the policies
adopted would continue to be the right ones.94 Indeed, he
added his own personal commitment to the cause of Army
education, recording: "I most strongly deprecate any
reduction in the increasing volume of its activities or
any attempt to narrow its scope."95
In consideration of these arguments, Sir Frederick
Bovenschen, the Permanent Under-Secretary, voiced his
concern that some of the older soldiers might come to
resent too much compulsory education. However, with the
backing of the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye, who considered that
since the Army had taken many millions of men away from
their civilian studies so it had an obligation to educate
them for their subsequent return to civil life, Adam's
views prevailed and the E.C.A.C. agreed that no
impediment should be put in the way of the continuation
of Army education along the current lines.95
Having survived these challenges, Army education
continued to build on its achievements as the war went
on. Whilst the Haining Scheme was set to continue and
expand its activities, with some 100,000 lectures, short
courses and classes being arranged for the troops by




C.A.C.'s Regional Committees over the six months ending
March 1944,9 7 the decision was taken to repeat the
complete Winter Scheme of Education over the Winter of
1943-44, and to carry on the B.W.P. hour without limit.98
Although the accompanying booklets eventually came to an
end in May 1944, when the eighteen monthly issues that
had been produced were consolidated into a single
volume,99 the B.W.P. hour was destined to remain a part
of the training programme at home for the rest of the war
and be adopted in a modified form in overseas
. 10 0
commands.
The A.B.C.A. hour also continued to seek to consolidate
its place in Army life, and A.B.C.A. added a further
innovative dimension to its range of teaching aids with
the dramatization of current affairs. Early in 1943
Williams was visiting an A.B.C.A. training course
organized by Michael MacOwan, an Education Officer with
London District Anti-Aircraft, who had run the
Westminster Theatre before the war. Williams, who had
patronized the theatre, approached MacOwan with the idea
of producing A.B.C.A. plays and he agreed to cooperate.
MacOwan had in mind the creation of something along the
97Wilson, p. 173.
9 8WO 163/92, "Education in the Army during the Winter 1943/44,"
Memorandum by A.G., E.C.A.C./P(43)99., 6 September 1943; WO
163/92, E.C.A.C./M(43)37.
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lines of the American Federal Theatre's experimental
Living Newspapers productions of the 1930s, which
utilized a range of theatrical techniques to explore
topical issues of the day, and he recruited Stephen
Murray of the London District Theatre Unit to assist
him.101 Murray produced a short piece in this style on
the League of Nations, entitled United We Stand, and
performed it during the weekly A.B.C.A. hour at several
gun sites. General Adam was invited to attend one of the
performances and was so impressed that at the end of 1943
an A.B.C.A. Play Unit was set up under MacOwan to tour
productions around the troops, and the bulk of Murray's
London District Theatre Unit was eventually absorbed into
. . X 0 2
It .
The first play performed by this new department was J. B.
Priestley's Desert Highway, a study of anti-semitism
written especially for the Army. The rest of the
productions, though, were written by the Unit itself. The
writing was done on a committee basis by MacOwan together
with Bridget Boland, a film writer serving in the A.T.S.,
Ted Willis, a civilian who had written plays for the
amateur Unity Theatre before the war, and Jack Lindsay,
an Australian author and poet in the Royal Signals. At
101
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script meetings all four would act out allotted political
roles, MacOwan the Liberal, Boland the Conservative,
Willis the Socialist and Lindsay the Communist, with the
intention of developing thought-provoking material.103 As
Boland records:
We could have handled the material very
carefully, not offending anyone, but we thought
that would be a bore. The whole point of A.B.C.A.
was to start discussions, to start the soldier
thinking for himself. After the play we wanted
them to go away and talk - and if we didn't start
an argument they weren't going to. We worked on
the principle that if it doesn't annoy somebody,
it's a bore, cut it out. Find something that is
going to annoy somebod^^ the object being to
annoy everybody equally.
The first of the Unit's plays, which came to encompass a
range of dramatic techniques that included factual
episodes, fantasy, poetry, cross-cutting between time and
place, sound and lighting effects and audience
participation, was performed in the Summer of 1944 and
entitled Whats Wrong With The Germans?, a portrait of
life under a Nazi police state. This was followed by The
Great Swop, a discussion of the principles and workings
of Lend-Lease, and The Japanese Way, a study of the
indoctrination of a Japanese soldier. The final wartime
production was performed in the Spring of 1945 and
entitled Where Bo We Go From Here? It told the
controversial story of a Tyneside family between the wars
103
Ibid. , p. 106.
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and dealt with the issues of welfare provision and post¬
war planning.105 Adam was a little nervous of the
political reactions to this play, but Lady Grigg came to
the dress rehearsal on her husband's behalf, gave it her
consent, and the press notices were entirely
favourable.10 6
Whilst the Haining Scheme and the A.B.C.A. and B.W.P.
hours were the major educational initiatives of the war,
in that they were expected to be applied to troops across
the country, it was notable that the military authorities
did not ignore the special educational needs of
particular categories of soldiers. One such category were
those in military hospitals or convalescent depots whose
mental and physical recovery it was thought would be
greatly assisted by the provision of educational
facilities. To this end, an A.E.C. instructor was
appointed to every medical establishment of over 300 beds
and, in association with Army psychiatrists, developed a
range of educational activities for the patients. These
included the pursuit of hobby interests, more formal
academic lectures and classes, and A.B.C.A. and B.W.P.
type discussions which were considered to be particularly
useful as a remedial aid to neurosis cases.107
105
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Another such category were soldiers in military prisons
or detention barracks whom it was felt might benefit from
educational provision as a means of reforming their
characters. An A.E.C. instructor was thus appointed to
every 200 prisoners in these corrective establishments
and, together with Army psychiatrists, set to organizing
a range of educational activities for the prisoners. In
1943 an official syllabus was issued for these
institutions which laid down at least three periods a
week of education, of which one was to be devoted to
individual interests such as music, art and drama, and
the others to A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. discussions which were
considered to be particularly beneficial in enabling
soldiers to shed the anti-social attitudes many of them
, . , ,10 8
displayed.
A further category that received particular attention
were illiterates, who by the very nature of their
disadvantage were unlikely ever to become fully
militarily efficient because they were unable to read
orders or instructions, and whose morale was perpetually
low through the sense of shame and inferiority many of
them carried. From 1940 some efforts were made by
individual commands to provide educational facilities for
the 1% of recruits that were regarded as illiterate. In
1943, though, a special drive was launched to eradicate
108Williams (1), pp. 83-85; Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 407-408;
White, pp. 116-118.
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"the problem and a network of Basic Education Centres
(B.E.C.s) was set up around the country, in the
interests, it was recorded, "both of the Army and of the
Nation." The B.E.C.s, which were staffed by A.E.C.
personnel and run in cooperation with Army psychiatrists
and Personnel Selection Officers at the Primary Training
Centres, provided an intensive six to eight-week course
of reading and writing on the basis of a special booklet,
drawn up in consultation with civilian experts, entitled
English Parade. However, they also included a range of
other activities, such as physical training, handicrafts,
nature study and A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. discussions, which
it was considered added variety to the course and
contributed to the illiterate's sense of confidence and
achievement, so aiding his study of the written word. By
the Spring of 1945 eleven B.E.C.s were in operation,
which between them had provided for some 7,000 soldiers,
and the results revealed that the reading and spelling
ages of the soldiers involved improved on average by
approximately two years over the course.109
During the course of the war, then, the military
authorities instituted a formidable array of educational
provision for the troops, and there has been much debate
on its impact. Certainly, whilst the voluntary Haining
109Williams (1), pp. 76-80; Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 227-230;
White, pp. 112-114; R. C. Shawyer, "The Army Fights Illiteracy,"
Adu/L Education 17 (December 1944), pp. 76-82.
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Scheme was to remain largely marginal to the life of the
average soldier,110 there was a good deal of evidence to
suggest that the compulsory A.B.C.A and B.W.P. hours made
an important contribution towards sustaining and
improving the morale of the troops. Army morale reports
consistently referred to the good effect these
discussions were having in counteracting soldiers'
ignorance and restoring their faith in the war effort.111
In fact, one such report noted in 1943:
Commanders are generally agreed that interest in
them is increasing, that they are appreciated by
the troops and that they are (in the words of an
Army Commander) 'a necessary part, in the
broadest sense, of the armoury of the efficient
soldier.'112
Moreover, in a wider context, it has been argued that
these discussions did much to create a keener sense of
citizenship amongst the troops by not only instilling in
them the values of rational argument and critical
judgement, but by providing them with a heightened socio¬
political awareness. As Basil Yeaxlee, Secretary of
C.A.C., observed in 1944:
110Mackenzie, p. 178.
111
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There is a new political consciousness,
quickened by knowledge, so greatly lacking
before, of how our local and national government
works, of our Commonwealth relationships and
international problems. This induces a greater
sense of personal responsibility. Scores of
thousands of young adults who have never cast a
vote or participated in an election have now
begun to realise that if the mass of the people
take no interest and no action the^^in effect,
consent to the rule of the minority.
Indeed, in Croftian fashion, these discussions, and the
material on which they were based, were accused by some
elements in the Conservative Party of turning soldiers
politically leftwards and being in some way responsible
for the loss of the 1945 General Election. "The Forces
vote in particular, " contended R. A. Butler, "had been
virtually won over by the left-wing influence of the Army
Bureau of Current Affairs."114
In any assessment of these arguments, it is first
necessary to establish whether these discussions ever
actually took place on any effective scale in the Army.
Although official estimates suggested that by 1943
A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. discussions were being carried out
successfully in some 60% of units at home,115 it was
clear that in a good many units they never got off the
ground. In the case of A.B.C.A., not only was it evident
113Basil Yeaxlee, "Army Education," Journal of the Royal Society of
Arts 92 (June 1944), p. 365.
114R. A. Butler, The Art of the Possible (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1971), p. 129.
115W0 163/53, Appendix "B" to A.C./G(44)4; Williams (1), p. 18.
277
that a number of junior officers either regarded the
scheme as a further unwelcome chore, or were afraid that
their ignorance might be shown up in discussions with
their men,116 but a good many commanding officers, upon
whom the success of the scheme ultimately depended,
either saw it as having little relevance to military
training or as positively seditious, and failed to ensure
that it was properly carried out.117 As one Army lecturer
observed in 1943:
The Army Bureau of Current Affairs (A.B.C.A.)
provides a sufficient proof that commanding
officers can, and in some cases do, disregard
instructions, at least where education is
concerned. When the Bureau was established, over
twelve months ago, an Army Council Instruction
was issued that henceforward in all units regular
weekly talks on current affairs, based on
pamphlets issued by the Bureau, were to be given
by regimental officers; but even at this date no
one knowing the facts pretends that the
Instruction is everywhere being faithfully
observed, or denies that in a considerable number
of units no attempt whatever is made to implement
116Michael Joseph, The Suurxi in the Scabbard (London: Michael
Joseph, 1942), p. 223; M.O.-A., FR 948, 3 November 1941; White,
p. 100; Rev. D. D. Caldwell, letter to the author, November
1988; Maj. F. C. McMahcn (retd), letter to the author, October
1988; Lt.-Col. W. R. H. Charley (retd), letter to the author,
January 1989.
117White, pp. 99-100; Llcyd, p. 19; Hawkins and Brimble, pp. 297-
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Bcnamy Dobree, "A.B.C.A. Gets Going," Hie Spectator 168 (January
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This was a view confirmed by many serving in the Army.
One soldier noted in the Spring of 1942:
The A.B.C.A. scheme remains a dead letter, more
often than not, not because it would be
impossible to spare one period a week, but
because these talks just don't fit into the
general scheme of things.119
Another reported at the end of 1942:
If any time has to be cut from the programme one
of the first casualties is the talk on 'Current
Affairs.' In fact, there have been scarcely
veiled indications from junior officers that
'Current Affairs' and all talks on similar
subjects are to be avoided whenever possible.
Time that might otherwise have been devoted to
the subject is frequently occupied by extending a
routine parade with little or no training
value.1
William Shebbeare concluded in 1944:
... most units do not take it very seriously. If
the programme gets very full - as it almost
always does - then the first thing to get left
out is A.B.C.A. A period of A.B.C.A. may appear
in the training programme week after week and yet
never take place at all. It is always being
cancelled at the last minute.
118
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Indeed, if one applies this picture of indifference on
the part of commanding officers to B.W.P. discussions as
well, and given the fact that since there was always a
shortage of competent unit instructors to conduct these
classes, and the manpower resources of C.A.C. and the
A.E.C., which only came to number some 2,000 serving
personnel across the entire Army, were strictly limited,
so they were by their very nature more difficult to
implement, then it does seem that the situation was at
best patchy. One unofficial estimate in 1943 put the
number of units that were successfully carrying out
A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. discussions as low as 10%.122
However, even if these discussions were implemented with
full effect across most units, questions have to be
raised about whether they had quite the impact on the
troops that was claimed for them. Primarily, whilst a
number of soldiers may have benefitted from the
discussion periods and been given new insights into the
world around them, it seems doubtful that they created in
the mass of the troops some burning new sense of
citizenship or political consciousness. Not only was it
evident that many men regarded them with a good deal of
12 2
A Correspondent, "Army Education," The Journal of Education 75
(December 1943), p. 549; Williams (1), p. 197; Ross, pp. 24-25.
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apathy or cynicism,123 but censors' reports of soldiers'
letters in the latter years of the war indicated that
they played no great part in their daily thoughts or
lives.124 In fact, The Economist went as far as to
conclude in 1943 that:
The temptation to see army education through
somewhat romantic glasses is too seldom resisted.
The picture of a great civilian army pulsing with
interest and information on world affairs and
civic problems is almost entirely a well-meaning
myth. The mass of soldiers, like the mass of
civilians, is mostly unmoved and unaffected by
matters outside daily work.
Similarly, even if a number of soldiers were influenced
by these discussions, it is difficult to see them as
being directly responsible for the troops voting Labour
or for the outcome of the general election. In the first
instance, whilst the majority of soldiers undoubtedly
supported Labour, only a minority actually voted and
research has shown that their votes did not have a
12 3
M. 0. -A. , FR 948; Infantry Subaltern, Heme Forces, letter to the
Editor, The New Statesman and Nation 25 (April 1943), pp. 256-
257; Cadet, letter to the Editor, The New Statesman and Nation
26 (July 1943), p. 72; Lt.-Col. R.A.O.C., letter to the Editor,
The New Statesman and Nation 29 (February 1945), p. 108; William
P. Wylie, letter to the Editor, The Spectator 173 (December
1944), p. 599; Another Captain, letter to the Editor, The
Spectator 174 (January 1945), p. 12; Gary Allighan, "Who
Obstructs the Soldiers' Vote?," The Trilxne, no. 392 (1944), pp.
11-12; Signalman Smith, letter to the Editor, The Tribune, no.
399 (1944), p. 13; L.-Cpl. F. G. G. Hunt, "A.B.C.A. Alone Won't
Do," The Tribme, no. 420 (1945), p. 10.
WO 163/53, A.C./G(44)4; WO 163/53, Morale Report, November 1943-
January 1944, A.C./G(44)22., 23 May 1944; WO 163/54, Morale
Report, November 1944-January 1945, A.C./G(45)l2., 4 July 1945.
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significant impact on the overall result.126 Furthermore,
although some of the educational material was mildly
reformist at times, it was heavily edited in the War
Office and often by relevant government ministries, and
most observers agree that it was largely uncontroversial
in nature.127 Moreover, even if the course of these
discussions drifted to the Left, they generally took
place against certain inbuilt constraints. As one soldier
observed in 1945:
all Army education is based on the notion
that the Army has to remain a politically neutral
body. This so-called political neutrality is the
real stumbling block which makes the development
of the Army as a progressive and clear-thinking
political force so immensely difficult. All
Army education, lectures and discussions are
based on the alleged eternity and sacredness of
our present social system.
Indeed, the very fact that the bulk of the civilian
population voted Labour without having had the benefit of
these discussions suggests that the critics of Army
education, along with those of Army newspapers and
libraries, should have looked more to the spirit of the
age and the circumstances of Army life to explain why
"z6Summerfield, p. 133.
12 7
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soldiers voted the way they did.129 Certainly, General
Adam regarded the accusations of political bias as
"absurd",130 and Williams himself consistently denied
them. Responding to the charge, some twenty-five years
after the event, that he had helped deliver votes to the
Labour Party, he noted:
If it were true, Attlee's government proved very
ungrateful, for one of its immediate economies
was to dismantle the Army Bureau of Current
Affairs. I suppose I was lucky to escape the
tower.1
What the true impact these discussions had on the troops
it is perhaps almost impossible to assess. Where their
value possibly lay in military terms, though, was in the
change in routine they afforded to the soldiers, the
chance of a quiet cigarette, and as a safety-valve for
their frustrations. As one former soldier recalls:
A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. were a break in the training
routine where soldiers could smoke and dream
whilst somebody else stood up and aired extremist
political views. If these appeared to embarrass
the officer then everybody agreed with them for
the hell of it.132
From as early as 1942 the military authorities began to
plan educational provision for the demobilization period,
129MacKenzie, p. 186.
130AdamVIII, chap. 8, p. 5.
13 3W. E. Williams, letter to the Editor, The Sunday Telegraph, 11
October 1970, p. 12.
132Peter Harris, letter to the author, January 1988.
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and in July 1945 introduced an Army Education (Release
Period) Scheme under the direction of Philip Morris, the
Director for Education in Kent. Building on wartime
educational developments and designed to assist soldiers
in their return to civil life, this was to include six
hours of compulsory education a week on a range of non-
military subjects, of which two were to be devoted to
A.B.C.A. and B.W.P. Classes were to be conducted by unit
personnel, with additional assistance from C.A.C.'s
Regional Committees where required, and the A.E.C. was to
coordinate the effort.133 Of note also was the influence
exerted on the BBC by Morris and General Adam to provide
a series of Forces educational broadcasts for the troops.
These, it was contended, would not only assist the scheme
but would allow the BBC to experiment in the use of
educational broadcasting techniques for post-war
... 134
civilians.
The Release Scheme was to prove less successful than was
hoped. Not only did the sudden end of the Japanese War
throw the plan out of step, since it was envisaged that a
period of a year would elapse between V.E. and V.J. Days
during which time it would have had a chance to build up
steadily and progressively, but it suffered from
shortages of educational materials and instructors, and
iJJWilliams (1), pp. 18-26.
134
Adam VIII, chap. 8, p. 12.
284
lack of cooperation on the part of some commanding
officers.135 By early 1946 it was admitted that "in some
commands, the implementation of the scheme has fallen far
short of what had been hoped."136
Whilst the Release Scheme was underway, however, the
planning of educational provision for the post-war Army
proceeded and, conscious of the need to make adequate
arrangements for the new generation of national
servicemen, a new peacetime Scheme of Education was
announced in 1947. Drawing on wartime experience, it
included three hours a week of compulsory education in
non-military subjects, of which one hour was to be
devoted to citizenship on the basis of the B.W.P.
consolidated volume, and one to current affairs
discussions using material provided by the new civilian
Bureau of Current Affairs, which had been founded by W.
E. Williams when he left the War Office in 1945. The bulk
of the teaching was to be done by the R.A.E.C.,137 but
the current affairs discussions were to be conducted as
before by regimental officers, and links were to be
135Williams (1), pp. 111-123; Signalman, letter to the Editor, The
New Statesman and Nation 30 (October 1945), p. 230; Peter Rees,
Home Ooming Heroes. An Account of the Re-Assimilation of British
Military Personnel into Civilian Life (London: Leo Cooper,
1992), p. 195.
136WO 32/15572, Morale Reports, Army at Home, November 1945-January
1946, Army Overseas, December 1945-February 1946; quoted in R.
Pope, "The Planning and Implementation of British Demobilisation
1941-6," (Ph.D. thesis, Open University, 1985), p. 291.
137rechristened the Poyal Army Educational Corps in 1946.
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maintained with the civilian educational organizations
13 8
through a new Army Education Advisory Board.
It was, though, perhaps indicative of the antipathy
towards education that continued to be held in some
quarters in the Army that the peacetime scheme as it
stood did not last long into the post-war era. Faced with
a lack of cooperation from commanding officers, who
complained that it had little intrinsic value to the
soldier and that it merely served to interfere with their
more important tasks,139 not only was the decision taken
in the late 1940s to abolish set weekly hours for
education and reintroduce the old examination system for
Army Certificates of Education, but also to tailor the
syllabus more to the needs of military training and phase
out discussion of domestic political issues in
citizenship and current affairs periods, devoting them
instead to Army related subjects.140 In many ways the
wartime experiment had come to an end.
During the course of the war the military authorities
made significant changes both in terms of the scale and
content of educational provision for the Army. Whilst
education in the pre-war Regular Army had been largely
138MacKenzie, pp. 192-3, 213-217; White, pp. 180-181.
139WO 163/497, First Report. Army Working Day Investigating Team,
22 July 1948; WO 163/497, Second Report. Army Working Day
Investigating Team, 17 October 1948; WO 163/317, Army Manpower
Committee. Final Report (First Draft), 10 November 1948.
14°White, pp. 184-185; Mackenzie, pp. 219-220.
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reduced to elementary instruction in military related
subjects, to which a soldier's chances of earning a
little extra pay were attached, the War Office instituted
a vast adult education programme for the wartime Army,
operating on a scale probably unprecedented in British
history, and training a generation of servicemen in the
values of responsible citizenship. It was, in the words
of General Adam, "a great manifestation of democratic
faith."141 Indeed, what the experience of war seemed to
illustrate was that the modern soldier would no longer be
motivated into effective military performance purely by
appeals to duty or the stirring up of patriotism or
revenge, but as an intelligent being he needed to be
persuaded of the positive objectives for which he was
fighting. As Brigadier E. H. A. J. O'Donneli, Deputy
Adjutant-General in the War Office, recorded towards the
end of the war:
The democratic citizen of 1944 is generally an
intelligent and reasonably well educated man who
wants to know something about the rights and
wrongs of the dispute to which he is asked to
devote perhaps his life, and certainly years of
discomfort and dislocation. He is no longer
content to be actuated by slogans - he requires a
sense of purpose.
However, not only was it possible for one soldier to
141Gen. Sir Ronald F. Adam, "Adult Education in the Forces," Adult
Education 18 (December 1945), p. 55.
142Brig. E. H. A. J. O'Donnell, "Morale," The Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution 90 (February 1945), p. 2.
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recall that having served in Britain throughout the war
he never even heard of A.B.C.A. or B.W.P.,143 but it was
perhaps a reflection of the Army's determination to
return to more traditional forms of education in the
post-war years that Trevor Royle cites the experience of
one group of young national servicemen who, on beginning
their training at the R.A.E.C. School, were curtly
informed by the Commandant that they didn't want any
"dirty-pink L.S.E types" in the Corps.144 The days of
responsible citizenship were clearly over.
143Thomas Whilde, letter to the author, October 1988.
14 4
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Having examined some of the major areas of Army life, it
seems apparent that the military authorities were
compelled to effect a good deal of social change in the
Army during the Second World War. It became an
institution seemingly more careful of human values, more
responsive to the needs and aspirations of the ordinary
soldier, and more democratic in spirit. Looking back from
1944, William Shebbeare observed: "The changes that have
been made in the British Army in the past four years have
been very great. It is difficult now to remember how
backward our army was in 1939. 1,1
The most important reason for this change was the
absorption of large numbers of civilians into the Army,
and the need to create from them a fighting force of high
morale and efficiency capable of taking on the Axis
powers. It was no coincidence that the bulk of the
reforms took place during 1940-42 when military prospects
looked bleakest. The fact that the Army began the war
with a series of defeats rather than victories meant that
much of the complacency about previous methods was
challenged and new techniques more readily employed.2
Public and political pressures also seem to have played
1
Captain X [William G. C. Shebbeare], A Soldier Locks Ahead
(London: George Routledge & Sens, 1944), p. 7.
2
Jack Davies, letters to the author, August 1989, July 1990.
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their part. Because so many families became intimately
associated with the Army during the war so it came under
the civilian microscope, perhaps as never before. In this
sense the press, and in particular newspapers such as the
Daily Mirror which acted as the self-appointed champion
of citizens in uniform, was an important background
influence. Likewise, every aspect of the Army came under
intense parliamentary scrutiny and a vocal lobby group of
M.P.s constantly harried the War Office over reform.
The role of personalities was also important and none
more so than the Adjutant-General, General Adam, under
whom much of the change took place. Although apparently
no different in social outlook from any of his military
contemporaries, he emerges as a man with a deep
understanding of the new citizen Army and as a reformer
to rival any that the Service may previously have had.
Regarded with deep suspicion by Churchill,3 and not with
a little distrust by some of his fellow senior officers,4
he was lauded by the outside experts he sponsored in the
Army and characterized by one columnist as the Army's
"number one democrat."5 Another commentator. Brigadier
3
Public Record Office, War Office Papers [hereafter WO], WO
259/77, Prime Minister's Personal Minute, Serial No. M.159/3.,
13 March 1943.
4S. P. Mackenzie, Politics and Military Morale. Current Affairs
and Citizenship Training in the British Armj 1914-1950 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 120.
5Vincent Sullivan, "Army's No 1 Democrat," Leicester l&ening
Mail, 27 April 1946, p. 3.
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Shelford Bidwell, has described Adam as one of the most
enlightened men ever to have held the post of Adjutant-
General .5
Furthermore, there does seem to have been a "New
Jerusalem" element in some aspects of military thinking,
characterized by the notion that the Army had a role to
play in helping to shape post-war society and that it
could send its wartime recruits back into civilian life
as more enlightened citizens than before. It was a new
concept of the Army as a positive social force rather
than as a retrogressive element in society.
Indeed, it has to be recognized that much of the change
that took place within the Army did not occur within a
vacuum, but alongside similar changes that were taking
place in civilian society: the rise of new management
techniques, the introduction of joint production
committees, the breaking down of class barriers, the
extension of welfare provision and advances in
educational thinking. In some senses, then, the
experience of the Army seems to bear out the views of
Arthur Marwick and others over the radicalizing effects
7
of the war on society.
6
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What was apparent within this process of social change,
in terms of the relationship between the Army and
society, was that in both method and composition the Army
perhaps became more a part of the nation than ever
before. In seeking to shape the wartime citizen Army into
an effective fighting force, the military authorities
were compelled to import many of the values of the
civilian society from which its members were drawn, and
utilize the civilian expertise it incorporated to its own
ends. An impressive array of psychologists,
psychiatrists, journalists, lawyers, broadcasters,
educationalists, cinematographers, professional
entertainers and other specialists were employed in their
civilian capacity on military related tasks, and these
brought with them new techniques and approaches to these
problems.
Moreover, whilst the Army took from civilian society, it
also gave back, and through new initiatives such as the
War Office Selection Boards, which were widely emulated
by civilian organizations after the war in the selection
of high grade personnel,8 and the Army Legal Aid Scheme,
which provided the model for the post-war reform of the
8
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292
civil legal system,9 we see the development of a closer
and more mutually beneficial relationship between the
Army and society. This was a relationship in which the
Army utilized the civilian expertise which it had
absorbed, and harnessed it to solving military problems,
and in turn civilian society learned from the Army and
adapted and applied military solutions to some of its own
problems.
Although social change undoubtedly took place in the Army
during the Second World War, questions have to be raised
about just how profound this change actually was. Whilst
there were certainly traditionalist elements in the
highest ranks of the Army and the military establishment
who hindered progress, the biggest problems in this
respect seem to have been the middle ranking officers who
controlled the Army on a day-to-day basis, the majority
of whom were regulars. Well schooled in the values of the
pre-war Army, it was clear that a good many had little
time for the new reforms and either partially
implemented them or simply ignored them; a problem
compounded by the fact that the War Office had no
satisfactory means of ensuring that they were carried
out. One soldier summed up the dilemma:
9
WO 32/14569, Standing Committee on Army Post-War Problems.
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(P.P., Bills: Public, vol. 3, 1948-49).
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All the schemes of the Higher Command depend on
co-operation from C.O.s. To give that co¬
operation they must understand the spirit which
motivates these schemes and they must be willing
to foster that spirit. But it is only very rarely
there seems to be any C.O. sufficiently
enlightened in mind to be capable of doing
either.... The stumbling block is that there is
no way of getting past the C.O. The situation is
that of a well-meaning Army Council distributing
sensible plans which are never sufficiently well
disseminated to become operative; and of their
having no means whatever, beyond the words of the
C.O. passed up through the usual channels, of
finding out whether or not their schemes are
being put into operation.
Indeed, in the light of a good deal of non-cooperation on
the part of commanding officers, and the fact that in a
number of respects the Army seemed to put back the clock
after the war, it is perhaps fair to conclude that what
changes took place were not as deep-seated nor as deep-
rooted as some might have wished. In this sense, the
experience of the Army seems to bear out the views of
Angus Calder and others, namely that the war might not
have had quite the radicalizing effect on society that
has been attributed to it.11
By 1945 the British Army was, in many ways, a more
progressive and enlightened social institution than that
of 1939, and in the context of its social history it had
taken a significant step forward. Yet as William
Shebbeare himself was compelled to admit, shortly before
10
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11
Angus Calder, The People's War. Britain 1939-45 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1969), pp. 17-18.
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his death in the fighting in Normandy: "... there is
plenty of room for still further advance."12
12
Captain X, p. 77. Maj. William Godolphin Conway Shebbeare, 23rd
Hussars, was killed on 18 July 1944, aged twenty-eight. He has
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